1 ZANDANSHATAR GOMBOJAV APPOINTED AS PRIME MINISTER OF MONGOLIA WWW.MONTSAME.MN PUBLISHED:2025/06/13      2 WHAT MONGOLIA’S NEW PRIME MINISTER MEANS FOR ITS DEMOCRACY WWW.TIME.COM PUBLISHED:2025/06/13      3 ULAANBAATAR DIALOGUE SHOWS MONGOLIA’S FOREIGN POLICY CONTINUITY AMID POLITICAL UNREST WWW.THEDIPLOMAT.COM PUBLISHED:2025/06/13      4 THE UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND (UNICEF) IN MONGOLIA, THE NATIONAL FOUNDATION FOR SUPPORTING THE BILLION TREES MOVEMENT, AND CREDITECH STM NBFI LLC HAVE JOINTLY LAUNCHED THE “ONE CHILD – ONE TREE” INITIATIVE WWW.BILLIONTREE.MN PUBLISHED:2025/06/13      5 NEW MONGOLIAN PM TAKES OFFICE AFTER CORRUPTION PROTESTS WWW.AFP.MN PUBLISHED:2025/06/13      6 GOLD, MINED BY ARTISANAL AND SMALL-SCALE MINERS OF MONGOLIA TO BE SUPPLIED TO INTERNATIONAL JEWELRY COMPANIES WWW.MONTSAME.MN PUBLISHED:2025/06/13      7 AUSTRIA PUBLISHES SYNTHESIZED TEXTS OF TAX TREATIES WITH ICELAND, KAZAKHSTAN AND MONGOLIA AS IMPACTED BY BEPS MLI WWW.ORBITAX.COM  PUBLISHED:2025/06/13      8 THE UNITED STATES AND MONGOLIA OPEN THE CENTER OF EXCELLENCE FOR ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING IN ULAANBAATAR WWW.MN.USEMBASSY.GOV  PUBLISHED:2025/06/12      9 MONGOLIA'S 'DRAGON PRINCE' DINOSAUR WAS FORERUNNER OF T. REX WWW.REUTERS.COM PUBLISHED:2025/06/12      10 MONGOLIA’S PIVOT TO CENTRAL ASIA AND THE CAUCASUS: STRATEGIC REALIGNMENTS AND REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS WWW.CACIANALYST.ORG  PUBLISHED:2025/06/12      МОНГОЛ УЛСЫН 34 ДЭХ ЕРӨНХИЙ САЙДААР Г.ЗАНДАНШАТАРЫГ ТОМИЛЛОО WWW.MONTSAME.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/06/13     SXCOAL: МОНГОЛЫН НҮҮРСНИЙ ЭКСПОРТ ЗАХ ЗЭЭЛИЙН ХҮНДРЭЛИЙН СҮҮДЭРТ ХУМИГДАЖ БАЙНА WWW.ITOIM.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/06/13     МОНГОЛ БАНК: ТЭТГЭВРИЙН ЗЭЭЛД ТАВИХ ӨР ОРЛОГЫН ХАРЬЦААГ 50:50 БОЛГОЛОО WWW.EGUUR.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/06/13     МОНГОЛ ДАХЬ НҮБ-ЫН ХҮҮХДИЙН САН, ТЭРБУМ МОД ҮНДЭСНИЙ ХӨДӨЛГӨӨНИЙГ ДЭМЖИХ САН, КРЕДИТЕХ СТМ ББСБ ХХК “ХҮҮХЭД БҮРД – НЭГ МОД” САНААЧИЛГЫГ ХАМТРАН ХЭРЭГЖҮҮЛНЭ WWW.BILLIONTREE.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/06/13     ЕРӨНХИЙЛӨГЧИЙН ТАМГЫН ГАЗРЫН ДАРГААР А.ҮЙЛСТӨГӨЛДӨР АЖИЛЛАНА WWW.EAGLE.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/06/13     34 ДЭХ ЕРӨНХИЙ САЙД Г.ЗАНДАНШАТАР ХЭРХЭН АЖИЛЛАНА ГЭЖ АМЛАВ? WWW.EGUUR.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/06/13     “АНГЛИ ХЭЛНИЙ МЭРГЭШЛИЙН ТӨВ”-ИЙГ МУИС-Д НЭЭЛЭЭ WWW.MONTSAME.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/06/13     Г.ЗАНДАНШАТАР БАЯЛГИЙН САНГИЙН БОДЛОГЫГ ҮРГЭЛЖЛҮҮЛНЭ ГЭЖ АМЛАЛАА WWW.EGUUR.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/06/12     МОНГОЛООС ОЛДСОН “KHANKHUULUU” НЭРТ ҮЛЭГ ГҮРВЭЛ Т-REX-ИЙН ӨВӨГ БАЙСНЫГ ТОГТООЖЭЭ WWW.ITOIM.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/06/12     ИНФЛЯЦИ ЖОЛООДЛОГОГҮЙ БОЛЖ, ЦААШИД Ч ӨСӨХ ЭРСДЭЛТЭЙ БАЙНА WWW.NEWS.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/06/12    

Events

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MBCC “Doing Business with Mongolia seminar and Christmas Receptiom” Dec 10. 2024 London UK MBCCI London UK Goodman LLC

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Zandanshatar Gombojav Appointed as Prime Minister of Mongolia www.montsame.mn

