Mongolia's New Cabinet Is Assembled. Now Comes the Hard Part www.capitalmarkets.mn

Mongolia's 35th government was sworn in at 2:24 in the morning on April 4 — an unglamorous hour that perhaps captured the mood. Prime Minister Uchral N., confirmed by parliament just days earlier as the country's third prime minister in nine months, presented a 19-minister cabinet drawn from three parties: 16 from the ruling MPP, two from the Hun Party, and one from the National Coalition, spanning 16 ministries. Uchral N. framed the moment plainly: the government walks in facing a "triple crisis" of rising fuel prices, commodity market volatility, and domestic political fragmentation.

10 Ministers Held Over, 9 New Faces: Reading the Cabinet for Policy Signals
The most telling number in this cabinet is ten — the ministers carried directly over from the Zandanshatar G. government that collapsed just days ago. In a country that has now cycled through three prime ministers in nine months, the continuity is deliberate. Uchral N. told parliament he prioritised speed and stability over a clean slate, noting that mid-crisis reshuffles generate legal disputes, transitional costs, and lost momentum. On that logic, the holdovers make sense. 

The Ministers That Matter to Investors
Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources — Damdinnyam G. (holdover): The most consequential holdover for markets, and the one investors should watch most closely. Damdinnyam G. is a mining man in the fullest sense and has spent his tenure pushing one of the most sweeping reform agendas the sector has seen. Since taking office, he has been driving amendments to the Minerals Law as the centrepiece of his reform agenda — one of five key pieces of legislation he has targeted for overhaul. On royalties, the agenda is specific: restructuring copper royalty progressive payments to international standards; setting appropriate rates on processed and beneficiated products to incentivise domestic value-added manufacturing; aligning royalties on co-occurring elements with global norms; and channelling a greater share directly to the aimags and communities where extraction actually takes place. The broader direction is a deliberate shift away from equity-heavy agreements toward royalty-based structures — a model he has pointed to explicitly via the recent Orano uranium deal. He remains the government's point man on the Oyu Tolgoi renegotiation with Rio Tinto, which carries a first-half 2026 deadline. His position on Mongolia's benefit share: 53%, non-negotiable.

Minister of Finance — Mendsaikhan Z. (new): A first-time minister with a domestic economics background and prior roles spanning public investment, energy sector administration, and presidential advisory work. He pledged continuity with outgoing Finance Minister Javkhlan B.'s policy framework — a signal of fiscal stability rather than reform ambition. The more immediately significant signal came from Uchral N. himself, who announced on the day the cabinet was formed that the government is shifting into full austerity mode without waiting for a budget amendment — cutting non-essential spending, freezing new procurement, and reducing civil service costs. For holders of Mongolian government bonds and those watching sovereign credit dynamics, that posture matters: it suggests the new government understands the budget's vulnerability — Mongolia faces a ₮3.3 trillion fiscal gap — and is not waiting for the next political crisis before acting.

Minister of Energy — Naidalaa B. (new, Hun Party): The most substantively interesting new appointment. Naidalaa B. is a former Hun Party chairman, and the energy portfolio going to the Hun Party is no accident. The party has been Mongolia's most consistent institutional voice for structural energy reform since joining the 2024 coalition, with energy listed as a top priority from the outset. The National Energy Reform Committee, established in 2024 under the coalition, drove the first real electricity tariff adjustments to reflect actual costs in years and initiated revisions to both the Law on Renewable Energy and the Law on Energy. The party's deputy leader Dorjkhand T. chaired the subcommittee on energy investments, tariff reform, and mega projects — signing frameworks with Envision Group and advancing talks with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Korea on renewable energy investment. Naidalaa B. inherits that entire reform architecture. His mandate spans the immediate power supply crisis, a renewable transition targeting 30% of installed capacity by 2030, and positioning Mongolia as a credible future energy exporter. The appointment signals that energy is being treated as a structural priority, not dispensed as a factional reward.

