1 OYU TOLGOI: MONGOLIA’S HIGH-STAKES CLASH WITH RIO TINTO WWW.THEDIPLOMAT.COM PUBLISHED:2026/02/05      2 MONGOLIA PREPARES INTERNATIONAL TENDER TO BUILD STEEL PLANT WWW.AZERTAG.AZ  PUBLISHED:2026/02/05      3 RUSSIAN DEPUTY PM EXPECTS AGREEMENTS ON FREE TRADE AREAS WITH UAE, MONGOLIA, INDONESIA TO TAKE EFFECT IN 2026 WWW.INTERFAX.COM PUBLISHED:2026/02/05      4 "WHEN KOREAN COMPANIES INVEST IN RARE EARTHS IN MONGOLIA... GUARANTEEING MINING RIGHTS AND LOWERING TAXES" WWW.MK.CO.KR  PUBLISHED:2026/02/05      5 ENVIRONMENTAL AUDIT LICENSES NOW AVAILABLE ONLINE IN MONGOLIA WWW.MONTSAME.MN PUBLISHED:2026/02/05      6 EARTHMOVING WORK FOR THERMAL POWER PLANT-V TO BEGIN ON FEBRUARY 15 WWW.GOGO.MN PUBLISHED:2026/02/04      7 KH.NYAMBAATAR: SERGELEN SUBSTATION TO ENTER SERVICE THIS YEAR WWW.GOGO.MN PUBLISHED:2026/02/04      8 ALL-PARTY PARLIAMENTARY GROUP (APPG) ON MONGOLIA ESTABLISHED IN THE UK PARLIAMENT WWW.EMBASSYOFMONGOLIA.CO.UK PUBLISHED:2026/02/04      9 MONGOLIA RANKS AMONG ASIA’S SAFEST COUNTRIES WWW.INSIDEMONGOLIA.MN PUBLISHED:2026/02/04      10 MONGOLIA’S TRUMP ‘BOARD OF PEACE’ MEMBERSHIP REVIVES ITS ‘THIRD NEIGHBOUR’ PLAYBOOK WWW.INTELLINEWS.COM PUBLISHED:2026/02/04      УНГАРЫН ОТП БАНК МОНГОЛД ҮЙЛ АЖИЛЛАГАА ЯВУУЛАХ ХҮСЭЛТЭЭ ИЛЭРХИЙЛЛЭЭ WWW.MONTSAME.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2026/02/05     Г.ЗАНДАНШАТАР: ТӨСВИЙН ХӨРӨНГӨӨР ХАЙГУУЛ ХИЙСЭН ОРДУУДЫН ӨГӨӨЖИЙГ АРД ТҮМЭНД ХҮРТЭЭХ НЬ ЗҮЙ ЁСНЫ АСУУДАЛ WWW.EAGLE.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2026/02/05     БАЙГАЛЬ ОРЧНЫ АУДИТЫН ТУСГАЙ ЗӨВШӨӨРЛИЙГ ЦАХИМААР ОЛГОЖ ЭХЭЛЛЭЭ WWW.EAGLE.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2026/02/05     СУДАЛГАА: ТӨСВИЙН ХӨРӨНГӨ ОРУУЛАЛТАД 10 ИХ НАЯДЫГ ЗАРЦУУЛАВ WWW.NEWS.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2026/02/05     “ЧИНГИС ХААН” НИСЭХ ОНГОЦНЫ БУУДЛЫН ӨРГӨТГӨЛИЙН БАРИЛГЫГ 2028 ОНД ЭХЛҮҮЛНЭ WWW.GOGO.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2026/02/05     МОНГОЛ-ХЯТАДЫН БАНК, САНХҮҮГИЙН САЛБАРЫН ДУГУЙ ШИРЭЭНИЙ УУЛЗАЛТ БОЛЛОО WWW.ITOIM.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2026/02/04     НИЙСЛЭЛИЙН АВТО ЗАМЫН 19 УУЛЗВАРААС ЦАГДААГИЙН БИЕТ ЗОХИЦУУЛАЛТЫГ ХАСЖЭЭ WWW.MONTSAME.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2026/02/04     БРИТАНИЙН ПАРЛАМЕНТАД БҮХ НАМЫН МОНГОЛЫН БҮЛЭГ БАЙГУУЛАГДАВ WWW.EMBASSYOFMONGOLIA.CO.UK НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2026/02/04     “СЭРГЭЛЭН” ДЭД СТАНЦЫН ГҮЙЦЭТГЭЛ 92 ХУВЬТАЙ ҮРГЭЛЖИЛЖ БАЙНА WWW.MONTSAME.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2026/02/04     ДУЛААНЫ 5-Р ЦАХИЛГААН СТАНЦЫН ГАЗАР ШОРООНЫ АЖЛЫГ ЭНЭ САРЫН 15-НД ЭХЛҮҮЛНЭ WWW.GOGO.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2026/02/03    

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MBCC “Doing Business with Mongolia seminar and Christmas Receptiom” Dec 10. 2025 London UK MBCCI London UK Goodman LLC

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Oyu Tolgoi: Mongolia’s High-Stakes Clash With Rio Tinto www.thediplomat.com