At its plenary session on June 12, 2025, the State Great Khural (Parliament) of Mongolia discussed and approved the appointment of Zandanshatar Gombojav as the Prime Minister of Mongolia.
As the Mongolian People's Party, which won the majority of seats in the State Great Khural as a result of the 2024 regular parliamentary elections, nominated Zandanshatar Gombojav as the Prime Minister of Mongolia, President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa submitted the proposal to the State Great Khural according to Article 39.2 of the Constitution.
Zandanshatar Gombojav, who has worked in the fields of academic research, economics, and foreign affairs, and at the state legislative and executive levels since 1992, is considered to be capable of ensuring public trust, political leadership, and policy stability.
A total of 68 members of the State Great Khural asked questions from the nominee and received answers and 28 members expressed their positions regarding the appointment. When a vote was held, 108 MPs out of the 117 members present at the plenary session, or 92.3 percent supported the appointment of Zandanshatar Gombojav as the Prime Minister of Mongolia.
Subsequently, the Resolution on the Appointment of the Prime Minister of Mongolia was approved. The 34th newly appointed Prime Minister of Mongolia Zandanshatar Gombojav addressed the State Great Khural.
Noting the urgent need to stabilize the economy, improve the income and livelihood of the people, and address pressing issues such as sudden energy failures, Prime Minister Zandanshatar stated the main goal of the new Government will be to overcome risks and challenges and enhance national resilience at all levels.
The newly appointed Prime Minister of Mongolia stated, “Human development will be the biggest mega project of our government. The new Government will work to be a Government that places the development of Mongolians at the core of its policies and the rights of its citizens at the center of its solutions. The Government will focus on the development of competent, productive, healthy, and globally competitive Mongolians, and will intensify comprehensive reforms in health, education, and social security. It will introduce a performance-based pay policy in every sector. The Government will reform the welfare system and pursue the principle that the best welfare is employment. The Government will intensify pension reform, reduce social insurance fund losses, and transfer the management to a fair, transparent, and professional asset management system."
Zandanshatar Gombojav was born in 1970 in Baatsagaan soum, Bayankhongor aimag, and has a wife and four children. In 1987, he graduated from Secondary School No. 77 in Ulaanbaatar and studied at the Irkutsk Institute of National Economy in the Russian Federation from 1987 to 1992, earning a degree in finance and economics. He has a Master’s degree in Economics. He began his professional career as a lecturer at the University of Commerce and Industry. From 1995 to 1998, he served as an economist, department head, and division director at the Agricultural Bank. Between 1998 and 2000, he worked as the manager of the training center at the Bank of Mongolia and as the bank’s representative at the Agricultural Bank. From 2000 to 2003, he was the Deputy Director at Khan Bank, and worked as Deputy Minister of Food and Agriculture from 2003 to 2004. From 2005 to 2010, he was a member, Vice President, and later President of the Board of the Socialist Democratic Youth Union under the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP). He served as a Member of Parliament from 2004 to 2012, as Minister of Foreign Affairs from 2009 to 2012, and between 2012 and 2013, he was the Secretary General of the MPP. From 2013 to 2015, he conducted research at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law at Stanford University in the United States. He was re-elected to Parliament in 2016 and served until 2024. From 2017 to 2019, he was a Member of the Government and the Chief of Cabinet Secretariat of the Government of Mongolia. From 2019 to 2024, he served as Chairman of the State Great Khural. Since 2024, he has worked as the Chief of Staff of the Office of the President of Mongolia.

 

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What Mongolia’s New Prime Minister Means for Its Democracy www.time.com


It’s either a triumph for people power or a worrying lurch towards authoritarianism, depending on whom you ask, but Mongolia has a new Prime Minister: Zandanshatar Gombojav, a Russian-educated former banker who previously served as Foreign Minister, Chief of the Cabinet Secretariat, and speaker of the State Great Khural parliament.

“I will work forward, not backward,” Zandanshatar told the State Great Khural, whose lawmakers overwhelmingly approved his elevation to the premiership by 108 out of the 117 members present. “By respecting unity, we will overcome this difficult economic situation.”

They’re economic woes that contributed to the downfall of outgoing Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene, who belongs to the same Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) but quit after failing to receive sufficient backing in a June 3 confidence vote he called to quell popular protests demanding his ouster.

For several weeks, thousands of predominantly young demonstrators have thronged central Ulaanbaatar’s Sukhbaatar Square in outrage at the lavish displays of wealth that Oyun-Erdene’s son and fiancée posted on social media, including helicopter rides, an expensive engagement ring, a luxury car, and designer handbags.

The crowds called for Oyun-Erdene to disclose his personal finances, but he declined saying that they had already been provided to the nation’s Anti-Corruption Agency, as required by law. However, public trust in that body and the wider judiciary is scant following a slew of high-profile graft scandals coupled with a conspicuous lack of prosecutions or accountability.

“Oyun-Erdene was the one who was talking about morals, transparency, and corruption,” protest leader Unumunkh Jargalsaikhan, 27, tells TIME. “But Mongolia is actually degrading when it comes to the economy and freedoms. The corruption scandal was just the spark.”

Unumunkh blames rising living costs and torpid wages for driving public anger, especially among young people. Mongolia is facing an economic crunch with government spending rising 20% year-on-year for the first four months of 2025 but goods exports falling by 13% over the same period, owed not least to a 39% decline in coal exports. Still, Oyun-Erdene was dismissive of the protesters and in a statement instead blamed “a web of interests, tangled like a spider’s web” for toppling him.

Oyun-Erdene’s supporters say his ouster had three drivers: Firstly, and with a dash of irony, his relentless pursuit of official graft, including a draft law his cabinet just submitted that would compel all public officials to justify their income.