A New Cabinet, A Narrow Window
The governance questions are real and on the record. But the more pressing question for investors is not who raised concerns on confirmation night — it is what this cabinet does in the weeks ahead. The Oyu Tolgoi deadline is live. The budget needs to hold. The energy sector needs to deliver a winter without blackouts. A new investment law that has been promised at every economic forum for a decade is once again on the table — this time with the man who made that promise now sitting in the prime minister's chair. The cabinet is imperfect. The moment is not. Whether one can rise to meet the other is what investors should be watching.

Deliberative Council Assesses Progress of ‘Mongolians—Stewards of Their Wealth’ Polling www.montsame.mn

 A regular meeting of the Deliberative Council responsible for organizing the “Mongolians – Stewards of Their Wealth” deliberative polling was held.

During the meeting, members received a presentation from the National Statistics Office on the first phase of the polling, which was conducted nationwide from March 27 to April 3. They also discussed preparations for the second phase, scheduled to take place this coming weekend.

The Government of Mongolia issued a resolution to organize a nationwide deliberative polling with a purpose to implement the Law on National Wealth Fund, increase its revenue and ensure its fair and equitable distribution to citizens. In this context, a nine-member Deliberative Council was set up to oversee the organization of the nationwide polling.

The first stage of the deliberative poll was held nationwide from March 27 to April 3. The second stage is scheduled for April 11–12 at the State Palace in Ulaanbaatar.

Ukraine ranks among the worst in Europe for internet freedom, while the US lags behind Mongolia www.dev.ua

Cloudwards rated internet freedom in Ukraine at 44 points out of 100. In the European segment of the rating, only Belarus and Russia were lower.

Ukraine ranks among the worst in Europe for internet freedom, while the US lags behind Mongolia
This is stated in the study Internet Freedom by Country in 2026 from Cloudwards. The authors assessed 171 countries on five criteria: access to torrents, adult content, social networks, political and civic content and VPN. To calculate, they used data from OONI Explorer, materials from Freedom House, as well as government announcements, court decisions and regulatory acts.

Ukraine, with a score of 44, was in the same group as Cambodia, El Salvador, Israel, and Somalia. For comparison, the United States received 64 points, the United Kingdom 52, South Korea 32, and Mongolia 76. That is, in this dimension, Ukraine was not only lower than most EU countries, but also lower than a number of states that are rarely mentioned as examples of digital freedom.

The list is topped by 11 countries with a score of 92. Among them are Belgium, Denmark, Finland, New Zealand, Norway and Timor Leste. The worst result is in North Korea, which received 0 points. China, Iran, Pakistan and Russia each have 4 points. Separately, the authors emphasize that the most persecuted category in the world remains torrents: even in countries with the highest scores, this segment is not completely free due to copyright restrictions.

This ranking should be read not as a simple scale of «free or unfree internet», but as a cross-section of specific restrictions. Even the best-performing countries did not score 100, and Ukraine’s 44 points mean that the problem lies not in one single ban, but in a combination of restrictions on access to content, online expression and tools for circumventing blocks. For the reader, this essentially means one simple thing: in terms of rules for accessing the open internet, Ukraine is now closer to the bottom of the global list than to the European leaders.

Previously, dev.ua wrote about how the Ministry of Digital Affairs is developing an order that will fix specific Internet speed figures that are mandatory for all operators, but quality indicators will increase gradually until 2030.

37,337 people sign petition seeking dismissal of Kh.Nyambaatar www.gogo.mn

Since March 31, 37,337 people had signed a petition calling for the dismissal of Mayor Kh.Nyambaatar.

The petition is being collected on the www.uih.mn website and is addressed to Prime Minister N.Uchral in order to protect civil and public interests guaranteed by the Constitution and relevant laws.

The petition states that Kh.Nyambaatar, Governor of the Capital City and Mayor of Ulaanbaatar, may have created conditions that constitute ethical and legal violations in the exercise of his official duties. The petition cites several concerns, including the organization of demonstrations against citizens and incitement of the public.

It alleges that, in response to citizens’ opinions and protests, the city administration has used civil servants and party members to organize counter-demonstrations and gatherings, thereby directly and indirectly affecting citizens’ constitutional rights to express their views and hold peaceful demonstrations, while also fostering division among the public.

The petition further states that organizing actions against citizens through a state institution is incompatible with democratic governance principles. 