15 years of tensions over the massive copper mine boiled over in December 2025. Can Mongolia and the mining giant reach a resolution?
Located in Mongolia’s South Gobi Desert, the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold mine has long stood as a paradox. The project hailed as the cornerstone of Mongolia’s economic modernization has simultaneously festered into a decades-long battle over sovereignty, fairness, and shared prosperity.
For 15 years, the mine – one of the world’s largest undeveloped copper deposits – has pitted the Mongolian state against Rio Tinto, the Anglo-Australian mining giant that holds a 66 percent stake in, and operational control over, the site. The tension reached a boiling point in December 2025, when two seismic developments reshaped the landscape: a Russian court ordered Rio Tinto to pay $1.32 billion in damages, and Mongolia’s State Great Khural unanimously adopted a resolution mandating sweeping changes to protect national interests in the project.
These events have reignited fundamental questions about a partnership forged in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, when Mongolia lacked bargaining power. Rather than a simplistic case of corporate exploitation or nationalist overreach, Oyu Tolgoi should be viewed as the messy reality of an “obsolescing bargain” – a dynamic where host nations gain leverage as investments mature, while multinationals cling to contractual certainty. 
For Mongolia, the stakes are existential: Oyu Tolgoi accounts for 30 percent of its exports and billions in state revenue in the near future. For Rio Tinto, the mine is similarly irreplaceable: a linchpin in its strategy to supply copper for the global energy transition. The conflict, then, is not a zero-sum game, but a test of whether two interdependent parties can recalibrate a flawed framework to serve both sovereign dignity and commercial viability.
The Origins of an Uneven Bargain
The legal and financial architecture of Oyu Tolgoi was cemented in two agreements: the 2009 Investment Agreement and the 2011 Shareholders’ Agreement. Negotiated amid Mongolia’s post-financial crisis vulnerability, the deals granted Rio Tinto extraordinary concessions: tax stability for decades, priority in recovering capital costs, and near-total operational autonomy. Mongolia secured a 34 percent stake through its state-owned enterprise Erdenes Oyu Tolgoi LLC, but the terms deferred meaningful dividends until Rio Tinto recouped its investments – an arrangement that has left the country waiting for its fair share as the mine’s value soars.
Surface mining began in 2013, but the deposit’s true wealth – 31 million tons of copper and 13 million ounces of gold – lies underground. After years of delays and disputes, underground production finally launched in 2023, following a 2022 settlement between Ulaanbaatar and Rio Tinto. By 2025, the project’s total capital expenditure had surpassed $26 billion, with output surging. Copper production rose 61 percent year-on-year, and gold 121 percent. 
For Mongolia, the mine provided $660 million in taxes and fees in 2025 alone. That adds up to cumulative state revenue of $5.5 billion since 2010, plus some $2.4 billion in domestic procurement. Yet these gains are overshadowed by a lopsided debt structure: $16.3 billion of Oyu Tolgoi’s $20.2 billion in debt consists of shareholder loans from Rio Tinto, with interest rates that Mongolian policymakers and civil society have long criticized as above market norms.
Rio Tinto defends the terms, framing shareholder loans as a standard financing tool for megaprojects that carry “full financial risk” during exploration and construction. In a December 2025 submission to Mongolia’s parliamentary oversight committee, Oyu Tolgoi LLC emphasized that such loans are “long-term, unsecured, and provided without collateral,” arguing that direct comparisons to Mongolia’s sovereign debt or short-term international bonds are “inconsistent with international standards.” 
The company also claims that Mongolia’s total share of benefits – including taxes, royalties, and dividends – already stands at 61 percent, far higher than the 37 percent cited by parliamentary experts. But for many Mongolians, these figures ring hollow. The state has yet to receive significant dividends, while Rio Tinto’s cumulative negative cash flow of $11 billion (as of September 2025) masks the long-term value it stands to gain from an 80-year productive asset.
The 2025 Turning Points: Legal Risk and Sovereign Assertion
December 2025 marked a pivotal shift in the debate, driven by two unrelated but mutually reinforcing events. On December 10, Russia’s Kaliningrad Arbitration Court ordered Rio Tinto to pay 104.75 billion rubles ($1.32 billion) to RUSAL, the Russian aluminum giant, over Rio’s 2022 seizure of RUSAL’s 20 percent stake in Queensland Alumina Limited (QAL) amid Australian sanctions on Russia. While the case does not involve Oyu Tolgoi directly, it named Rio Tinto subsidiaries that own the Oyu Tolgoi stake, casting a legal cloud over the mine’s ownership structure.
Rio Tinto swiftly rejected the ruling, stating it “will vigorously defend against it” and noting that Australian courts had already upheld its compliance with sanctions. In a December 15 statement shared with this author, the company emphasized that the Russian judgment “relates to Australian sanctions and has no bearing on Oyu Tolgoi’s operations.” 
Yet the ruling has eroded Rio’s narrative of legal invincibility – a particularly sensitive point as Mongolia scrutinizes the company’s adherence to local laws. For Ulaanbaatar, the decision underscored a broader concern: that multinational corporations may prioritize geopolitical compliance with Western sanctions over their obligations to host nations.
More than two weeks later, on December 26, Mongolia’s State Great Khural adopted Resolution No. 120 with an 81.2 percent majority (69 votes in favor). The landmark piece of legislation mandates sweeping reforms to Oyu Tolgoi’s governance. The resolution, born from months of public hearings and a special parliamentary inspection, reflects deep public frustration – a big portion of Mongolians surveyed in December 2025 believe the country receives an unfair share of Oyu Tolgoi’s benefits. 
The new resolution calls for reviewing (and potentially revoking) two contested mining licenses at the larger Oyu Tolgoi site (Shivee Tolgoi and Javkhlant) held by Rio Tinto partner Entrée Gold. It also demands renegotiations of the 2011 Shareholders’ Agreement to lower Rio’s loan interest rates and guarantee Mongolia a 53 percent benefit share (the original 2010 target), while channeling Oyu Tolgoi’s export revenue through Mongolia’s central bank and commercial banks for transparency. Finally, the resolution calls for investigating corruption allegations against Oyu Tolgoi and Rio Tinto (suspicions that the firm says are “unfounded”) and boosting geological exploration to expand Oyu Tolgoi’s reserves.
The resolution is a bold assertion of sovereign will, but it comes with risks. Rio Tinto has historically resisted unilateral changes to agreements, warning that they could deter foreign investment or trigger arbitration at the International Center for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). In a January 2026 statement provided to this author, Oyu Tolgoi LLC acknowledged the importance of “constructive engagement” but emphasized that public hearings had included “inaccuracies” that it had not been given time to address.
The company’s December 17 submission to parliament further argued that the Investment Agreement already covers the Javkhlant and Shivee Tolgoi licenses, and that its feasibility studies have been updated in compliance with Mongolian law – contradicting parliamentary claims that the project has operated “without an approved feasibility study for the past 10 years.”
The Core Fault Lines: Law, Finance, and Trust
The Oyu Tolgoi dispute hinges on four interconnected tensions, each amplified by the December 2025 developments: legal compliance, financing fairness, resource sovereignty, and transparency.
First, legal alignment remains a flashpoint. Parliamentary experts have accused the Investment and Shareholders’ Agreements of violating Mongolian law – including provisions on board voting rights, share transfer rules, and the primacy of the company charter. 