Secondly, last year’s updated Minerals Law, which puts 34% of the equity of “strategic” mines—defined as producing over 5% of GDP—into a Sovereign Wealth Fund. Today, nine of Mongolia’s 16 strategic deposits are privately owned by influential industrialist families. “Those private companies are very unhappy and completely opposed to 34% belonging to the state,” says Jargalsaikhan Dambadarjaa, a Mongolian broadcaster and political commentator.

The third alleged driver is more contentious: that Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh deviously undermined Oyun-Erdene in order to change the constitution to boost presidential powers and extend term limits from the single, six-year stint currently permitted.

True, incoming Prime Minister Zandanshatar’s most recent posting was as chief-of-staff to Khurelsukh, who chose to give a midnight speech to the State Great Khural on the eve of Oyun-Erdene’s no-confidence vote that urged lawmakers to represent their constituents rather than a single political leader. Despite the MPP having enough lawmakers to reach the 64-vote threshold required to save Oyun-Erdene, his own party deserted him, with the secret ballot totaling just 44 votes for, 38 against.

Oyun-Erdene’s camp paints Khurelsukh as an aspiring autocrat intent on aligning Mongolia with authoritarian neighbors China and Russia, noting how he hosted Vladimir Putin in Ulaanbaatar in September, flouting an International Criminal Court arrest warrant, and also attended Moscow’s Victory Day Parade in May. A doctored photo depicting Khurelsukh as having commissioned a giant golden statue of himself in the manner resembling a Central Asian despot is doing the rounds on social media.

However, this narrative has some problems. Gladhanding Putin is a political necessity for landlocked Mongolia, whose 3.5 million population relies on Moscow for 90% of imported gas and petroleum and is completely beholden to Russia for security. “Turning up in September was Putin showing the rest of the world his middle finger,” says Prof. Julian Dierkes, a Mongolia expert at the University of Mannheim in Germany. “There was no option for Mongolia to say no.”

Moreover, Khurelsukh has proven an internationalist, first addressing the U.N. General Assembly soon after his inauguration in 2021 and returning every year since. (His predecessor, Khaltmaagiin Battulga, rarely showed up.) While not outright condemning Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, Khurelsukh’s latest UNGA address in September did pointedly voice opposition to “using force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state.”

Khurelsukh has also repeatedly gone on record to oppose amending the constitution, which was just updated in 2019 to strengthen the legislative branch. “Honestly, there isn’t a lot of worry about the President trying to stay in power,” says Bolor Lkhaajav, a Mongolian political analyst and commentator. Dierkes agrees: “I call baloney on the ‘evil President thesis.’”

It’s also a thesis that completely ignores the concerns of the Sukhbaatar Square protesters while presuming that things in Mongolia were otherwise rosy and improving under Oyun-Erdene. However, Mongolia’s score on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index had fallen from 35 out of 100 when he came to power in 2021 to just 33 last year. Meanwhile, human-rights groups have condemned the prosecution of peaceful protesters and prominent journalists under his watch. Mongolia’s press freedom ranking dropped to 109 out of 180 countries last year, down from 88 in 2023, according to Reporters Without Borders.

“On corruption, he’s taken rhetorical actions,” Dierkes says of Oyun-Erdene. “And on democracy promotion, he’s taken negative actions. He is no democracy warrior.”

Moreover, while Zandanshatar is clearly close to the President, he is by no means a lacky, being a highly educated career politician—a former visiting scholar at Stanford—with his own power base. Still, what Zandanshatar’s rise to the premiership means for Mongolia going forward is a big question.

A married father-of-four, Zandanshatar, 55, developed a reputation as a thoughtful, steady speaker of parliament. Following his posting at Stanford, he returned enthused about deliberative polling, which was subsequently employed to gauge public opinion prior to the 2019 constitutional amendment. Zandanshatar does, however, have a democratic deficit given he’s one of the few senior MPP figures not to have won a seat in the 2024 election, though he had been elected three times previously. 

Although choosing a non-lawmaker as Prime Minister is not unprecedented, Dierkes fears this may serve as a “legitimacy achilles heel” should the winds turn against him. Jargalsaikhan also notes Zandanshatar was one of the proponents of Mongolia’s 2006 “windfall tax” on copper and gold mining profits. (The 68% levy—the world’s highest—was repealed in 2009 after decimating investor confidence.)

Oyun-Erdene had earmarked 14 new mega projects to boost economic growth, including a major expansion of renewable energy and cross-border railway connections with China, which receives 90% of Mongolian exports. He also promised to diversify the country’s economy, which is heavily dependent on a mining industry that accounts for a quarter of GDP. But policy continuity is key to attracting the foreign investment necessary to realize these goals.

“Until investment laws are consistent here, investors are going to be wary,” says Steve Potter, an honorary member and former chairman of the American Chamber of Commerce in Ulaanbaatar. “Constant changes in rules and regulations have long been a problem. Consequently, foreign investment has been very lackluster.”

Investor uncertainty isn’t the only worry. Having lasted in power four-and-a-half years, Oyun-Erdene was the longest-serving of Mongolia’s 18 Prime Ministers since its 1990 democratic revolution. The revolving door of governments and leaders has augmented the idea that parliamentarian democracy is flawed or inherently unsuited to Mongolian society, while rendering a centralized political system more appealing for some—an idea that is being amplified by shadowy actors on social media and galvanized by Oyun-Erdene’s tone deaf response to protesters’ demands.

“The protests were organic, but instead of showing his financial papers the Prime Minister’s response was so political,” says Bolor. “His reaction showed just how disconnected he was from the people, who only care about how his policies are impacting their daily lives, such as air pollution, unemployment, and corruption.”

