Government Reopens Bank Accounts of 12,100 Companies for One Month www.montsame.mn

Mongolia’s 35th Prime Minister, Uchral Nyam-Osor, has issued his Directive No. 01 to temporarily reopen the bank accounts of 12,100 companies that had been frozen due to tax debts. The accounts will be accessible for one month starting today.

The directive was issued based on the General Law on Taxation due to the current economic challenges. Through the directive, the companies are allowed to settle their tax liabilities, pay salaries, and resume their operations.

Prime Minister Uchral has launched the first measure under the “Chuluulye” (Liberate) Initiative, which aims to reduce red tape and place greater trust in the private sector and citizens, according to the Press and Public Relations Department of the Cabinet Secretariat.

Number of Tourists Up by 40% www.montsame.mn

The number of tourists visiting Mongolia increased by 39% in the first quarter of this year compared to the same period last year.

Specifically, 143,431 tourists arrived in the first quarter, an increase of 40,580 compared to last year. In March alone, 59,317 tourists visited, which is 19,815 more than in March 2025—representing a 50% increase.

According to the Mongolia Tourism Organization, the steady growth in inbound tourist flows is the result of the joint efforts and cooperation of stakeholders in the tourism sector.

Mongolia Keeps AI-92 Fuel Price Stable, Raises Diesel and AI-95 Prices www.montsame.mn

Mongolia has stabilised the border price of AI-92 gasoline at USD 705 per ton under its agreement with Russia’s Rosneft, reported the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources.

While the price of AI-92 gasoline remains unchanged, prices for AI-95 gasoline and diesel fuel have been increased to some extent. In Ulaanbaatar, retail diesel prices stood at MNT 3,490–3,990 per litre on April 4–5. In the countryside, diesel is sold at MNT 4,500 per litre in Uvs aimag and MNT 4,200 per litre in Dornod aimag. The price of AI-95 gasoline is MNT 4,100 per litre.

Mongolia imports around 97 percent of its petroleum products from Russia.

Mongolia mining: wealth beneath the Gobi and its global stakes www.identecsolutions.com

A landlocked giant in the making Mongolia mining sits at the center of a paradox: a sparsely populated, landlocked country that has become indispensable to several of the world’s most resource-hungry industries. Wedged between Russia and China, Mongolia controls a vast interior of steppe and desert that conceals some of Asia’s most significant mineral endowments. Over the past two decades, mining has evolved from a peripheral activity into the backbone of national development, shaping everything from fiscal policy to urban growth in Ulaanbaatar.

Copper and coal dominate the narrative, yet gold, fluorspar, and emerging critical minerals are increasingly part of the conversation. This concentration of wealth underground has created both opportunity and vulnerability. High commodity prices can rapidly lift government revenues and foreign exchange earnings, but downturns expose the narrowness of the economic base. Infrastructure limitations, particularly transport and power, repeatedly constrain the pace at which resources can be extracted and exported.

At the same time, Mongolia’s position in global supply chains is rising as manufacturers and governments seek alternatives to more geopolitically risky sources of minerals. Investors view the country as geologically world class but operationally complex, where regulatory clarity and logistical capacity often matter as much as ore grades.

For Mongolians, mining promises jobs, royalties, and modernization, yet it also raises questions about inequality, environmental stewardship, and the future of traditional pastoral livelihoods. Understanding this tension is essential to grasp why Mongolia mining has implications far beyond its borders. (1)

What lies beneath the Gobi
The geological foundations of Mongolia mining are rooted in a series of mineral belts that stretch across the southern and central regions of the country, many of them exposed in the arid expanses of the Gobi Desert. The most internationally significant of these is the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold system, one of the largest known deposits of its kind, where multiple ore bodies have been identified at considerable depth.

