Ex-President Moon to Visit Mongolia, a Potential US-North Korea Summit Site www.en.sedaily.com

Mongolia Holds Diplomatic Ties With Both Koreas, Longstanding Bond With the North
A 2018 Summit Contender and Host of the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue
President Lee's State Visit Underscored the Country's Role on the Peninsula
Moon Cast in a Former-Leader Diplomacy Role, Echoing Carter in 1994
Aligning With Lee's Dialogue Push, Drawing Attention as an Unofficial Bridge

Former President Moon Jae-in will visit Mongolia as early as next week. With U.S. President Donald Trump raising the possibility of pursuing a summit with North Korea around the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) leaders' meeting set for November in Shenzhen, China, attention is turning to the trip by Moon, who has experience in both inter-Korean and U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy. Mongolia was among the candidate sites for the 2018 U.S.-North Korea summit.

According to political sources on the 20th, Moon is arranging a visit to Mongolia as early as next week. The specific purpose of the trip and whom he will meet have not been disclosed. Still, given that Moon held three inter-Korean summits with the North Korean leader during his term and coordinated directly with Trump on the North's nuclear program, attention is focused on the possibility that his experience and personal networks could be tapped as the situation on the Korean Peninsula shifts.

Some observers expect a diplomatic role for a former head of state, much as former U.S. President Jimmy Carter visited Pyongyang in 1994, when the North Korean nuclear crisis was at its peak, and helped open the way to U.S.-North Korea talks.

Moon's trip draws added interest as Trump has repeatedly signaled his willingness to resume dialogue with the North Korean leader. With the United States sending conciliatory messages toward the North, including adjustments to the scale of the South Korea-U.S. joint military exercises, there is growing talk that the situation on the peninsula could move back toward dialogue.

Mongolia, in particular, maintains diplomatic relations with both Koreas and has kept a longstanding friendly relationship with North Korea. Ahead of last year's APEC leaders' meeting in Gyeongju, when the prospect of a U.S.-North Korea summit was raised, former Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj, who was then visiting South Korea, said in a broadcast interview that "if a U.S.-North Korea summit is held, Ulaanbaatar could be the best location."

Mongolia has also positioned itself as a mediator and dialogue platform on Korean Peninsula issues by hosting the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, a forum discussing the North Korean nuclear program and Northeast Asian security matters, since 2014. It was against this backdrop that Ulaanbaatar was floated as a candidate site for the 2018 U.S.-North Korea summit.

In fact, Mongolia's role as a bridge between the two Koreas also drew attention during President Lee Jae-myung's visit to the country about a month ago. Given that Lee has stressed the need to ease tensions on the peninsula and resume inter-Korean dialogue, expectations were raised that Mongolia — which maintains traditional ties with the North while expanding cooperation with the South — could become a channel for delivering messages to the North going forward.

Former President Moon Jae-in meets with the Democratic Party leadership at his private residence in Pyeongsan Village, Habuk-myeon, Yangsan, South Gyeongsang Province, on Jan. 2, 2023. Yonhap News

In diplomatic circles, some analysts say that in such circumstances the role of unofficial channels — used to gauge the other side's intentions and exchange messages ahead of formal negotiations — could become more important. Moon not only spoke directly with the North Korean leader but also shuttled between Trump and the North Korean leader during the U.S.-North Korea summit diplomacy of 2018 and 2019, coordinating both sides' positions.

The view is gaining traction that, drawing on this experience, Moon could directly confirm the intentions of North Korea's top leader through Mongolia — a third country with wide room to maneuver — and relay them to the U.S. side, helping turn a standoff back toward dialogue.

Of course, since the specific purpose, schedule and interlocutors of Moon's Mongolia trip have not been disclosed, it would be premature to link it directly to the Lee Jae-myung government's efforts on a special envoy to the North or to mediation between the United States and North Korea.

Still, the assessment is that Moon's visit to Mongolia is notable in that it comes at a time when, with official dialogue between the United States and North Korea cut off, Trump is openly floating the possibility of a meeting with the North Korean leader. The interpretation is that if a former head of state or a third country is used to probe the other side's intentions and deliver messages before official diplomatic channels move, it could help raise the prospects of dialogue down the road.