So while Oyun-Erdene’s demise was likely rooted in factional bickering rather than a nefarious power grab, the debacle contains a stark warning that Mongolia’s political class needs to start pulling in the same direction for cherished freedoms to be secured. “Democracy itself is very fragile,” says Jargalsaikhan. “But it’s so important and can only be protected by a thriving parliamentarian system. And we must not lose democracy in Mongolia.”

by
Charlie Campbell

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Ulaanbaatar Dialogue Shows Mongolia’s Foreign Policy Continuity Amid Political Unrest www.thediplomat.com

No prime minister, no problem: Mongolia’s 10th International Conference on Northeast Asian Security proceeded as planned.
Mongolia hosted the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue (UBD) on Northeast Asian Security in Ulaanbaatar from June 5-6. This year’s dialogue was surrounded by domestic political turmoil – the ousting of Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai last week and the search for a replacement, with Zandanshatar Gombojav just nominated. Yet despite the circumstances, the UBD demonstrated continuity in Mongolia’s foreign policy and its broader aim to be engaged in matters of global affairs. 
On June 5, Foreign Minister Battsetseg Batmunkh opened the 10th Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, also known as the International Conference on Northeast Asian Security. In her opening remarks, Battsetseg highlighted Mongolia’s presence in regional and global affairs, and said that its peaceful foreign policy and diplomatic approaches aim to establish confidence-building and peacekeeping between conflicting parties. 
Battsetseg expanded on the purpose of the the UBD. As one of Northeast Asia’s important international conferences, she said, scholars, academics, and researchers can openly discuss and engage in fruitful dialogue on challenging topics, while seeking a peaceful resolution to these challenges. 
This year’s UBD gathered over 230 scholars and experts from 40 countries. In comparison to the previous year’s UBD, this year saw participation of some new partners, such as the United Arab Emirates, Oman, the Philippines, and Iceland. 
The Philippines ambassador to China, James FlorCruz, who is also the country’s non-resident ambassador to Mongolia, spoke at the UBD. “We are committed to deepening these bilateral relationships while upholding our core principles of sovereignty, independence, and the peaceful settlement of disputes,” he said. As Mongolia and the Philippines have been strengthening bilateral ties, the participation of FlorCruz in the UBD was a boost to the two countries’ bilateral relations.
FlorCruz highlighted, “For the Philippines, fostering peaceful and stable relations with all nations in Northeast Asia – including China, Japan, Mongolia, and the two Koreas – is a matter of strategic interest.”  
In addition to round table discussions the UBD offers platforms and opportunities for sideline engagements. For instance, the director of Institute of Strategic Studies under the National Security Council of Mongolia, Mendee Jargalsaikhan, signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Uzbekistan-based International Institute for Central Asia, headed by Javlon Vakhabov, to expand their partnership. 
Mongolia’s hosting of the UBD amid political unrest shed light on the importance of the country’s foreign policy – and the need for continuity. Sandwiched between two large powers, Russia and China, Mongolian diplomacy must always be active and engaged with its neighbors, but also beyond. Simply put, Mongolia cannot afford to have its foreign policy derailed by political instability at home.
Since Mongolia’s democratization in 1991, its governments, especially the prime minister’s office, has been extremely unstable, yet Mongolia’s foreign policy direction has not wavered. Other than disruption caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, the UBD has become an annual strategic platform for Ulaanbaatar to gather experts representing multiple and diverse perspectives.  
The 2025 Ulaabaatar Dialogue centered on five main themes: 1) security challenges and opportunities in Northeast Asia, 2) multilateral cooperation in Northeast Asia, 3) climate change and security challenges, 4) regional cooperation between Northeast Asia and Central Asia, and 5) energy challenges and climate change in Northeast Asia.
As Mongolia will be hosting COP17 for the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in 2026, the UBD put a special focus on climate issues. 
Despite the United States withdrawing from many climate agreements and multilateral agreements that would have guaranteed both financial and moral support for Mongolia’s commitment to address climate change, Ulaanbaatar’s other partners – in Asia, Europe, and now the Middle East – remain optimistic about such global outreach and partnerships. 
The UBD serves as a mechanism for Mongolia to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relations. In this year’s context, the dialogue created space for countries to seek cooperation mechanisms to tackle climate change.
Mongolia’s third neighbor partnerships, particularly with South Korea and Japan, can be augmented in the area of climate change. South Korea’s commitment to invest $1.9 billion in green technology aims to support the country’s ambitious goal to become carbon neutral by 2050. South Korea’s commitment to renewable energy and technological advancement is a major incentive for Ulaanbaatar to incorporate those advantages in its own fight against climate change.
Similarly, in Japan, according to the Asia Investor Group on Climate Change, “investors are increasingly committed to setting 2030 or 2035 emissions reduction targets.” China, too, has set a goal to reach carbon neutrality by 2060. Combining Japan, China, and South Korea’s investment potential in climate change and green funds, Mongolia certainly has the opportunity to attract investments from Asian partners even as the U.S. withdraws from this space. 
As Mongolia continues its international commitment to combating climate change, domestically, it is already experiencing the impact. The need to tackle climate change has become a multilevel challenge, which requires policymakers to understand the full complexity of the problem. At a policy level, the legislative branch as well as the executive branch will need to implement policies and allocate financial resources to climate change issues. In these efforts, the UBD serves as a platform to learn from others, and hopefully inspire and attract investment in sectors that are prone to climate change impact.
By
Bolor Lkhaajav is a researcher specializing in Mongolia, China, Russia, Japan, East Asia, and the Americas. She holds an M.A. in Asia-Pacific Studies from the University of San Francisco.