To the east and west of this complex lie extensive coal basins containing both thermal and high-quality coking coal, crucial for steelmaking. These basins have attracted large-scale investment and underpin Mongolia’s role as a key supplier to regional heavy industry. Beyond copper and coal, Mongolia hosts meaningful deposits of gold, silver, molybdenum, and fluorspar, the latter being an important input for chemical and aluminum industries. In recent years, attention has also turned to rare earth elements and uranium, resources that align with global trends toward electrification and energy diversification, though their commercial viability remains less certain. The spatial distribution of these resources closely follows ancient tectonic boundaries, making exploration geologically promising but logistically challenging due to remoteness and harsh climate.

Many deposits lie far from rail lines, water sources, and reliable electricity, increasing development costs. Nevertheless, the sheer scale and diversity of Mongolia’s mineral endowment explain why Mongolia mining continues to attract international exploration companies and strategic interest from major economies. The country’s resource map is still incomplete, suggesting that future discoveries could further elevate its global importance. (2)

An industry caught between ambition and constraints
The current state of Mongolia’s mining industry reflects a mix of world-class assets and persistent operational bottlenecks. Large-scale projects coexist with mid-tier producers and a sizeable artisanal and small-scale sector that provides livelihoods in rural areas but operates with limited oversight.

The government plays a central role through licensing, taxation, and, in some cases, equity participation in major mines, seeking to balance national interests with the need for foreign capital and technical expertise.

Infrastructure remains a defining constraint, as many mines depend on long-distance trucking to reach the Chinese border, while rail connections are still being expanded and modernized. Water scarcity in the Gobi adds another layer of complexity, forcing companies to invest heavily in recycling systems and alternative supply arrangements.

Environmental and social governance expectations have risen, with local communities increasingly vocal about dust, land use, and the protection of pasturelands (see also: Responsible mining). Permitting processes, while improving, can still be unpredictable, affecting project timelines and investor confidence.

At the same time, Mongolia has made efforts to align its regulatory framework with international standards, participating in transparency initiatives and strengthening environmental assessment requirements. Skills shortages and reliance on imported equipment also shape the industry’s performance, particularly during periods of rapid expansion.

Despite these challenges, production levels have steadily increased, supported by high global demand for copper and coal. The sector’s trajectory will depend on whether Mongolia can translate its mineral potential into more reliable infrastructure, clearer policy, and broader economic diversification beyond raw exports. (3)

Exports, borders, and the China question
Mongolia mining is deeply shaped by trade geography, as almost all of the country’s major mineral exports ultimately move south to China. Copper concentrate, coking coal, and thermal coal dominate export earnings, making Mongolia one of China’s most important raw material suppliers for steel and power generation. This concentration has delivered scale and reliable demand, but it has also created structural dependence that limits Mongolia’s bargaining power.

When Chinese demand slows, or border procedures tighten, Mongolian producers feel the impact almost immediately through lower prices, inventory build-ups, and reduced government revenues. Most exports still rely heavily on trucking across a handful of Gobi border crossings, a system vulnerable to weather, congestion, and regulatory changes. Rail infrastructure is gradually improving, yet network gaps and gauge differences continue to complicate logistics and raise costs.

Efforts to diversify markets, including discussions around additional processing or alternative routes through Russia, have progressed slowly due to high capital requirements and geopolitical sensitivities. Within Mongolia, debates persist over whether to move beyond raw material exports by investing in domestic smelting, coal washing, or downstream industries, but these options require large-scale energy and water inputs that are not always available (see also: mining technology). Price volatility further amplifies risk, as government budgets remain closely tied to mineral revenues.

Despite these vulnerabilities, Mongolia’s proximity to China also provides a stable, long-term outlet for its resources, ensuring that Mongolia's mining remains tightly integrated into regional industrial supply chains for the foreseeable future. (4)

Geopolitics and the balancing act
Mongolia mining occupies a central place in the country’s foreign policy, as resource wealth intersects with its delicate position between two major powers. Russia and China exert economic and strategic influence through energy supplies, transit routes, and investment, yet Mongolia has long pursued a “third neighbour” strategy to broaden its diplomatic and economic partnerships with countries such as Japan, South Korea, the United States, and members of the European Union.