It also raises concerns over human rights violations and inappropriate conduct, saying that Kh.Nyambaatar has verbally insulted and slandered citizens and journalists who have made lawful demands. It claims that during demonstrations, he labeled citizens as “terrorists,” disclosed citizens’ home addresses, and displayed behavior unfit for a public official.

The petition also criticizes what it describes as opaque and inefficient budget spending. It says that during Nyambaatar’s tenure, the capital city’s total budget expenditure increased sharply from MNT 1 trillion 277.9 billion to MNT 5 trillion 866 billion, while implementation results, social impact, budget transparency, and oversight mechanisms remain insufficient and unclear to the public.

It further argues that high-value investment projects have been implemented inefficiently, underperformed, or not carried out as planned, raising concerns over whether the principle of fiscal responsibility has been compromised.

CJ Foodville expands K-bakery reach in Asia as Mongolia cake sales top 1.7m www.biz.chosun.com

Tous les Jours, operated by CJ Foodville, said on the 7th that it is continuing steady growth in key Asian markets such as Mongolia and Indonesia based on its master franchise strategy.

CJ Foodville said that in Mongolia it sold more than 1.7 million cakes cumulatively over 10 years. Brand recognition is so high that 1 out of every 2 people in Mongolia has bought a Tous les Jours cake.

Tous les Jours entered Mongolia for the first time among domestic bakery brands in May 2016 by signing a master franchise agreement with the local "Artisan LLC" (then named Mong Bakery). Since then, it has expanded stores centered on Ulaanbaatar and has recently been increasing openings in provincial cities.

As of the end of February, Tous les Jours operates 24 stores in Mongolia, and in the first quarter it also renovated some locations to align with the domestic Tous les Jours brand.

In Indonesia, it is also delivering remarkable results through collaboration with the local master franchise company. Since entering Indonesia in 2011, Tous les Jours has operated stores in key commercial districts centered on Jakarta, the capital area. In addition, through collaboration with the local corporations "Sora," it is expanding store openings to regions outside the capital area.

A CJ Foodville official said, "Tous les Jours is continuing to grow by collaborating with excellent master franchise companies in the Asian market," adding, "As a brand leading K-bakery in the global market, we will create a new formula for success through a more differentiated strategy."

Government Reopens Bank Accounts of 12,100 Companies for One Month www.montsame.mn

Mongolia’s 35th Prime Minister, Uchral Nyam-Osor, has issued his Directive No. 01 to temporarily reopen the bank accounts of 12,100 companies that had been frozen due to tax debts. The accounts will be accessible for one month starting today.

The directive was issued based on the General Law on Taxation due to the current economic challenges. Through the directive, the companies are allowed to settle their tax liabilities, pay salaries, and resume their operations.

Prime Minister Uchral has launched the first measure under the “Chuluulye” (Liberate) Initiative, which aims to reduce red tape and place greater trust in the private sector and citizens, according to the Press and Public Relations Department of the Cabinet Secretariat.

Number of Tourists Up by 40% www.montsame.mn

The number of tourists visiting Mongolia increased by 39% in the first quarter of this year compared to the same period last year.

Specifically, 143,431 tourists arrived in the first quarter, an increase of 40,580 compared to last year. In March alone, 59,317 tourists visited, which is 19,815 more than in March 2025—representing a 50% increase.

According to the Mongolia Tourism Organization, the steady growth in inbound tourist flows is the result of the joint efforts and cooperation of stakeholders in the tourism sector.

Mongolia Keeps AI-92 Fuel Price Stable, Raises Diesel and AI-95 Prices www.montsame.mn

Mongolia has stabilised the border price of AI-92 gasoline at USD 705 per ton under its agreement with Russia’s Rosneft, reported the Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources.

While the price of AI-92 gasoline remains unchanged, prices for AI-95 gasoline and diesel fuel have been increased to some extent. In Ulaanbaatar, retail diesel prices stood at MNT 3,490–3,990 per litre on April 4–5. In the countryside, diesel is sold at MNT 4,500 per litre in Uvs aimag and MNT 4,200 per litre in Dornod aimag. The price of AI-95 gasoline is MNT 4,100 per litre.