Oyu Tolgoi LLC vehemently disputes this, arguing the agreements were negotiated “under public and parliamentary oversight” and comply with the laws in force at the time. The company noted that Mongolia’s 2006 Minerals Law explicitly permitted investment agreements to “maintain stable conditions for investors,” and that board provisions were agreed upon under the Civil Code’s “principle of freedom of contract.” For Mongolia, however, the issue is not just past compliance but present relevance. As its legal framework evolves (including the 2019 constitutional amendment defining “benefits” for resource projects), Mongolia thinks past agreements must adapt to reflect current sovereign priorities.
Second, financing terms are a visceral grievance. Mongolia’s parliament and civil society argue that Rio Tinto’s shareholder loan interest rates – reportedly 3-6 percentage points above market rates – unfairly delay dividends and shift risk to the joint venture. Oyu Tolgoi LLC counters that such rates reflect “project-specific and country-specific risks,” including Mongolia’s credit rating, political uncertainty, and the mining sector’s long payback periods. Negotiations between the shareholders to reduce rates are ongoing, but progress has been glacial – highlighting the imbalance of power that persists despite Mongolia’s growing leverage.
Third, the Oyu Tolgoi mine has become a symbol of resource sovereignty, which  in turn lies at the heart of national identity. Mongolia’s ambition to raise its stake to 51 percent or more is rooted in a belief that its natural resources should serve its people first. 
The Javkhlant and Shivee Tolgoi licenses have become a symbol of this fight: parliament views Entrée Resources’ control as a barrier to full development, while Oyu Tolgoi LLC insists the licenses are geologically inseparable from the main mine and can only be developed using existing infrastructure. The company warns that delaying their integration “adversely affects the mine plan and cost projections,” but Mongolians see this as yet another example of foreign corporations dictating terms over their sovereign assets.
Fourth, transparency deficits have eroded public trust. While Oyu Tolgoi LLC publishes tax and fee payments, civil society and parliament have raised concerns about transfer pricing, cost allowances, and the lack of clarity on how “benefits” are calculated. The company’s claim that Mongolia’s share of the benefits stands at 61 percent clashes with parliamentary estimates of 37 percent, reflecting differing definitions of what constitutes “benefits” (e.g., whether VAT paid through suppliers or social insurance contributions should be included). 
The new resolution’s transparency mandates aim to bridge this gap, but success will depend on independent verification – something Rio Tinto has not always embraced.
The Silence of Stakeholders: What Non-Responses Reveal
The aftermath of December’s developments has been marked by striking contrasts in stakeholder engagement. Rio Tinto and Oyu Tolgoi LLC responded promptly to inquiries, providing formal statements and referencing their submissions to parliament. But other key actors – including Mongolia’s government, parliamentarians, and Russia’s Kaliningrad Arbitration Court – have remained silent. This silence speaks volumes. For Mongolia’s leaders, it may reflect a desire to avoid escalating tensions before negotiations with Rio Tinto begin in earnest. For the Russian court, it underscores the case’s geopolitical sensitivity: a ruling targeting a Western multinational, even over an Australian asset, risks complicating Russia’s relations with Mongolia, a country it seeks to maintain as a strategic partner.
The lack of response from Mongolia’s government is particularly notable given the resolution’s mandate to implement reforms within months. Prime Minister Zandanshatar Gombojavyn’s administration faces a delicate balancing act: asserting national interests without triggering a backlash from Rio Tinto, which could halt funding or pursue arbitration. The government’s recent moves to secure loan and financial cooperation with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) – efforts that were approved alongside the Oyu Tolgoi resolution – suggest it is preparing for a potential showdown, diversifying its financial partnerships to reduce reliance on Rio Tinto.
Toward a Shared Victory: The Path Forward
This is a battle that neither side can “win” at the expense of the other. Mongolia cannot afford to alienate Rio Tinto entirely: the company’s technical expertise and capital are still needed to maximize the mine’s value, and arbitration could drain state resources for years. Rio Tinto, meanwhile, cannot afford to ignore Mongolia’s demands: public anger is at a fever pitch, and the Russian court ruling has exposed its vulnerability to legal risks in geopolitically complex regions. The company’s future in the energy transition – dependent on securing stable supplies of copper – depends on its ability to rebuild trust with host nations.
A sustainable solution must address three core needs: fairer financing, enhanced sovereignty, and transparency and accountability. 
First, a modest reduction in shareholder loan interest rates, aligned with current market conditions, would accelerate dividend payments to Mongolia without undermining Rio Tinto’s returns. This is a compromise both sides can accept – Mongolia gains faster access to revenue, while Rio Tinto preserves the project’s viability.
Second, both sides could work out a phased pathway for Mongolia to increase its stake to 51 percent as capital costs are recovered, coupled with joint control over key decisions (e.g., license integration, exploration plans). This would honor Mongolia’s desire for ownership while giving Rio Tinto certainty over the transition.
Finally, there should be independent audits of benefit calculations, public disclosure of cost allowances and transfer pricing, and a joint committee with equal representation from Mongolia and Rio Tinto to oversee compliance. This would rebuild public trust and reduce the risk of future disputes.
Such a compromise would not satisfy hardliners on either side. Nationalists in Mongolia will demand full control, while Rio Tinto shareholders may resist concessions that reduce short-term profits. But it is the only path to a “win-win” outcome: Mongolia secures its sovereign right to a fair share of its resources, and Rio Tinto gains the stability it needs to operate the mine for decades to come.
Conclusion
Oyu Tolgoi is more than a mine – it is a test case for how resource-dependent democracies can assert their interests in an era of global capital. Mongolia’s December resolution is a milestone in this journey, proving that small nations can rewrite the rules of engagement with multinational corporations. Rio Tinto’s willingness to negotiate (albeit reluctantly) shows that even the largest firms must adapt to changing expectations of corporate responsibility.
The Russian court ruling, while tangential to Oyu Tolgoi’s operations, has added a geopolitical wildcard: it reminds Rio Tinto that its actions in one part of the world can have consequences elsewhere, and that Western sanctions cannot insulate it from legal risks in non-Western jurisdictions. For Mongolia, this is a strategic opportunity to leverage Rio Tinto’s vulnerability to secure better terms.
In the end, the real winner will not be Mongolia or Rio Tinto alone, but the principle that resource partnerships must be based on equity, transparency, and mutual respect. If Oyu Tolgoi can evolve into such a model, it will provide a blueprint for other nations grappling with similar conflicts – from Zambia’s copper mines to Peru’s lithium projects. If not, it will remain a cautionary tale of missed opportunities, where short-term greed and nationalist pride overshadowed the shared prosperity that should be the goal of every resource project.
As negotiations begin in 2026, the eyes of the world will be on the South Gobi. For Mongolia, this is a chance to turn a legacy of unfair deals into a future of sovereign economic empowerment. For Rio Tinto, it is an opportunity to prove that profitability and responsibility can coexist. The stakes could not be higher – and the outcome will define the future of resource governance for decades to come.
By Sumiya Chuluunbaatar