This balancing act is particularly visible in the mining sector, where Western capital and technology have played a crucial role in developing flagship projects. At the same time, Mongolia must carefully manage relations with China, its dominant export destination, to avoid disruptions that could destabilize its economy. Geopolitical tensions and global efforts to secure critical mineral supply chains have increased international interest in Mongolia, but they have also intensified scrutiny over governance, environmental standards, and national control of resources.

Periods of resource nationalism, including shifts in taxation or ownership rules, have occasionally strained investor confidence, while more recent reforms have aimed to improve stability and transparency. Infrastructure projects, such as rail links and energy connections, are often entangled with broader strategic considerations involving both neighbours.

As the world moves toward electrification and decarbonization, Mongolia mining could gain further geopolitical significance due to its copper and emerging critical mineral potential. How Mongolia navigates these external pressures while safeguarding sovereignty will be decisive for its long-term development. (5)

Possible paths for the next decade
The future of Mongolia’s mining sector will likely unfold along multiple possible trajectories shaped by commodity cycles, infrastructure investment, and policy choices. In an optimistic scenario, sustained demand for copper and other transition-related minerals encourages large-scale upgrades to rail, power, and water systems, reducing logistics costs and enabling higher production volumes. Clearer permitting processes and consistent fiscal rules could attract additional foreign investment, while gradual diversification into processing and related industries would create more domestic value. A more cautious baseline assumes steady output growth but continued dependence on a limited number of major projects and export routes, leaving the economy exposed to periodic shocks from border disruptions or price swings. Under this path, incremental improvements in governance and infrastructure help, but structural vulnerabilities remain.

A downside scenario envisions prolonged infrastructure bottlenecks, policy reversals, or a sharp global demand downturn, leading to stalled projects, fiscal stress, and social tension in mining regions. Environmental pressures, particularly water scarcity in the Gobi, could also constrain expansion if not managed effectively.

Much will depend on how effectively the government, companies, and local communities collaborate on development, environmental protection, and benefit-sharing. Mongolia’s mineral wealth offers significant potential, but realising it will require careful coordination, long-term planning, and a willingness to balance economic ambition with sustainability and social stability. (6)

 FAQ
Why is mining so important to Mongolia’s economy?
Mining is the largest contributor to Mongolia’s export earnings, foreign investment, and government revenues. It supports jobs directly in extraction and indirectly in transport, services, and construction. Because other sectors, such as manufacturing and agriculture, are relatively small in comparison, fluctuations in commodity prices and production levels have an outsized impact on national economic performance. This makes Mongolia highly dependent on the stability and competitiveness of its mining sector.

What are the main environmental challenges linked to Mongolia's mining?
Water scarcity, particularly in the Gobi region, is the most critical constraint, as large-scale operations require significant water for processing and dust control. Land disturbance, air quality issues from trucking, and potential impacts on pastoral livelihoods are additional concerns. Companies and regulators have increasingly focused on water recycling, stricter environmental assessments, and community engagement to mitigate these risks, but balancing development with sustainability remains an ongoing challenge.

Does Mongolia plan to process more minerals domestically?
There is growing interest in adding value through coal washing, copper smelting, or other forms of domestic processing, but progress has been slow. These projects require significant investments in energy, water, and infrastructure that are not yet fully in place. While policymakers see local processing as a way to create jobs and reduce reliance on raw exports, economic and logistical barriers continue to limit the pace of this shift.

Takeaway
Mongolia’s mining sector is a cornerstone of its development, built on globally significant deposits that connect the country to regional and global supply chains while exposing it to infrastructure limits, market dependence, and geopolitical pressure. In the years ahead, success will depend not only on geology and investment but on stronger mine risk management, including better water governance in the Gobi, more resilient transport systems, rigorous safety standards, and proactive community engagement to reduce operational, environmental, and social risks that could otherwise disrupt production and public trust.

BY  Mark Buzinkay

Mongolia’s SOE Debt Doubles to ₮11 Trillion Since 2023 www.insidemongolia.mn

Mongolia’s state-owned enterprises are grappling with a growing debt crisis, and since 2023, their debt has doubled to ₮11 trillion.