Mongolia imports around 97 percent of its petroleum products from Russia.

Mongolia mining: wealth beneath the Gobi and its global stakes www.identecsolutions.com

A landlocked giant in the making Mongolia mining sits at the center of a paradox: a sparsely populated, landlocked country that has become indispensable to several of the world’s most resource-hungry industries. Wedged between Russia and China, Mongolia controls a vast interior of steppe and desert that conceals some of Asia’s most significant mineral endowments. Over the past two decades, mining has evolved from a peripheral activity into the backbone of national development, shaping everything from fiscal policy to urban growth in Ulaanbaatar.

Copper and coal dominate the narrative, yet gold, fluorspar, and emerging critical minerals are increasingly part of the conversation. This concentration of wealth underground has created both opportunity and vulnerability. High commodity prices can rapidly lift government revenues and foreign exchange earnings, but downturns expose the narrowness of the economic base. Infrastructure limitations, particularly transport and power, repeatedly constrain the pace at which resources can be extracted and exported.

At the same time, Mongolia’s position in global supply chains is rising as manufacturers and governments seek alternatives to more geopolitically risky sources of minerals. Investors view the country as geologically world class but operationally complex, where regulatory clarity and logistical capacity often matter as much as ore grades.

For Mongolians, mining promises jobs, royalties, and modernization, yet it also raises questions about inequality, environmental stewardship, and the future of traditional pastoral livelihoods. Understanding this tension is essential to grasp why Mongolia mining has implications far beyond its borders. (1)

What lies beneath the Gobi
The geological foundations of Mongolia mining are rooted in a series of mineral belts that stretch across the southern and central regions of the country, many of them exposed in the arid expanses of the Gobi Desert. The most internationally significant of these is the Oyu Tolgoi copper-gold system, one of the largest known deposits of its kind, where multiple ore bodies have been identified at considerable depth.

To the east and west of this complex lie extensive coal basins containing both thermal and high-quality coking coal, crucial for steelmaking. These basins have attracted large-scale investment and underpin Mongolia’s role as a key supplier to regional heavy industry. Beyond copper and coal, Mongolia hosts meaningful deposits of gold, silver, molybdenum, and fluorspar, the latter being an important input for chemical and aluminum industries. In recent years, attention has also turned to rare earth elements and uranium, resources that align with global trends toward electrification and energy diversification, though their commercial viability remains less certain. The spatial distribution of these resources closely follows ancient tectonic boundaries, making exploration geologically promising but logistically challenging due to remoteness and harsh climate.

Many deposits lie far from rail lines, water sources, and reliable electricity, increasing development costs. Nevertheless, the sheer scale and diversity of Mongolia’s mineral endowment explain why Mongolia mining continues to attract international exploration companies and strategic interest from major economies. The country’s resource map is still incomplete, suggesting that future discoveries could further elevate its global importance. (2)

An industry caught between ambition and constraints
The current state of Mongolia’s mining industry reflects a mix of world-class assets and persistent operational bottlenecks. Large-scale projects coexist with mid-tier producers and a sizeable artisanal and small-scale sector that provides livelihoods in rural areas but operates with limited oversight.

The government plays a central role through licensing, taxation, and, in some cases, equity participation in major mines, seeking to balance national interests with the need for foreign capital and technical expertise.

Infrastructure remains a defining constraint, as many mines depend on long-distance trucking to reach the Chinese border, while rail connections are still being expanded and modernized. Water scarcity in the Gobi adds another layer of complexity, forcing companies to invest heavily in recycling systems and alternative supply arrangements.

Environmental and social governance expectations have risen, with local communities increasingly vocal about dust, land use, and the protection of pasturelands (see also: Responsible mining). Permitting processes, while improving, can still be unpredictable, affecting project timelines and investor confidence.

At the same time, Mongolia has made efforts to align its regulatory framework with international standards, participating in transparency initiatives and strengthening environmental assessment requirements. Skills shortages and reliance on imported equipment also shape the industry’s performance, particularly during periods of rapid expansion.