Asia-Pacific Community: Chinese know-how fuels Mongolia's Gobi greening drive www.xinhuanet.com

Deep in Mongolia's Gobi area, technicians from China's M-Grass Ecology and Environment (Group) Co., Ltd. crouched on the sandy ground, inspecting newly planted Haloxylon ammodendron seedlings in Khanbogd County. With meticulous care, they parted the gravel to confirm each root was firmly nestled in soil.

Characterized by vegetation cover below 10 percent, annual precipitation of approximately 104 mm, winter temperatures as low as minus 31.5 degrees Celsius and summer maxima exceeding 42.2 degrees Celsius, this harsh setting creates major challenges for afforestation. Yet, backed by the Chinese enterprise, a durable green initiative is progressing.

The Haloxylon ammodendron forest project sits near Mongolian wild ass habitats, where M‑Grass technicians are now preparing for large‑scale planting this autumn.

"Whether Haloxylon ammodendron seedlings take root and survive depends on hydrological surveys, native vegetation assessments, seedling selection, soil testing, fertilizer comparisons, planting depth, irrigation during early growth, and meticulous subsequent maintenance," said Wang Junfang, the project's technical team leader.

"Gobi afforestation must fully respect desert ecology. The planting process also seeks to protect the native vegetation already growing on this land," he added.

To minimize disruption to the Gobi surface and native plants, the technical team downsized the planting pit from 40 to 20 centimeters in diameter, enabling more precise operations that protect the desert ecosystem during afforestation.

The 400-hectare Haloxylon ammodendron forest project, a key component of Mongolia's One Billion Trees initiative, is led by a Mongolian enterprise with ecological restoration technology consultation provided by M-Grass.

The project plans to plant 330,000 Haloxylon ammodendron seedlings. The location was chosen in a Gobi area historically home to wild Haloxylon, leveraging local species' drought resilience to improve survival rates.

The project's field investigations began in May 2025, with 80 hectares planted last fall. This autumn, the project aims to plant 200 additional hectares using a proven "mechanical digging plus manual planting" method, a process expected to be completed within two months. The remaining acreage will be carried over to the following year.

In parallel with main afforestation tasks, the project has established a 10-hectare research demonstration zone. Over 20 native Mongolian species are being tested for plant biodiversity comparison, alongside adaptation trials of proven Chinese ecological products. The goal is to tailor China's experience in desertification control to Mongolia's local conditions.

Regarding irrigation design, Wang said the technical team adopts a water-saving approach based on the Gobi's water resource endowment. Natural precipitation supplemented by staged watering is planned to support seedlings during critical growth periods. Once fully established, seedlings will rely primarily on natural rainfall for maintenance.

Beyond ecological restoration, the Gobi afforestation project is designed to benefit local communities. Haloxylon ammodendron is a key desert host plant that often supports Cistanche deserticola, a medicinal parasitic plant. The team plans to trial Cistanche grafting on mature Haloxylon ammodendron two years after planting, while also monitoring carbon sequestration, to turn these sand‑fixing forests into economic assets for local communities.

China-Mongolia ecological cooperation is expanding on multiple fronts.

The China-Mongolia Desertification Prevention and Control Cooperation Center was inaugurated in Ulan Bator in September 2023. The center actively supports Mongolia's One Billion Trees initiative, including building ecological protection and restoration demonstration zones, promoting China's afforestation and desertification control technologies and models, and carrying out sandstorm monitoring and early warning cooperation.

M-Grass is also collaborating with another Mongolian company to advance mine site restoration and integrated grassland-livestock projects. They plan to pilot an 8-hectare mine slope restoration, covering drainage construction, soil improvement, vegetation planting, and long-term monitoring and evaluation.

Fan Lijun, director of the Belt and Road Initiative Research Institute at Inner Mongolia Academy of Social Sciences, said bringing China's mature desertification control experience to Mongolia and localizing it through resource‑based practice, while pursuing both ecological protection and industrial cultivation, is a new highlight in advancing the Belt and Road cooperation and the China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor.