How Big is the SOEs Debt?

This is nearly 1/3 of the country’s ₮32.9 trillion national budget for 2026, and it also accounts for 24% of total national debt. Of this, ₮7.2 trillion is short-term and must be repaid within a year, while ₮4 trillion is long-term. Short-term obligations include ₮3 trillion from pre-collected revenue, ₮3.4 trillion from other sources, and ₮0.2 trillion from bonds, highlighting urgent repayment pressures. Back in January 2025, 44 non-mining SOEs were merged under Erchist Mongolia LLC to improve management and governance, but the initiative has since failed.

Erchist Mongolia LLC Fails: The company recently faced liquidation after operating at a ₮3.5 billion loss, and it failed to manage its own operations, let alone address the losses of other SOEs. A company leaving this much debt within a year would be impossible anywhere except under state ownership, which underscores how deep the SOE debt problem has become and why urgent solutions are needed.

Government External Debt Remains High

As of Q4 2025, Mongolia’s external debt from multilateral and bilateral lenders totals ₮23.1 trillion, while the country’s total external debt is around ₮32 trillion. 53% of the bilateral/multilateral debt is owed to multilateral lenders, and 47% to bilateral partners. Major multilateral creditors include the Asian Development Bank with ₮7.7 trillion and the World Bank with ₮3 trillion, while key bilateral lenders are China with ₮3.9 trillion, Japan with ₮2.8 trillion, India with ₮1.4 trillion, and South Korea with ₮1.3 trillion.

Currency Exposure Highlights Vulnerabilities: Debt exposure by currency underscores Mongolia’s dependence on foreign financing. 55% of this debt is in US dollars, 20% in IMF Special Drawing Rights, and the remainder in yen, euro, won, and other currencies. This makes repayment sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations and global financial conditions.
Public Finances Under Strain

Rising SOE obligations, combined with high external debt, are creating mounting pressure on Mongolia’s public finances. Repayment deadlines and currency exposure pose serious risks that policymakers cannot ignore, and the newly appointed Prime Minister now faces the reality that the government itself carries huge debt. Any plan to privatize SOEs or increase transparency must first tackle the massive, unmanageable obligations weighing on the state.

Foreign exchange reserves reach USD 7.2 billion www.gogo.mn

Mongolia’s foreign exchange reserves reached USD 7,187.8 million at the end of the first quarter of 2026, up USD 182.5 million from the beginning of the year and marking a record high.

The reserves are sufficient to cover 8.4 months of imports of goods paid for in foreign currency, 5.6 months of imports of goods and services, and 275% of short-term external debt. This meets internationally used reserve adequacy standards.

Asia’s EVolution: How Mongolia became a dumping ground for Japan’s hybrid electric vehicles www.channelnewsasia.com

Winter is coming on the Mongolian steppe. The wind has started to bite hard as it sweeps through the open grasslands and low granite hills that punctuate the landscape.

For Namnansuren Tuvdsuren and his family of nomadic herders, the temperature dropping means guiding their sheep, goats and cattle on horseback or motorcycle becomes a tougher proposition.

So, like many herders across Mongolia’s harsh expanse, they keep a more modern tool at hand: a Toyota Prius.

The hybrid electric vehicle (HEV), originally designed for the streets of Tokyo, is proving its worth in the wild.

“Basically, if we don’t have our motorcycle around, we just use the Prius,” Tuvdsuren explained as he navigated the open land from behind the wheel, shifting his animals in a tight flock.

“In winter, if a young horse or cow gets injured, we just tie their legs together, lay down the backseats in the car and load it in.”

Namnansuren Tuvdsuren is a young herder on the steppe, who uses a Prius for his daily work. (Photo: CNA/Jack Board)
Nationwide, hybrid vehicles account for 45 per cent of Mongolia’s total vehicle fleet of about 1.5 million, according to the Ministry of Road and Transport Development. 

The vast majority of these are Priuses, attractive because of their reliability, cheap and available spare parts and fuel efficiency that offsets the high cost of petrol. 