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The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) in Mongolia, the National Foundation for Supporting the Billion Trees Movement, and Creditech STM NBFI LLC have jointly launched the “One Child – One Tree” initiative www.billiontree.mn

The UNICEF Mongolia, the Mongolian Billion Tree Foundation, and Creditech STM NBFI LLC signed a Memorandum of Understanding on June 9, 2025 to jointly collaborate on the “One Child – One Tree” initiative.
The initiative aims to ensure that the rights and wellbeing of children are respected and fulfilled by providing opportunities to learn in a healthy, eco-friendly environment, enhancing their knowledge and awareness of nature and ecology, encouraging them to actively participate in creating green spaces with their own hand and promoting their engagement within the broader community. 
The initiative aims to support the education of children in Mongolia and promotee environmental sustainability through implementing school-based forestry and gardening programs.
1.  The Parties aim to achieve the following results through this cooperation:
• Establish up to 500 school-based tree nurseries and food gardens.
• Enable up to 280,000 students to receive education on forestry and gardening.
• Engage up to 15,000 teachers and students in tree planting and forest conservation activities. 
• Develop and implement at least five innovative mechanisms to sustain tree growth and environmental stewardship.

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New Mongolian PM takes office after corruption protests www.afp.mn

 Mongolian lawmakers on June 13 confirmed former top diplomat Gombojav Zandanshatar as the country’s new prime minister, after his predecessor resigned following weeks of anti-corruption protests.
Thousands of young people have demonstrated in the capital Ulaanbaatar in recent weeks, venting frustration at wealthy elites and what they see as pervasive corruption and injustice.
They called for then Prime Minister Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene to step down and got their wish when the embattled leader announced his resignation last week.
Mr Zandanshatar – also from Mr Oyun-Erdene’s ruling Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) – was elected as his replacement in the early hours of Friday morning, with 108 out of 117 present voting in favour.
In a speech to lawmakers following his election, he stressed “the urgent need to stabilise the economy, improve the income and livelihood of its citizens”, according to a readout from the parliament.
The 52-year-old has been a fixture on Mongolia’s fractious political scene for around two decades and is seen as close to President Ukhnaa Khurelsukh.
He previously served as foreign minister and chief of staff to the president, as well as parliamentary speaker when the fledgling northern Asian democracy passed key constitutional reforms in 2019.
Before its recent political crisis, Mongolia had been ruled by a three-way coalition government since the 2024 elections resulted in a significantly reduced majority for Mr Oyun-Erdene’s MPP.
But in May, the MPP evicted its second-largest member, the Democratic Party (DP), from the coalition after some younger DP lawmakers backed calls for Mr Oyun-Erdene’s resignation.
That pushed Mr Oyun-Erdene to call a confidence vote in his own government, which he lost after DP lawmakers walked out of the chamber during the ballot.
Corruption ills
Mr Zandanshatar takes charge as Mongolia faces a combustive political cocktail of widespread corruption, rising living costs and concerns over the economy.
On the streets of Ulaanbaatar, prior to the vote, 38-year-old sociologist Tumentsetseg Purevdorj said his “political experience is a good asset”.
“But what we need is to have a strong and functional government,” she said.
“As a woman, I want him to include skilled woman representatives in the new cabinet.”
But other young Mongolians were sceptical that anything would change under the new prime minister.
“He has had high official status for over two decades,” Mr Bayaraa Surenjav, 37, told AFP.
“But I still can’t name a single good work he has done in those years.”
Mr Zoljargal Ganzereg, a 25-year-old economist, bemoaned the fact that “he was a politician when I was born and he is still up there”.
“Look at how we live, living paycheck to paycheck, barely affording the basic needs,” he said.
“If he can’t do anything about it, I have no choice but to move abroad.” AFP

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Gold, Mined by Artisanal and Small-Scale Miners of Mongolia to Be Supplied to International Jewelry Companies www.montsame.mn

The Bank of Mongolia has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the Swiss Better Gold Association and Argor Heraeus, the precious metals refinery of Switzerland.
Under the Memorandum of Understanding, the parties will cooperate in supplying gold mined by artisanal and small-scale miners in Mongolia to international jewelry companies as raw materials. This will demonstrate that the gold mining and supply chain in Mongolia is transparent and reliable. Gold miners will also be given incentives for each kilogram of gold they deliver.
In the first phase, artisanal and small-scale miners operating in Bulgan aimag will be involved. The Bulgan aimag branch of the Bank of Mongolia and the Precious Metal Assay Laboratory of the Mongolian Agency for Standardization and Metrology will collaborate on the Project.
During the World Gold Council meeting held last year, along with the Central Banks of Colombia, Ecuador, and the Philippines, the Bank of Mongolia joined the “London Principles,” a set of principles aimed at formalizing the purchase of gold from artisanal and small-scale miners, supporting responsible artisanal mining, and integrating them into the formal supply chain.