Fitch Affirms Mongolia at 'B+'; Outlook Stable www.fitchratings.com

Fitch Ratings - Hong Kong - 19 Aug 2026: Fitch Ratings has affirmed Mongolia's Long-Term Issuer Default Ratings (IDRs) at 'B+' with a Stable Outlook.

Mongolia's ratings are supported by strong medium-term growth, modest government debt and high per capita income relative to 'B' category peers. These strengths are balanced by the country's high reliance on external funding and commodity exports to China, which make it vulnerable to external shocks. High external debt, modest foreign-exchange reserves and a record of procyclical economic policy add to external vulnerabilities. Mongolia scores well on World Bank Governance Indicators (WBGIs) relative to 'B' category peers, but faces policy uncertainty.

A full list of rating actions is at the end of this rating action commentary.

Key Rating Drivers
Mining to Sustain GDP Growth: We forecast robust real GDP growth of 5.6% in 2026 and around 5.5% in the medium term, driven by continued mining and infrastructure investment. Strong copper and gold exports remain underpinned by the expansion in underground operations at the Oyu Tolgoi mine and solid global demand. Meanwhile, resilient Chinese demand and improving cross-border transport links sustain growth in coal export volumes.

Renewed Inflationary Pressure: We expect inflation to average 10% in 2026 on persistent food price pressure and rising energy costs, holding it above the Bank of Mongolia's 4%-8% target range. The effect of the global oil price shock, triggered by the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, had been mitigated by stable, low-cost Russian supplies. However, fuel shortages have emerged in Russia since July 2026, prompting Mongolia to seek alternative supplies from Korea and China and introduce temporary fuel rationing.

Political Tension Ahead of Elections: Mongolia has had three prime ministers over the past year, reflecting heightened political instability, despite broad policy continuity under the ruling party's simple parliamentary majority. Mongolia has also entered a prolonged election cycle, with presidential and parliamentary elections due in 2027 and 2028, respectively. Party divisions and political tension could complicate decision-making on sensitive issues, such as resource management, while rising spending pressure risks fiscal slippages.

Fiscal Position to Shift to Deficits: We expect the overall fiscal balance to shift to a deficit of 2.2% of GDP in 2026, from a 1.5% surplus in 2025. The government plans to introduce a supplementary budget in September to incorporate public-sector wage increases and tax cuts. The authorities reversed value-added tax rebates introduced in 2025 and replaced them in May 2026 with a package of cuts carrying a lower fiscal cost, though these still weigh on non-mining revenue.

The government has concluded lengthy negotiations with Rio Tinto on the Oyu Tolgoi shareholders agreement. The revised terms reduce project costs and could bring forward the government's first dividend receipt to as early as 2026. We have not incorporated this into our fiscal forecasts, given uncertainty over the timing and amount.

Off-Budget Spending: Our fiscal deficit projections include expenditure on two mega projects - a hydropower plant and an oil refinery - at a combined cost of around USD2 billion, financed by concessional bilateral borrowing. We expect related disbursements of about 1.8% of GDP in 2026. The authorities exclude both projects from the budget to avoid breaching the 2.0% of GDP structural deficit ceiling, though we do not expect them to repeat such exclusions.

The ceiling applies to structural revenue, which is total revenue less allocations to the Fiscal Stabilisation Fund (FSF) and Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF). We project these allocations to total 2.1% of GDP.

Spending Pressure: We project the overall deficit to widen further to 3.3% of GDP in 2027, reflecting pre-election spending and a proposed pension reform package costing about 1.3% of GDP annually. We expect general government debt to rise gradually in the medium term, driven by borrowing for the two mega projects, elevated current spending and transfers to the SWF and the FSF, whose combined balance stood at about 10% of GDP in June 2026.

Large CADs; Moderate Reserve Buffers: We project the current account deficit (CAD) at 5.6% of GDP in 2026 amid higher oil import costs in 2H26. The deficit is largely financed by foreign direct investment and external borrowing, while structurally large service and primary income deficits constrain reserve accumulation from commodity exports. Gross official international reserves reached USD8.0 billion in July 2026, against USD7.0 billion at end-2025, covering less than four months of current account payments (projected 2026 'B' median: 4.2).