“If you throw a rock in Mongolia, chances are you’ll hit a Prius,” said a taxi diver in the capital.

“Climb up the Khüiten Peak and guess what, a Prius will be there,” he added, referring to the country’s tallest mountain that even the most rugged four-wheel drives struggle to ascend.

Mongolia is awash with cheap, end-of-life hybrids imported from Japan once they have served their purposes on tamer urban streets.

They can be found in every corner: from the jammed avenues of Ulaanbaatar to the depths of the Gobi Desert.
Ulaanbaatar has one of the coldest winters of any capital in the world and some of its dirtiest air. The Prius functions reliably even in such extremes, and its cleaner, battery-assisted motor helps cut the vehicle emissions driving the city’s air crisis.

Yet behind the affection for the Prius lies a more difficult reality - and a deep irony: in trying to reduce air pollution by promoting cleaner vehicles, Mongolia has inadvertently imported a new form of waste.

In a country with such brutal conditions and the roughest roads imaginable, those batteries, already expiring after years of use overseas, fail fast and need to be replaced.

With no permitted way to recycle or safely dispose of the depleted and hazardous battery packs, and recent legislation putting those who try on the wrong side of the law, experts warn that Mongolia is becoming a green technology dumping ground.

And it is an emerging lesson for other countries bracing for a wave of electric vehicles without plans in place for when they are no longer roadworthy.

“For a country like Mongolia, with vast distances, hybrids are much more practical. You can drive 100 to 150 km on electricity and then 800 to 1000 km with the gasoline engine”, said Baasanbayar Sambuu-Yondon, the executive director of the Mongolian Automobile Distributors Association (MADA).

Where many countries throughout Asia prohibit or severely restrict the importation of used vehicles, Mongolia’s policies have facilitated the deluge of second-hand hybrids from Japan.

For more than a decade, the country’s regulatory environment actively enabled the surge of used hybrid imports through a combination of low import taxes and duty exemptions on such vehicles, which were marketed as “clean” cars.

Approximately 80 per cent of vehicle imports to the country come from Japan, with 95 per cent of those used.

Priuses are purchased at auction typically once their Toyota battery service period and warranty have expired - after that the batteries become expensive to maintain and replace. 

The vehicles are then brought into Mongolia by various industry players, Sambuu-Yondon explained.

“In other words, cars with expired or heavily deteriorated batteries are coming into Mongolia,” he said.

It is still a flexible rule, far more lenient than countries in Southeast Asia, for example.

Countries such as Indonesia prohibit used car imports entirely, while Vietnam and Singapore impose much stricter age and registration limits.

Over the past decade, Mongolia has typically imported between 50,000 and 70,000 cars annually, both old and new, according to figures from MADA.

But in recent years, that number roughly doubled - to around 120,000 cars in 2023 and 130,000 cars in 2024.

“Mongolia’s vehicle fleet has reached a point where its age and need for renewal have become significantly pressing,” said Munkhnasan Enkhtaivan from Mongolia’s Ministry of Road and Transport Development.

The vast majority of imports are right-hand drive vehicles - opposite to what they are meant to be based on driving lanes in Mongolia - due to being from Japan, where right hand drive vehicles and driving on the left side of the road are the norm.

He added that nearly every adult in the capital now owns close to two cars. More and more of them are old Toyota Priuses rolling across the border.

As a result, Ulaanbaatar is in the midst of a traffic nightmare. The city suffers chronic congestion, a bitter irony in the least densely populated country on earth.

“These cars are not owned out of necessity, but because anyone can afford one,” he said. “They are extremely cheap, ageing vehicles.”

In 2025, exporter listings show a ten-year-old Prius selling for roughly US$3,000-US$8,000 at source.

“These cars have already been driven for many years before they even get here, so naturally, the parts are worn,” said mechanic and business owner, Tseren-Osor Naidan.

“Extreme cold or heat causes wear and tear, and the rough terrain adds more strain. But still, these cars hold up surprisingly well. Toyota really built them strong.”

The cars may be tough but the batteries fail much faster in the extreme cold than they otherwise would.