Despite these challenges, production levels have steadily increased, supported by high global demand for copper and coal. The sector’s trajectory will depend on whether Mongolia can translate its mineral potential into more reliable infrastructure, clearer policy, and broader economic diversification beyond raw exports. (3)

Exports, borders, and the China question
Mongolia mining is deeply shaped by trade geography, as almost all of the country’s major mineral exports ultimately move south to China. Copper concentrate, coking coal, and thermal coal dominate export earnings, making Mongolia one of China’s most important raw material suppliers for steel and power generation. This concentration has delivered scale and reliable demand, but it has also created structural dependence that limits Mongolia’s bargaining power.

When Chinese demand slows, or border procedures tighten, Mongolian producers feel the impact almost immediately through lower prices, inventory build-ups, and reduced government revenues. Most exports still rely heavily on trucking across a handful of Gobi border crossings, a system vulnerable to weather, congestion, and regulatory changes. Rail infrastructure is gradually improving, yet network gaps and gauge differences continue to complicate logistics and raise costs.

Efforts to diversify markets, including discussions around additional processing or alternative routes through Russia, have progressed slowly due to high capital requirements and geopolitical sensitivities. Within Mongolia, debates persist over whether to move beyond raw material exports by investing in domestic smelting, coal washing, or downstream industries, but these options require large-scale energy and water inputs that are not always available (see also: mining technology). Price volatility further amplifies risk, as government budgets remain closely tied to mineral revenues.

Despite these vulnerabilities, Mongolia’s proximity to China also provides a stable, long-term outlet for its resources, ensuring that Mongolia's mining remains tightly integrated into regional industrial supply chains for the foreseeable future. (4)

Geopolitics and the balancing act
Mongolia mining occupies a central place in the country’s foreign policy, as resource wealth intersects with its delicate position between two major powers. Russia and China exert economic and strategic influence through energy supplies, transit routes, and investment, yet Mongolia has long pursued a “third neighbour” strategy to broaden its diplomatic and economic partnerships with countries such as Japan, South Korea, the United States, and members of the European Union.

This balancing act is particularly visible in the mining sector, where Western capital and technology have played a crucial role in developing flagship projects. At the same time, Mongolia must carefully manage relations with China, its dominant export destination, to avoid disruptions that could destabilize its economy. Geopolitical tensions and global efforts to secure critical mineral supply chains have increased international interest in Mongolia, but they have also intensified scrutiny over governance, environmental standards, and national control of resources.

Periods of resource nationalism, including shifts in taxation or ownership rules, have occasionally strained investor confidence, while more recent reforms have aimed to improve stability and transparency. Infrastructure projects, such as rail links and energy connections, are often entangled with broader strategic considerations involving both neighbours.

As the world moves toward electrification and decarbonization, Mongolia mining could gain further geopolitical significance due to its copper and emerging critical mineral potential. How Mongolia navigates these external pressures while safeguarding sovereignty will be decisive for its long-term development. (5)

Possible paths for the next decade
The future of Mongolia’s mining sector will likely unfold along multiple possible trajectories shaped by commodity cycles, infrastructure investment, and policy choices. In an optimistic scenario, sustained demand for copper and other transition-related minerals encourages large-scale upgrades to rail, power, and water systems, reducing logistics costs and enabling higher production volumes. Clearer permitting processes and consistent fiscal rules could attract additional foreign investment, while gradual diversification into processing and related industries would create more domestic value. A more cautious baseline assumes steady output growth but continued dependence on a limited number of major projects and export routes, leaving the economy exposed to periodic shocks from border disruptions or price swings. Under this path, incremental improvements in governance and infrastructure help, but structural vulnerabilities remain.

A downside scenario envisions prolonged infrastructure bottlenecks, policy reversals, or a sharp global demand downturn, leading to stalled projects, fiscal stress, and social tension in mining regions. Environmental pressures, particularly water scarcity in the Gobi, could also constrain expansion if not managed effectively.