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Austria Publishes Synthesized Texts of Tax Treaties with Iceland, Kazakhstan and Mongolia as impacted by BEPS MLI www.orbitax.com

Austria's Ministry of Finance has published the synthesized texts of the tax treaties with Iceland, Kazakhstan, and Mongolia as impacted by the Multilateral Convention to Implement Tax Treaty Related Measures to Prevent Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (MLI). The synthesized texts have been prepared based on the reservations and notifications (MLI positions) submitted by the respective countries. The authentic legal texts of the tax treaties and the MLI take precedence and remain the legal texts applicable.
The MLI applies for the 2016 Austria-Iceland tax treaty:
with respect to taxes withheld at source on amounts paid or credited to non-residents, where the event giving rise to such taxes occurs on or after 1 January 2024; and
with respect to all other taxes, for taxes levied with respect to taxable periods beginning on or after 1 January 2025.
The MLI applies for the 2004 Austria-Kazakhstan tax treaty:
In Austria:
with respect to taxes withheld at source on amounts paid or credited to non-residents, where the event giving rise to such taxes occurs on or after 1 January 2024; and
with respect to all other taxes, for taxes levied with respect to taxable periods beginning on or after 1 January 2025;
In Kazakhstan:
with respect to taxes withheld at source on amounts paid or credited to non-residents, where the event giving rise to such taxes occurs on or after 1 January 2024; and
with respect to all other taxes, for taxes levied with respect to taxable periods beginning on or after 30 May 2024.
The MLI applies for the 2003 Austria-Mongolia tax treaty:
In Austria:
with respect to taxes withheld at source on amounts paid or credited to non-residents, where the event giving rise to such taxes occurs on or after 1 January 2025; and
with respect to all other taxes, for taxes levied with respect to taxable periods beginning on or after 1 January 2026;
In Mongolia:
with respect to taxes withheld at source on amounts paid or credited to non-residents, where the event giving rise to such taxes occurs on or after 1 January 2025; and
with respect to all other taxes, for taxes levied with respect to taxable periods beginning on or after 1 July 2025.
MLI synthesized texts of Austria's tax treaties can be found on the Ministry of Finance treaty webpage.

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The United States and Mongolia Open the Center of Excellence for English Language Teaching in Ulaanbaatar www.mn.usembassy.gov

On June 12, representatives from the Government of Mongolia, the U.S. Embassy, and representatives of the diplomatic corps and international organizations, participated in the formal opening ceremony of the Center of Excellence for English Language Teaching, which is a joint partnership between the U.S. government, the Mongolian government, the National University of Mongolia, and other partners, including diplomatic missions and select companies.
The Center of Excellence for English Language Teaching is a key part of the U.S.-Mongolia Excellence in English Initiative. Since its soft opening in March, the Center has hosted an array of programs conducted by English Language Fellows, Fulbright English Teaching Assistants, Peace Corps volunteers, and other educators.  
“Establishing the Center of Excellence marks a significant milestone in our shared commitment to advancing education and fostering professional development for English teachers across Mongolia,” U.S. Ambassador to Mongolia Richard Buangan said in remarks delivered at the National University of Mongolia on June 12. “This Center will serve as a hub for innovation, learning, and growth, providing invaluable resources and opportunities for Mongolian educators to enhance their skills and knowledge.”
The U.S. embassy supports a range of English language programs across Mongolia.  These include the English Access Microscholarship Program, an after-school program for high school students that currently has 200 participants, and three U.S. English Language Fellows and seven Fulbright English Teaching Assistants, who work at local schools and colleges across the country.

 

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Mongolia's 'Dragon Prince' dinosaur was forerunner of T. rex www.reuters.com

A newly identified mid-sized dinosaur from Mongolia dubbed the "Dragon Prince" has been identified as a pivotal forerunner of Tyrannosaurus rex in an illuminating discovery that has helped clarify the famous predator's complicated family history.
Named Khankhuuluu mongoliensis (pronounced khan-KOO-loo mon-gol-ee-EN-sis), it lived roughly 86 million years ago during the Cretaceous Period and was an immediate precursor to the dinosaur lineage called tyrannosaurs, which included some of the largest meat-eating land animals in Earth's history, among them T. rex. Khankhuuluu predated Tyrannosaurus by about 20 million years.
It was about 13 feet (4 meters) long, weighed about 1,600 pounds (750 kg), walked on two legs and had a lengthy snout with a mouthful of sharp teeth. More lightly built than T. rex, its body proportions indicate Khankhuuluu was fleet-footed, likely chasing down smaller prey such as bird-like dinosaurs called oviraptorosaurs and ornithomimosaurs. The largest-known T. rex specimen is 40-1/2 feet long (12.3 meters).
Khankhuuluu means "Dragon Prince" in the Mongolian language. Tyrannosaurus rex means "tyrant king of the lizards."
"In the name, we wanted to capture that Khankhuuluu was a small, early form that had not evolved into a king. It was still a prince," said paleontologist Darla Zelenitsky of the University of Calgary in Canada, co-author of the study published on Wednesday in the journal Nature, opens new tab.
Tyrannosaurs and all other meat-eating dinosaurs are part of a group called theropods. Tyrannosaurs appeared late in the age of dinosaurs, roaming Asia and North America.
Khankhuuluu shared many anatomical traits with tyrannosaurs but lacked certain defining characteristics, showing it was a predecessor and not a true member of the lineage.
"Khankhuuluu was almost a tyrannosaur, but not quite. For example, the bone along the top of the snout and the bones around the eye are somewhat different from what we see in tyrannosaurs. The snout bone was hollow and the bones around the eye didn't have all the horns and bumps seen in tyrannosaurs," Zelenitsky said.
"Khankhuuluu had teeth like steak knives, with serrations along both the front and back edges. Large tyrannosaurs had conical teeth and massive jaws that allowed them to bite with extreme force then hold in order to subdue very large prey. Khankhuuluu's more slender teeth and jaws show this animal took slashing bites to take down smaller prey," Zelenitsky added.
So the term rare earth elements, it refers to 17 chemically similar elements within the lanthanide series.
The researchers figured out its anatomy based on fossils of two Khankhuuluu individuals dug up in the 1970s but only now fully studied. These included parts of its skull, arms, legs, tail and back bones.
The Khankhuuluu remains, more complete than fossils of other known tyrannosaur forerunners, helped the researchers untangle this lineage's evolutionary history. They concluded that Khankhuuluu was the link between smaller forerunners of tyrannosaurs and later true tyrannosaurs, a transitional animal that reveals how these meat-eaters evolved from speedy and modestly sized species into giant apex predators.
"What started as the discovery of a new species ended up with us rewriting the family history of tyrannosaurs," said University of Calgary doctoral student and study lead author Jared Voris. "Before this, there was a lot of confusion about who was related to who when it came to tyrannosaur species."
Some scientists had hypothesized that smaller tyrannosaurs like China's Qianzhousaurus - dubbed "Pinnochio-rexes" because of their characteristic long snouts - reflected the lineage's ancestral form. That notion was contradicted by the fact that tyrannosaur forerunner Khankhuuluu differed from them in important ways.
"The tyrannosaur family didn't follow a straightforward path where they evolved from small size in early species to larger and larger sizes in later species," Zelenitsky said.
Voris noted that Khankhuuluu demonstrates that the ancestors to the tyrannosaurs lived in Asia.
"Around 85 million years ago, these tyrannosaur ancestors crossed a land bridge connecting Siberia and Alaska and evolved in North America into the apex predatory tyrannosaurs," Voris said.
One line of North American tyrannosaurs later trekked back to Asia and split into two branches - the "Pinnochio-rexes" and massive forms like Tarbosaurus, the researchers said. These apex predators then spread back to North America, they said, paving the way for the appearance of T. rex. Tyrannosaurus ruled western North America at the end of the age of dinosaurs when an asteroid struck Earth 66 million years ago.
"Khankhuuluu was where it all started but it was still only a distant ancestor of T. rex, at nearly 20 million years older," Zelenitsky said. "Over a dozen tyrannosaur species evolved in the time between them. It was a great-great-great uncle, sort of."
Reporting by Will Dunham in Washington, Editing by Rosalba O'Brien