Servicing and replacing Prius battery modules - often done cell by cell - is a common practice. 

Naidan does that too. But with no official waste channel, what is a necessary small-scale adaptation to keep hybrids alive has quietly become an environmental hazard.

Passenger cars contain different kinds of batteries. Nearly all - including EVs and HEVS contain a 12-volt lead unit used for starting the vehicle and operating its internal systems.

These are cheap, common and highly toxic if exposed to the environment or when smelted.

But HEVs, especially older models, typically use a nickel-metal hydride (NiMH) battery, which while less toxic than lead batteries can still pose health and environmental risks if not handled properly at their end-of-life.

Even if a battery is completely dead or damaged, if it is not decommissioned and stored properly, it poses a fire hazard, said Munkhsukh Natsag, a battery engineer in Ulaanbaatar.

“We are now facing serious challenges concerning hazardous waste, specifically how to dispose of, collect and store the batteries used in these vehicles,“ said Enkhtaivan.

“In Mongolia today, a discarded high-voltage battery might be sitting outside someone’s ger, in an open yard, where a child could easily be playing next to it. That is how dangerous the situation is,” she said, referring to the traditional tented communities common throughout the country.

Still, the metals within the batteries have value and there are informal collection systems at work throughout the country.

Depleted hybrid battery packs still have value but it is has become illegal to export them from Mongolia. (Photo: CNA/Jack Board)
On the outskirts of Ulaanbaatar, what resembles a fairly anonymous vehicle repair garage is actually at the heart of the entire country’s dead battery disposal network.

What happens here is shrouded in secrecy. 

The owner of the establishment was coy about any questioning of his activities and he requested his name not be published for fear of repercussions from the government, even though he is well known among the mechanics of the city.

Dozens of unmarked green barrels sitting outside in the elements is a clue to what is happening here. 

This is the place where right now nearly every single depleted Prius battery in the capital and beyond is collected, according to Bataar, an alias for the owner.

At the time of CNA’s visit, he was holding onto about 50,000 of them, a surfeit that had been gathering since the start of 2025.

“In Ulaanbaatar, I am confident I collect every single battery,” he said.

Realising both the economic potential and the environmental danger of discarded batteries, Bataar set his sights on Ulaanbaatar’s dense network of garages and service centres, buying up depleted hybrid packs from wherever he could find them.

“Before, they would end up dumped in landfills or buried in the hills. There is no official disposal site for them. People used to haul batteries by porter truck and dump them openly,” he said.

But now, he has a problem. Since early 2025, the government has made battery exports illegal. Bataar woke up to find his business on the wrong side of the law.

“I feel so suffocated that I could die. I’ve carried out this service properly for years, and now I’m suddenly forced to stop,” he said.

Both of Mongolia’s neighbouring countries, Russia and China, prohibit the cross-border transport of such hazardous materials through their territory, and third-country export is essentially banned, explained Enkhtaivan.

There are no officially authorised companies, repair shops or licensed facilities that are permitted to handle this work properly. 

With hundreds of thousands of HEVs on the country’s books, the scale of the issue is concerning, she said.

“So these batteries - this waste - remain inside the country. It is all in Mongolia,” she said. 

In these patches, unregistered smelters had been processing all kinds of lead battery waste before being chased away by authorities.

What has been left in this landscape are the remnants of those activities: piles and piles of lead battery casings, elements and scorched earth.

While this is helping to solve some issues, the Electrochem Mongol plant is unable to recycle hybrid-car batteries, a process that would require different technology and a separate purpose-built facility.

“At the moment, we’re still in the research and development phase for that next step,” said the company’s factory director Avirmed Munkhuu.

Electrochem Mongol’s CEO, Odonsuren Ulziibat, is optimistic that within three years, pending funding, that kind of plant could be built, with the ability to also process lithium batteries within a decade.

“In 10 years, we are going to need to be ready to process those EV batteries as waste too”, he said.