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Mongolia prepares international tender to build steel plant www.azertag.az

Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources Damdinnyam Gongor said Mongolia is ready to announce an international open tender as part of its goal to establish a domestic steel plant, Montsame reported.
According to the project’s preliminary feasibility study, a steel production complex is planned with an investment of USD 806 million. Once implemented, the project is expected to produce one million tonnes of steel products annually, including 500,000 tonnes of rebar, 400,000 tonnes of steel billets, and 100,000 tonnes of steel grinding balls. The complex is also projected to process 850,000 tonnes of coking coal per year, produce 600,000 tonnes of metallurgical coke, and generate 60 MW of electricity to meet part of its own power demand.
Members of the working group noted during a preparatory meeting on the construction of the complex that the project would make it possible to meet domestic demand for steel products and support the development of downstream steel-processing industries. The Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources reported that the meeting reviewed the preliminary feasibility study and approved a plan to select international strategic investors and partners. A government working group tasked with preparing for the selection of investors and contractors for the steel complex was established by a prime ministerial order in 2025.
Presenting the preliminary feasibility study, Gankhuyag G., Manager of the Production, Technology, and Project Development Department at Erdenes UTP LLC, said Mongolia imported about one million tons of steel products last year. He noted that domestic steel demand is projected to reach 1.7 million tonnes by 2030, prompting plans to build a complex with an annual capacity of one million tons. Once operational, the facility is expected to meet 60–70 percent of domestic steel demand and enable local sourcing of products such as rebar, steel grinding balls, and steel billets.