High External Debt: Net external debt, at 112% of GDP at end-2025, is about 6x the 'B' median. However, over 30% of this is foreign direct investment and more than 20% concessional loans, both of which we expect to remain stable sources of funding. Mongolia is among the world's most commodity-dependent sovereigns, with mineral exports (almost entirely to China) accounting for 90% of external receipts and 30% of government revenue.

ESG - Governance: Mongolia has a medium WBGI ranking at 47, reflecting its record of peaceful political transitions, moderate institutional capacity, established rule of law and a moderate level of corruption.

RATING SENSITIVITIES
Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Negative Rating Action/Downgrade
-External Finances: Significant external stress, potentially undermining external financing flows and leading to a decline in foreign reserves; for example, from a commodity shock amid expansionary domestic economic policies.

-Public Finances: Significant increase in the government debt/GDP ratio; for example, from sustained budget deficits or weaker medium-term growth prospects.

-Structural Features: Political instability or major policy shifts sufficient to significantly disrupt strategic mining projects or foreign direct investment inflows.

Factors that Could, Individually or Collectively, Lead to Positive Rating Action/Upgrade
-External Finances: Reduction in external financing risks; for example, through significant accumulation of foreign-currency reserves and a fall in net external debt, accompanied by prudent external debt management.

-Public Finances: Implementation of prudent fiscal policies that reduce pro-cyclicality and build fiscal buffers.

-Macroeconomic and Structural: Sustained strong economic growth without the emergence of imbalances, supported by a business environment conducive to robust foreign direct investment inflows.

Sovereign Rating Model (SRM) and Qualitative Overlay (QO)
Fitch's proprietary SRM assigns Mongolia a score equivalent to a rating of 'BB-‌' on the Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR scale.

Fitch's sovereign rating committee adjusted the output from the SRM score to arrive at the final Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR by applying its QO, relative to SRM data and output, as follows:

- External Finances: -1 notch, to reflect Mongolia's vulnerability to external shocks, given its dependence on commodity exports to China, particularly coal, as well its high external financing needs and debt in the context of modest foreign-exchange reserves.

Fitch's SRM is the agency's proprietary multiple regression rating model that employs 18 variables based on three-year centred averages, including one year of forecasts, to produce a score equivalent to a Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR. Fitch's QO is a forward-looking qualitative framework designed to allow for adjustment to the SRM output to assign the final rating, reflecting factors within our criteria that are not fully quantifiable and/or not fully reflected in the SRM.

Debt Instruments: Key Rating Drivers
Senior Unsecured Debt Equalised: The senior unsecured long-term debt ratings are equalised with Mongolia's Long-Term IDR, reflecting Fitch's expectation of average recovery prospects in a default scenario. We have assigned a Recovery Rating of RR4 to these debt instruments.

Country Ceiling
Mongolia's 'BB-‌' Country Ceiling is one notch above the Long-Term Foreign-Currency IDR. This reflects moderate constraints and incentives, relative to the IDR, against capital or exchange controls being imposed that would prevent or significantly impede the private sector from converting local currency into foreign currency and transferring the proceeds to non-resident creditors to service debt.

Fitch's Country Ceiling Model produced a starting point uplift of +1 notch above the IDR. Fitch's rating committee did not apply a qualitative adjustment to the model result.

REFERENCES FOR SUBSTANTIALLY MATERIAL SOURCE CITED AS KEY DRIVER OF RATING
The principal sources of information used in the analysis are described in the Applicable Criteria.

Climate Vulnerability Signals
Mongolia has an elevated Climate Vulnerability Signal (Climate.VS) of 50 in 2035, mainly reflecting exposure to transition risk. This stems from exposure to green energy costs and a decline in global demand for fossil fuels. The impact of current climatic conditions as well as the current cost of decarbonizing the economy are reflected in the SRM. We have not adjusted the rating beyond that to account for these factors, given the long time scale, the high uncertainty of the potential impact or the action Mongolia might take to adapt to or mitigate the exposure.