Engineers at Electrochem Mongolia process lead batteries at a new dedicated recycling facility. (Photo: CNA/Jack Board)
The government has been working with international partners such as the Asian Development Bank, the World Bank and JICA, and conducted several studies since 2016 on how to properly manage its battery waste issues.

Based on these studies, it has become clear that Mongolia urgently needs hybrid-vehicle battery waste facilities, Enkhtaivan said.

But its unique challenges - a small economy with a surplus of ageing hybrid vehicles - means funding for such projects is hard to secure, she said. Given Japan’s role in the trade, she said partners there have shown willingness to help.

Japan already has its own system for recycling NiMH batteries. 

It also has a utilisation fund from fees that consumers pay when they buy a new car to cover its eventual recycling. 

But that system does not apply to the cars exported to Mongolia and the money can normally be refunded to the exporter in that case.

The moment an aging Prius is sold overseas, its disposal obligations vanish. 

Mongolia inherits not just the cars, but also their toxic aftermath.

Other countries also have the capability to deal with battery waste. 

China is considered the global leader in lithium-ion battery recycling.

South Korea has advanced battery reuse and remanufacturing capacity, while Singapore established a lithium-ion battery recycling facility, the first of its kind in Southeast Asia, in 2021.

Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia are currently building up their capacity to do the same.

There remains a lack of pre-export inspection on the quality of the cars and their battery units coming into the country. 

“Mongolia could feasibly set a minimum battery health threshold that it will or will not accept in the future,” Enkhtaivan said.

As Mongolia struggles with a problem it did not solely create, its experience offers a warning to every country concerned about the EV transition, she added. 

As more electric vehicles with lithium batteries enter the country, the problem will not disappear, only shift.

According to the International Energy Agency, global electric‐car sales in 2024 exceeded 17 million units. 

While sales in emerging economies including in Asia, Latin America and Africa were still low, they nearly doubled that year.

“You must build a complete, integrated waste-management system before these vehicles enter your market.  If there is one lesson from Mongolia, it is this,” she said.

“That entire chain should be visible and traceable, as clearly as reading it on the palm of your hand. Now we are chasing after the problem.”

Even where countries do not permit second-hand vehicle imports, eventually lithium batteries from new vehicles will need replacing too.

China’s own electric revolution has produced its share of casualties. Satellite images have captured entire fields of discarded electric cars and batteries.

Countries without the means to handle the problem face grim environmental and logistical challenges.

“The result will be severe damage, but the most alarming part is this: we have no way of knowing what kind of harm will emerge, or how serious it will be, until years from now,” Enkhtaivan said.

Out on the steppe, the afterlife of a car that is used for herding livestock, fetching water and firewood and taking kids to school is far from top of mind for Mongolia’s nomadic communities.

But life on the land is steeped in tradition and connection to the living earth. The morning ritual of offering the first cup of tea in the morning to the sky and soil remains important to this day.

Yet as spent batteries and broken hybrids pile up on the edges of the land, that same bond between people and the earth is quietly being tested.

By Jack Board

Additional reporting by Khaliun Amarsaikhan.

Source: CNA/jb(ao)

Mongolia, Republic of Korea and Australia dominate on Day 4 of FIBA 3x3 Asia Cup 2026 www.fiba.basketball

SINGAPORE – Mongolia (men and women), Republic of Korea (men) and Australia (women) delivered statement performances on Day 4 of the FIBA 3x3 Asia Cup 2026, topping their pools and powering into the Quarter-Finals as the Main Draw intensified.

With knockout spots on the line, the tournament’s contenders began to separate themselves at The Kallang.

Mongolia men stay perfect

Mongolia’s men continued their strong run, finishing unbeaten to top their pool and advance to the Quarter-Finals.

They opened with a composed 21-15 win over Chinese Taipei, before surviving a thriller against the Philippines. After trailing early, Mongolia stormed back behind Bolor-Erdene Gantsolmon, who delivered key plays down the stretch in a 21-19 victory.

Gantsolmon, currently tied for first overall in player value (24.5), has been central to Mongolia’s success, leading a balanced and resilient unit through a perfect pool phase.