Much will depend on how effectively the government, companies, and local communities collaborate on development, environmental protection, and benefit-sharing. Mongolia’s mineral wealth offers significant potential, but realising it will require careful coordination, long-term planning, and a willingness to balance economic ambition with sustainability and social stability. (6)

 FAQ
Why is mining so important to Mongolia’s economy?
Mining is the largest contributor to Mongolia’s export earnings, foreign investment, and government revenues. It supports jobs directly in extraction and indirectly in transport, services, and construction. Because other sectors, such as manufacturing and agriculture, are relatively small in comparison, fluctuations in commodity prices and production levels have an outsized impact on national economic performance. This makes Mongolia highly dependent on the stability and competitiveness of its mining sector.

What are the main environmental challenges linked to Mongolia's mining?
Water scarcity, particularly in the Gobi region, is the most critical constraint, as large-scale operations require significant water for processing and dust control. Land disturbance, air quality issues from trucking, and potential impacts on pastoral livelihoods are additional concerns. Companies and regulators have increasingly focused on water recycling, stricter environmental assessments, and community engagement to mitigate these risks, but balancing development with sustainability remains an ongoing challenge.

Does Mongolia plan to process more minerals domestically?
There is growing interest in adding value through coal washing, copper smelting, or other forms of domestic processing, but progress has been slow. These projects require significant investments in energy, water, and infrastructure that are not yet fully in place. While policymakers see local processing as a way to create jobs and reduce reliance on raw exports, economic and logistical barriers continue to limit the pace of this shift.

Takeaway
Mongolia’s mining sector is a cornerstone of its development, built on globally significant deposits that connect the country to regional and global supply chains while exposing it to infrastructure limits, market dependence, and geopolitical pressure. In the years ahead, success will depend not only on geology and investment but on stronger mine risk management, including better water governance in the Gobi, more resilient transport systems, rigorous safety standards, and proactive community engagement to reduce operational, environmental, and social risks that could otherwise disrupt production and public trust.

BY  Mark Buzinkay

Mongolia’s SOE Debt Doubles to ₮11 Trillion Since 2023 www.insidemongolia.mn

Mongolia’s state-owned enterprises are grappling with a growing debt crisis, and since 2023, their debt has doubled to ₮11 trillion.

How Big is the SOEs Debt?

This is nearly 1/3 of the country’s ₮32.9 trillion national budget for 2026, and it also accounts for 24% of total national debt. Of this, ₮7.2 trillion is short-term and must be repaid within a year, while ₮4 trillion is long-term. Short-term obligations include ₮3 trillion from pre-collected revenue, ₮3.4 trillion from other sources, and ₮0.2 trillion from bonds, highlighting urgent repayment pressures. Back in January 2025, 44 non-mining SOEs were merged under Erchist Mongolia LLC to improve management and governance, but the initiative has since failed.

Erchist Mongolia LLC Fails: The company recently faced liquidation after operating at a ₮3.5 billion loss, and it failed to manage its own operations, let alone address the losses of other SOEs. A company leaving this much debt within a year would be impossible anywhere except under state ownership, which underscores how deep the SOE debt problem has become and why urgent solutions are needed.

Government External Debt Remains High

As of Q4 2025, Mongolia’s external debt from multilateral and bilateral lenders totals ₮23.1 trillion, while the country’s total external debt is around ₮32 trillion. 53% of the bilateral/multilateral debt is owed to multilateral lenders, and 47% to bilateral partners. Major multilateral creditors include the Asian Development Bank with ₮7.7 trillion and the World Bank with ₮3 trillion, while key bilateral lenders are China with ₮3.9 trillion, Japan with ₮2.8 trillion, India with ₮1.4 trillion, and South Korea with ₮1.3 trillion.

Currency Exposure Highlights Vulnerabilities: Debt exposure by currency underscores Mongolia’s dependence on foreign financing. 55% of this debt is in US dollars, 20% in IMF Special Drawing Rights, and the remainder in yen, euro, won, and other currencies. This makes repayment sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations and global financial conditions.
Public Finances Under Strain

Rising SOE obligations, combined with high external debt, are creating mounting pressure on Mongolia’s public finances. Repayment deadlines and currency exposure pose serious risks that policymakers cannot ignore, and the newly appointed Prime Minister now faces the reality that the government itself carries huge debt. Any plan to privatize SOEs or increase transparency must first tackle the massive, unmanageable obligations weighing on the state.