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Russian deputy PM expects agreements on free trade areas with UAE, Mongolia, Indonesia to take effect in 2026 www.interfax.com

The agreements on free trade areas signed between the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the United Arab Emirates, Mongolia, and Indonesia last year are currently undergoing ratification procedures and are expected to enter into effect in 2026, Russian Deputy Prime Minister Alexei Overchuk said.
"The ratification procedures in relation to the Emirates, Mongolia, and Indonesia are currently underway. Today we think that we have facilitated the access of our commodity producers to a market comprising about 730,000 million people. It is already a very serious number. And we hope that these agreements will start operating within about a year," he said.
A full-scale agreement on a free trade area with Iran and the EAEU, which was signed in late 2023, entered into effect in 2025, he said.
Talks on a free trade area with India were launched last year. Overchuk refrained from making any forecast as to when the parties could approach its signing. "In this case, it is perhaps too early to talk about some specific deadlines, it's important that these talks are ongoing and it is evident that the negotiating team is optimistic," he said.
India is actively negotiating establishing free trade areas with other regions, including the European Union, he said. "We're also looking into these issues and how it affects each other, it is also a subject of study for the negotiating teams," Overchuk said when asked how the agreements between India and the EU would impact the prospects of the country signing a free trade area agreement with the EAEU.

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"When Korean companies invest in rare earths in Mongolia... Guaranteeing mining rights and lowering taxes" www.mk.co.kr

Mongolia and South Korea are 'strategic partners'. Mongolia welcomes Korean companies to participate in resource development such as rare earths and major infrastructure projects."
Mongolian Prime Minister Gombojab Jandanshatar has identified South Korea as a key partner to share Mongolia's future. The relationship between Korea and Mongolia is viewed as a 'strategic partner' that creates mutual profits through technical cooperation and investment beyond simply importing and exporting resources. South Korea and Mongolia have held negotiations to sign an economic partnership agreement (EPA) from 2023 until the fourth round.
In an exclusive interview with Mail Business, Prime Minister Jandanshatar, who visited Davos, Switzerland to attend the 2026 World Economic Forum's annual meeting, stressed that he would institutionalize predictability to address the "uncertainty" that South Korean companies are most concerned about when investing in Mongolia. "We understand well that investors expect 'predictability' in long-term projects where large-scale capital is invested," he said. "We have an open position to discuss agreements to fix taxes, royalties and license conditions for a 'defined period' within the current legal framework such as the Investment Act and the Mining Act."
This suggests that the Mongolian government can positively consider expectations such as "fixing investment conditions within 10 years" that the South Korean side is interested in.
He suggested cooperation measures between Korea and Mongolia, ranging from investment systems to resources, infrastructure, trade, and culture, and added, "The (Mongolia) government will consider these agreements as strategic projects to ensure the predictability of regulations and protect investors' trust."
Mongolia is seeking to advance resource development. Core mineral cooperation, including rare earths, is also expected to expand the value chain, not just mining. "Minerals development goes beyond simple mining and requires technically complex and capital-intensive separation and refining processes," Prime Minister Jandanshatar said. "Mongolia is carefully considering both domestic and foreign processing options."
In particular, he noted, "Korean companies have the opportunity to participate in downstream processing, infrastructure development, technology transfer and capacity building as well as mining." It aims to strengthen essential infrastructure such as power, water resources, and environmental licensing first. "The Korea-Mongolia Rare Metal Cooperation Center, which opened in Ulaanbaatar in December last year, will be a platform for technical cooperation and joint investment," he said.
The Prime Minister also asked Korean companies to participate in large-scale infrastructure projects to solve traffic jams and housing difficulties in the capital Ulaanbaatar.
Currently, Mongolia is promoting the construction of Ulaanbaatar subways and trams, a smart satellite city near the new airport called "Khunnu City," and a "New Karakhorum" for balanced regional development. These projects are open to international partners based on competitive and non-discriminatory principles, he said. "There is great potential for Korean companies to contribute to construction, engineering, and smart cities."
Regarding investment incentives, he also said, "Depending on the nature and size of the investment, we will provide a stable investment framework, including a public-private partnership (PPP) model or a concession agreement (a contract that gives private companies certain rights or business rights that the government or public institutions have for a certain period of time)."
Prime Minister Zandanshatar also reported that the Mongolian government recently established an "investor protection center" to solve the practical difficulties faced by Korean companies. If the aforementioned "Scarcity Metal Cooperation Center" focuses on resource technology exchanges, the center serves as a window to protect corporate property rights and solve regulatory difficulties.
It also showed a willingness to expand the field of cooperation between Korea and Mongolia to advanced digital infrastructure beyond construction and civil engineering. Referring to Mongolia's long-term development plan, Vision 2050, and the 2026-2030 Development Guidelines, which recently passed parliament, the Prime Minister stressed that he wants to cooperate with Korea in future industries such as data centers and artificial intelligence (AI) beyond simple resource exports. This is interpreted as a proposal to create new value by combining digital technologies that Korea has strengths with Mongolia's energy and resource infrastructure.
Mongolia considers it important to sign an EPA with Korea to diversify its export structure concentrated in China and Russia. If the final agreement is signed, Korea will become the second country to sign an EPA with Mongolia after Japan. "If the EPA is signed, tariffs will be removed or reduced from more than 90% of bilateral trade items," the prime minister said. "Bilateral trade, which used to be centered on minerals, will be an opportunity to expand to consumer goods and services such as high-quality livestock, dairy products, and cashmere."
To this end, the Mongolian government is preparing to enter the Korean market by introducing a quality management system and a history tracking system that meets international standards. "Korea is Mongolia's sixth trading partner and a very important partner for export diversification," he stressed.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Zandanshatar praised the cultural consensus between the two countries, citing the recent performance of Mongolian and Korean teams in the popular Netflix entertainment show "Physical: 100 (Asia)." "The traditional value of Mongolians' strong body and spirit met with Korean content and drew deep sympathy," he said. "In the future, we want to deepen mutual understanding by linking Mongolian wrestling, horseback riding, and nomadic culture with the Korean content industry."
Prime Minister Gombojab Jandanshatar
Mongolian Prime Minister Gombojab Jandanshatar is a former financial expert who served as vice president of the Central Bank of Mongolia (BOM) and Khan Bank and is a leading "economic expert" politician who founded the Mongolian Economic Forum (MEF). He led Mongolia's constitutional revision and governance transparency by serving as foreign minister and speaker of the National Assembly, and took office as the 33rd prime minister in June last year. Based on abundant practical experience and global senses such as Stanford University training, he is currently leading economic innovation, including Mongolia's resource diplomacy and expansion of foreign investment.
[Reporter Yoon Won-seop / Reporter Jeon Hyeong-min]