Warrior Queen powers Mongolia

Mongolia’s women were equally impressive, sweeping their group to secure top spot and a place in the Quarter-Finals.

They dismantled Malaysia 20-6 before edging New Zealand 12-10 in a tightly contested showdown.

Leading the charge was the "Warrior Queen" herself, Khulan Onolbaatar, who continues to anchor the team’s performances. Ranked third overall in player value (17.2), Onolbaatar combined scoring and leadership to guide Mongolia through a perfect day.

With both teams advancing unbeaten, Mongolia have firmly established themselves as title contenders.

Prime Minister Uchral Appoints New Cabinet Members www.montsame.mn

At the plenary session of the State Great Khural (Parliament), the members of the Government presented by Prime Minister Uchral Nyam-Osor were discussed. Subsequently, the Prime Minister exercised his power granted under the Constitution and the Law on Government to appoint and formalize the members of the Cabinet.

While appointing the members of the Government, the Prime Minister emphasized that they were being appointed during an extraordinary period marked by disruptions in fuel supply, sharp price increases, shortages, rising inflation, and price surges, circumstances under which many countries around the world have declared states of emergency.

He noted that holding a ministerial position is less about power and more about responsibility. The Prime Minister stressed that ministers are entrusted with a heavy duty to confront challenges, overcome difficulties, work with greater speed and courage, and turn problems into solutions. He underlined the expectation that they will utilize their knowledge and experience to implement the Government’s policies, programs, and objectives, lead their respective sectors effectively, and work free from corruption and conflicts of interest.

He also emphasized strict accountability in both ethics and performance, calling on ministers to demonstrate patriotism through action, and to work with unity, strength, and decisiveness.

Following this, the newly appointed ministers took their oath before Parliament, paid respect to the state flag, and signed the oath document.

The Cabinet led by Prime Minister Uchral consists of:

First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economy and Development: Enkhbayar Jadamba
Deputy Prime Minister: Dorjkhand Togmid
Deputy Prime Minister: Nomtoibayar Nyamtaishir
Minister and Chief of the Cabinet Secretariat: Enkhbayar Battumur
Minister of Foreign Affairs: Battsetseg Batmunkh
Minister of Finance: Mendsaikhan Zagdjav
Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs: Amarsaikhan Sainbuyan
Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources: Damdinnyam Gongor
Minister of Defense: Batlut Damba
Minister of Environment and Climate Change: Sandag-Ochir Tsend
Minister of Education: Enkh-Amgalan Luvsantseren
Minister of Family, Labour and Social Protection: Aubakir Telyekhan
Minister of Road and Transport: Delgersaikhan Borkhuu
Minister of Culture, Sports, Tourism and Youth: Aldarjavkhlan Jukov
Minister of Urban Development, Construction and Housing: Bat-Amgalan Enkhtaivan
Minister of Food, Agriculture and Light Industry: Iderbat Tsagaankhuu
Minister of Digital Development, Innovation and Communications: Nomin Chinbat
Minister of Energy: Naidalaa Badrakh

Ulaanbaatar to Provide Free LPG Heating Systems to Insulated Households www.montsame.mn

Households that have fully insulated their homes will receive a one-time free installation of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) heaters.

In addition, a subsidy of up to MNT 900,000 will be provided during the heating season, from September 15 of the current year to May 15 of the following year. The subsidy will not be paid in cash but will be gradually deducted from households’ LPG heating bills, according to the Media and Public Relations Department of the Ulaanbaatar City Governor’s Office.

A total of 51,080 households have been selected for transition to gas heating, including 14,685 in Songinokhairkhan district, 12,229 in Chingeltei district, 8,483 in Bayangol district, 13,655 in Bayanzurkh district, and 2,028 in Sukhbaatar district.

Residents in the selected khoroos who wish to switch to LPG heating can apply by submitting a request form through their local administrative units. The initiative is part of the city’s plan to improve air quality by gradually transitioning households in 35 khoroos across five districts—designated as “green zones” for air quality improvement—to cleaner LPG-based heating systems.