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Mongolia’s Pivot to Central Asia and the Caucasus: Strategic Realignments and Regional Implications www.cacianalyst.org

Mongolia's diplomatic engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus marks a pivotal evolution of its "third neighbor" strategy, aimed at strengthening partnerships beyond its traditional ties with Russia and China. This strategic shift has gained urgency in light of changing regional dynamics within Greater Central Asia. Since 2020, Mongolia has intensified its diplomatic activities, exemplified by presidential visits to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2024. Economic interactions, while still modest, show promising growth, notably in trade with Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, where exports have notably increased. These developments align with broader regional trends towards greater independence from Russia and China, as Central Asian countries seek to establish cooperative mechanisms. Ultimately, Mongolia's westward pivot not only enhances its sovereignty but positions it as a crucial player in promoting regional stability and cooperation in the evolving Eurasian geopolitical landscape.
BACKGROUND: Mongolia's diplomatic engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus represents the latest evolution of its third neighbor strategy—a long-standing policy aimed at cultivating partnerships beyond Russia and China to enhance Mongolia’s sovereignty. This westward pivot has emerged as a strategic necessity for Mongolia, particularly as regional dynamics across Greater Central Asia undergo significant transformation.
Mongolia's diplomatic activity with Central Asia has accelerated markedly since 2020. High-level visits, previously sporadic, have become increasingly frequent and substantive. President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh's recent state visits to Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan in 2024 resulted in numerous bilateral agreements, bolstering cooperation in trade, transport, and cultural exchange. The visit to Uzbekistan yielded 14 bilateral agreements and the inauguration of Mongolia's Embassy in Tashkent. Similarly, the Kazakhstan visit established a formal strategic partnership. Mongolia's diplomatic outreach extended to Turkmenistan, marking the first bilateral presidential visits since diplomatic relations began in 1992, and to Kyrgyzstan, where bilateral relations have steadily improved following President Sadyr Japarov's 2023 visit to Mongolia and the opening of the Kyrgyz Embassy in Ulaanbaatar.
Economic engagement, while still modest, demonstrates upward momentum. Trade with Kazakhstan has reached approximately $150 million annually, with Mongolian exports of horse meat growing from $2.9 million in 2017 to $8.3 million in 2022. Kazakhstan's exports to Mongolia, primarily industrial and consumer goods, increased from approximately $72.9 million to $93 million during the same period. Mongolia's trade with Kyrgyzstan doubled from about $2 million in 2017 to over $5 million by 2022, driven by re-exported used cars and consumer goods. Trade with Uzbekistan grew dramatically from under $1 million in 2017 to nearly $10 million by 2022, focused on meat exports and Uzbek fertilizers. Meanwhile, trade with Turkmenistan and Tajikistan remains negligible. For Mongolia, with $20 billion GDP and over 90% of export goes to China, this is a significant development.
Mongolia's engagement with the Caucasus remains nascent but shows promising signs. High-level diplomatic exchanges include former President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj's official visits to Armenia in 2015 and Georgia in 2016, enhancing trade and cultural ties. Azerbaijan received a working visit from former President Khaltmaagiin Battulga in 2018, exploring collaborations in energy and investment. While trade volumes remain limited, recent growth is evident, particularly with Azerbaijan, where exports surged to approximately $1.6 million in 2024, primarily in livestock products.
These developments have occurred against the backdrop of emerging region-wide structures in Greater Central Asia, as countries seek to develop collective mechanisms for cooperation outside the frameworks dominated by Russia and China. Mongolia's engagement with these structures aligns with the broader regional trend toward developing greater agency and connectivity across Central Asia and the Caucasus.
IMPLICATIONS: Mongolia's deepening engagement with Central Asia and the Caucasus presents crucial economic and strategic diversification opportunities. Enhanced diplomatic and economic ties provide Mongolia with a hedge against over-reliance on China, currently its dominant trading partner, and alternative options given restrictive Western sanctions against Russia. The geographic and economic profiles of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with their combined population of approximately 56 million, offer ample market opportunities for Mongolia.
Politically, Mongolia's democratic governance, a distinctive feature in the region, offers a stable and transparent framework for engagement. This reliability in governance and commitment to international norms facilitates more predictable and trustworthy partnerships in areas crucial for regional development, such as trade facilitation, infrastructure investment, and the establishment of robust legal frameworks for transport corridors. This unique identity enhances Mongolia's value to Western partners and provides a practical model for how democratic principles can support economic and strategic cooperation in a challenging geopolitical landscape. Furthermore, Mongolia's active participation in cultural events like the World Nomad Games reinforces shared heritage with Central Asian states, promoting a regional identity that bridges East and West.