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Environmental Audit Licenses Now Available Online in Mongolia www.montsame.mn

The Ministry of Environment and Climate Change has begun issuing environmental audit licenses electronically, as part of efforts to make public services faster, more transparent, and free of unnecessary bureaucracy.
Previously, renewing a license required multiple layers of review, official orders, signatures, stamps, and paper documents, taking between two weeks and one month. Under the new system, applicants who submit compliant materials through the government’s electronic licensing platform, license.mn, can receive approval within 10 minutes. The ministry said the reform helps businesses save time and costs, reduces human involvement, bureaucracy, and corruption risks, and improves transparency and equal access to public services.
Environmental audits serve as an independent mechanism to assess the implementation of and compliance with environmental protection laws and standards. Under the law, enterprises that use natural resources are required to undergo an environmental audit every two years. Streamlining the licensing process has therefore become a practical solution that supports environmental protection while promoting sustainable business development. The ministry also noted that it plans to gradually digitize other licenses it issues.

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Earthmoving work for Thermal Power Plant-V to begin on February 15 www.gogo.mn

Prime Minister G.Zandanshatar visited the site of the Thermal Power Plant V project on February 3, 2026, a development intended to meet Ulaanbaatar’s growing electricity and heat demand and reduce pressure on the central energy system.
The plant will be built on the former ash pond of TPP-2 in Bayangol district and is planned to have a generation capacity of 300 MW of electricity and 340 Gcal of heat. The design incorporates environmentally friendly technologies, including an air-cooling system that reduces water use and wastewater-reuse solutions.
Officials say the plant will supply electricity to about 100,000 households and heat to 40,000 households. 90% of electricity produced will be fed into the central grid; the remaining 10% will cover the plant’s internal needs.
Earthmoving work will begin on February 15, starting with removal of ash accumulated since TPP-2 began operating in 1961. Main construction work is scheduled to start in April after completion of preparatory works. The construction period is estimated at 2.5 years.
The project is structured as a public–private partnership with a total cost of USD 658.5 million: the private sector will provide 80% of the financing and the capital city 20%.

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Kh.Nyambaatar: Sergelen substation to enter service this year www.gogo.mn

Khunnu city is planned on 31,000 hectares in Sergelen soum’s New Aviation Zone. Infrastructure work, electricity, water, heat supply, flood-protection canal, sewage, is being started in stages to support the new city.
Officials report the Sergelen substation is 92% complete. As part of the substation project, a 100 MW solar array and a 90 MW battery storage station will also be built. The capital city will select the final contractor for the battery/solar package this month through a public–private partnership process, city officials said.
Prime Minister G.Zandanshatar has stressed the strategic importance of developing Sergelen as a transit node for Ulaanbaatar’s energy transmission to ensure reliable operation of the capital’s power system.
Mayor Kh.Nyambaatar said, “The contractor is working to put the Sergelen substation into operation this year. The station will connect to the Songinokhairkhan substation in the west and the Nalaikh substation in the east, serving as a transit hub for the city’s energy flows. The 90 MW battery will also be built to charge Khunnu from its own sources and share the load during peak hours. We expect the PPP contractor selection to be completed within this month. Once connected to the Sergelen substation, the battery will meaningfully reduce missing energy consumption.”
City and national authorities note Mongolia’s electricity demand is rising 11–15% per year. To bolster supply, the capital has already commissioned the 300 MW Buuruljuut power plant and a 50 MW Baganuur battery storage facility. Construction of Thermal Power Plant- V is due to begin next April and the plant is expected to be commissioned in 2028.
Officials say the combined commissioning of the Sergelen substation, the 100 MW solar farm and the 90 MW battery storage will help eliminate energy shortages in Ulaanbaatar by strengthening transmission capacity, adding local generation and improving peak-hour resilience.