The integration into regional mechanisms offers Mongolia access to emerging transport corridors, particularly the "Middle Corridor" that connects Asia to Europe without crossing Russian territory. This connectivity could mitigate Mongolia's landlocked status and provide more direct routes to global markets. The successful development of these corridors would significantly reduce Mongolia's vulnerability to geopolitical pressures from its immediate neighbors.
Central Asian and Caucasus countries benefit from Mongolia's outreach through expanded diplomatic networks and opportunities for collaborative initiatives in transport, energy, agriculture, environment and mining. Mongolia's strategic neutrality and pragmatic foreign policy approach are viewed positively in the region, enabling enhanced collaboration without triggering sensitive geopolitical responses from Russia and China.
The burgeoning regional integration subtly shifts dynamics for Russia and China. Although both powers are likely to tolerate Mongolia's increased engagement due to its non-military, primarily economic and diplomatic nature, deeper regional cooperation could eventually dilute their influence. Increased regional activity that transcends Russian and Chinese dominance, along with coordinated economic policies, could reduce regional dependency on Moscow and Beijing, leading to cautious observation from both capitals.
China's Belt and Road Initiative has significantly shaped regional infrastructure development, but Mongolia's growing ties with Central Asia introduce an alternative approach to connectivity that might circumvent Beijing's leverage. Similarly, Russia's attempts to maintain regional influence through the Eurasian Economic Union face challenges as Mongolia and Central Asian states pursue more diverse partnerships. This diversification of regional relationships represents a gradual but significant shift in the geopolitical landscape.
Mongolia's third neighbors (the U.S., EU, India, Japan, South Korea, and Turkiye) view this westward pivot positively. Strengthening Mongolia's regional ties aligns with broader Western strategic goals, including promoting stability and sovereignty in Central Asia. High-profile European visits to Mongolia, followed by tours to Central Asia (e.g., French President Emmanuel Macron’s and former UK Foreign Secretary David Cameron’s multi-leg visits), illustrate growing interest in Mongolia's bridging role. These engagements allow Western countries to enhance their regional presence without being perceived as exclusively engaging with authoritarian regimes.
The U.S., which has traditionally engaged Central Asia through the C5+1 format, could consider integrating Mongolia into this dialogue, potentially transforming it into a C6+1 arrangement. As outlined in the American Foreign Policy Council's (AFPC) April 2025 report, such integration would better reflect Mongolia's shared strategic and economic challenges with the region, particularly in critical minerals essential to global supply chains. Similarly, Japan and South Korea recognize Mongolia's potential as a gateway to continental Asia, leveraging soft power and economic investments to enhance regional integration.
CONCLUSIONS: Mongolia's pivot toward Central Asia and the Caucasus is driven by strategic necessity and presents significant opportunities for regional integration. The past years' diplomatic and economic initiatives signal genuine, albeit incremental, progress. Although concrete outcomes remain limited, the diplomatic momentum could lead to substantive cooperation in trade, transport, and infrastructure.
For Mongolia, regional integration serves as a diplomatic insurance policy, enhancing strategic autonomy amid geopolitical uncertainty. The pragmatic approach toward bilateral and multilateral cooperation mitigates potential pressure from Russia and China while strengthening ties with Western democracies. The development of region-wide structures that exclude external powers could create space for greater collective agency among the states of Greater Central Asia, including Mongolia.
Mongolia's westward orientation strategically positions it as a significant actor capable of bridging regional divides, promoting economic cooperation, and advocating democratic governance. As suggested in the AFPC’s strategy document, the emergence of a more integrated Greater Central Asia, including Mongolia, could serve as a stabilizing force across the region. Whether this evolves into more tangible regional integration or remains predominantly at the diplomatic level will significantly impact Mongolia's role in the evolving Eurasian geopolitical landscape.
The increasing American strategic interest in Greater Central Asia, with its emphasis on developing exclusive region-wide structures and enhancing connectivity, aligns with Mongolia's objectives. This convergence of interests offers Mongolia an opportunity to reinforce its sovereignty through regional integration while contributing to a more balanced regional order less dominated by Russia and China. In this evolving framework, Mongolia's distinctive political identity and strategic positioning could turn the country into an indispensable player.
AUTHORS’ BIOS: Chimguundari Navaan-Yunden is an Ambassador-at-Large and a former Foreign Policy Advisor to the Prime Minister of Mongolia. Tuvshinzaya Gantulga is a Nonresident Fellow at the Mongolian National Institute for Security Studies and a former foreign policy aide to the President of Mongolia. Both are alumni of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Rumsfeld Fellowship Program and members of the CAMCA Network.

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