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All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Mongolia established in the UK Parliament www.embassyofmongolia.co.uk

An All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) on Mongolia has been newly established in the UK Parliament. The Ambassador of Mongolia, Mr Enkhsukh Battumur, attended the inaugural meeting on 2 February 2026. 
The APPG on Mongolia was initiated by Mr James Wild MP, who serves as Chair, while Ms Catherine West MP serving as Vice-Chair. Mr Dave Doogan and Baroness Northover serve as Officers. More than 20 Members of Parliament have joined the APPG on Mongolia. The inaugural meeting was attended by Mr James Wild MP, Ms Catherine West MP, Mr Dave Doogan MP, Baroness Northover, Mr Fabian Hamilton MP, Baroness Evans, Lord Cromwell, Baroness Uddin, Baroness Hooper and Earl of Courtown. The meeting was also attended by officials, including Ms Karen Maddocks, Deputy Director of the Northeast Asia Directorate at the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office, and Ms Sophie Warrell, Deputy Head of Mission at the British Embassy in Ulaanbaatar.
The APPG on Mongolia was first established in 1995 in the UK Parliament and has since actively contributed to discussions on Mongolia-United Kingdom relations, raised parliamentary questions to the UK Government, sought relevant information, and provided necessary support within the framework of Parliament. The support of successive members of the APPG on Mongolia played an important role in assisting Mongolia during its challenging transition period.
Members of the re-established APPG expressed their interest in receiving comprehensive briefings on the policies and measures being implemented by the Government of Mongolia in areas including critical minerals, renewable energy, environmental protection, the role of women in society and security. They further expressed their readiness to support, at the parliamentary level, efforts to enhance Mongolia-UK relations and cooperation in these areas.
APPGs are voluntary, cross-party groups established by Members of Parliament on specific countries or issues of shared interest and must comprise at least 20 representatives from the principal political parties represented in Parliament. Following recent revisions to the rules governing APPGs, under which each Member may formally join no more than six such groups, the establishment of new groups has become more restricted. In this context, the establishment of the APPG on Mongolia in the newly constituted UK Parliament in 2024, in accordance with the revised rules, reflects the importance attached to Mongolia by the UK Parliament.

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Mongolia Ranks Among Asia’s Safest Countries www.insidemongolia.mn

Mongolia ranks 5th among Asia’s safest countries, marking its strongest-ever performance in the Global Peace Index.
🗒️ The Global Peace Index (GPI) scores countries on a scale of 1 to 5, with lower scores indicating higher levels of peace. The index ranks 163 countries based on 3 core domains such as societal safety and security, ongoing conflict, and militarisation.
📈 Over the past decade
Mongolia’s Global Peace Index performance has generally improved over the past ten years, consistently placing the country within the global top 50. For example, Mongolia ranked 42nd globally in 2015 with a score of 2.22. By 2025, its score improved to 1.719, lifting the country to fifth place in Asia and 37th globally out of 163 countries.
🤩 While the Global Peace Index has deteriorated globally for the 13th consecutive year, Mongolia stands out as an exception, showing continued improvement.
Key drivers of this positive trend include a low level of ongoing conflict, relatively modest military expenditure, stable crime rates, and the absence of armed conflict. As a result, Mongolia has emerged as one of Asia’s more peaceful and stable countries.  
🚨 Common Crimes in Mongolia
Despite Mongolia’s strong standing as a relatively peaceful country, certain internal security challenges intensified over the past year. Traffic-related violations, corruption cases, and cybercrime recorded the sharpest increases. On the human side, 24,600 individuals were directly affected by crime, including 1,409 children under 18 (5.7%) and 11,341 women (46.1%). The number of people injured rose by 8.2% to 5,680, while fatalities increased by 18.6% year-on-year, with 567 lives lost compared to the same period in 2024.
Finally… Is Mongolia safe? Yes. However, travellers should take basic precautions, particularly on the roads, in crowded areas, and online. With sensible awareness and responsibility, travelling in Mongolia can be both safe and fascinating.

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Mongolia’s Trump ‘Board of Peace’ membership revives its ‘Third Neighbour’ playbook www.intellinews.com

Pressed between two powerful neighbours and perpetually wary of being drawn too near the orbit of either Moscow or Beijing, Mongolia has joined US President Donald Trump’s “Board of Peace,” a move that reflects the country’s longstanding effort to diversify its political partnerships.
The Mongolian government has not released details on the scope of its participation or any financial commitments associated with the initiative.
Trump has described the “Board of Peace” as a multilateral initiative focused on conflict mediation, postwar stabilisation and economic reconstruction, with Gaza identified as its initial priority. The initiative’s broader structure and long-term scope beyond Gaza have not yet been fully detailed.
Western countries, as well as Russia and China, have largely declined to join the initiative, but for Mongolia, the calculation appears less ideological than pragmatic. As a developing nation with vast resources but limited infrastructure, Ulaanbaatar may be able to use the Board to curry political and economic favour with Washington.
Third neighbours
Mongolia’s foreign policy emphasises maintaining close relations with countries beyond Russia and China — a framework known as the “third neighbour” strategy — to preserve diplomatic autonomy and reduce dependence on its immediate neighbours. The United States plays a central symbolic and strategic role in that approach.
“Historically, Mongolia has used moments of crisis to bond with the US, for example, by condemning the 1990 invasion of Kuwait or by joining the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ [in Iraq] in 2003,” said Amar Adiya, editor of the Mongolia Weekly online newsletter. 
In 2003, Mongolia committed troops to the US-led forces that fought the Iraq War. Here, Maj. Gen. T. Togoo, then chief of the Mongolian Army General Staff, greets Air Force Gen. Richard B. Myers, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, who visited Mongolia to relay Washington’s thanks (Credit: American Forces Press Service, public domain).
“Just as James Baker coined the ‘Third Neighbour’ term in 1990, the Board of Peace founding membership is the 2026 update — the ‘Third Neighbour’ 2.0,” said Amar. “It’s a way to ensure the US remains an active counterbalance to Russia and China, especially as Trump pivots to a ‘great power’ competition centred on critical minerals.”
Mongolia’s leadership, notably Prime Minister Zandanshatar Gombojav, is likely viewing the Board as a way to secure high-level access to the US administration.
“For Mongolia, the Board of Peace is less about world peace, despite the official narrative, and more about a presidential ‘fast-pass’ to the White House,” added Amar. “Zandanshatar knows that in Trump’s world, as in Mongolian domestic politics, you trade favours.”
Ulaanbaatar goals
Potential goals for Ulaanbaatar could include easing US immigration restrictions on Mongolian citizens and advancing economic cooperation. Mongolia also seeks more Western investment in its mining industry.
“This is an attempt to swap a seat at the table for a relaxation of the immigration visa freeze on Mongolians and gain more economic and investment deals, for example, critical minerals and direct flights,” Amar said.
Ulaanbaatar is also looking to extend Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compacts funded by the United States. The first major project, a $285mn compact completed in 2013, focused on land rights, health, vocational training, energy and transport. A second, $350mn Water Compact targeted chronic water shortages in Ulaanbaatar. 
Blair involvement
A Trump visit to Ulaanbaatar or the long-discussed launch of direct flights between the two countries would be seen domestically as a diplomatic coup, Amar said.
He added that former British prime minister Tony Blair — who sits on the Board’s executive committee — may have played a behind-the-scenes role in bringing Mongolia into the fold. 
Blair “likely served as the bridge,” Amar said. 
Amar also suggested Ulaanbaatar could use the Board of Peace initiative to expand deployments of its United Nations peacekeeping soldiers.
“Given that the UN mandate in South Sudan is winding down, Mongolia is looking for a new home for its elite peacekeepers,” he said. “Repurposing these troops for ‘Board of Peace’ stabilisation missions in places like Haiti could serve as an ‘in-kind’ contribution, allowing Mongolia to skip paying the $1 billion [Board] membership fee.”
Julian Dierkes, a Mongolia expert at the University of Mannheim in Germany, said the decision to join the Board was consistent with Mongolia’s pattern of joining multilateral initiatives.
“Part of Mongolia’s foreign policy is the intention to maintain friendly relations with as many countries as possible,” Dierkes said. “That means that Mongolia has eagerly joined almost all multilateral initiatives available to the government.”
Complications and a balancing act
That approach has previously created diplomatic complications, he said, pointing to a 2024 incident involving a visit to Ulaanbaatar by Russian President Vladimir Putin. Mongolia is party to the International Criminal Court (ICC), which has a warrant out for the arrest of Putin for war crimes. Yet despite their agreements with the ICC, Mongolia welcomed Putin with a red carpet. 
In September 2004, Mongolia essentially ignored an International Criminal Court arrest warrant out for Vladimir Putin as it welcomed the Russian leader for an official visit. Putin is seen with Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh during the visit (Credit: Russian Presidency, cc-by-sa 4.0).
Dierkes added that the government may perceive limited downside to participation.
“A radically realistic or perhaps cynical analysis might also suggest that the ‘Board of Peace’ will achieve exactly nothing, so that there is also very little cost to joining,” he said.
He also noted the continued importance of the US in Mongolia’s diplomatic calculations.
“Of course, the US is of particular, if largely symbolic, importance to the Mongolian government in maintaining ‘third neighbour’ links to counter pressure from its two overbearing immediate neighbours,” Dierkes said.
Amar described Mongolia’s current posture as a careful balancing act.
“Mongolia is playing a delicate game of ‘Three-Way Neutrality,’” he said. “If Moscow is open to the Board, Ulaanbaatar has a green light to flirt with Washington without fearing a backlash from the Kremlin.”
For now, Beijing’s response remains muted, and Ulaanbaatar appears willing to take the risk — betting that another seat at another table, even a controversial one, is better than being left out altogether.
By Michael Kohn

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