ESG Considerations
Mongolia has an ESG Relevance Score of '5[+]' for Political Stability and Rights, as WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and a key rating driver with a high weight. As Mongolia has a percentile rank above for the respective WBGI, this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

Mongolia has an ESG Relevance Score of '5' for Rule of Law, Institutional & Regulatory Quality and Control of Corruption, as WBGIs have the highest weight in Fitch's SRM and are therefore highly relevant to the rating and are a key rating driver with a high weight. As Mongolia has a percentile rank below 50 for the respective WBGI, this has a negative impact on the credit profile.

Mongolia has an ESG Relevance Score of '4[+]' for Human Rights and Political Freedoms, as the Voice and Accountability pillar of the WBGIs is relevant to the rating and a rating driver. As Mongolia has a percentile rank above 50 for the respective WBGI, this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

Mongolia has an ESG Relevance Score of '4[+]' for Creditor Rights, as willingness to service and repay debt is relevant to the rating and is a rating driver for Mongolia, as for all sovereigns. As Mongolia has a record of 20+ years without a restructuring of public debt, as captured in our SRM variable, this has a positive impact on the credit profile.

The highest level of ESG credit relevance is a score of '3', unless otherwise disclosed in this section. A score of '3' means ESG issues are credit-neutral or have only a minimal credit impact on the entity, either due to their nature or the way in which they are being managed by the entity. Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores are not inputs in the rating process; they are an observation on the relevance and materiality of ESG factors in the rating decision. For more information on Fitch's ESG Relevance Scores, visit www.fitchratings.com/topics/esg/products#esg-relevance-scores

Unlocking Mongolia's underground copper www.riotinto.com

Deep beneath Mongolia’s South Gobi region, more than a decade of work at Oyu Tolgoi is helping unlock one of the world’s largest known copper resources.

Demand for copper is growing, driven by emerging technologies like AI data centres, renewable energy, battery storage and the electricity networks that connect them. Supply shortages are expected to grow in the years ahead, with some forecasts predicting the world could face a copper supply deficit of around 30% by 2035.

Oyu Tolgoi is projected to become one of the world’s most important new copper sources, at a time when high-quality deposits are becoming harder to find and more complex to develop.

It’s already one of the world’s most significant copper-gold operations, comprising an open pit, a major concentrator and, since early 2023, a vast underground mine.

The combined operation will produce around 500,000 tonnes of copper a year on average from 2028 to 20361 – enough for about 6 million electric vehicles annually.

More than 80% of that value lies underground. And after more than a decade of planning, design, engineering, construction, and engagement with the Government of Mongolia, the underground project is now operational.

1 The 500ktpa copper production target (stated as recoverable metal) for the Oyu Tolgoi underground and open pit mines for the years 2028 to 2036 were previously reported in a release to the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) dated 11 July 2023 “Investor site visit to Oyu Tolgoi copper mine, Mongolia”. All material assumptions underpinning that production target continue to apply and have not materially changed.

Unlocking Oyu Tolgoi’s underground value
Discovered in 2001, Oyu Tolgoi has become one of the most technologically advanced, water efficient and safe mining complexes anywhere in the world.

The site contains a huge copper and gold resource that extends for at least 12 kilometres beneath the South Gobi Desert. It’s made up of several separate deposits, including the near-surface Oyut deposit in the centre of the mining licence area, the deeper Hugo North and Hugo South deposits, which contain the highest concentrations of copper, and the Heruga deposit to the southwest.

The vast underground Hugo North and South deposits were named after geologist Hugo T. Dummett (1940–2002), a key figure in the exploration and discovery of Oyu Tolgoi's copper–gold resources. Source: Delivering Oyu Tolgoi: Benefits and Challenges / Turquoise Hill Resources

While each deposit is different, together they make up one of the world's largest and most significant copper–gold resources.

Open pit mining at Oyu Tolgoi began in 2011, followed by first copper concentrate production from the concentrator in 2013.

The open pit established Oyu Tolgoi’s operations, but the project’s long-term future has always been underground.

And that underground journey has been our most significant effort to date.

Part of Oyu Tolgoi's secondary crusher, which is as tall as a 7-storey apartment block.

To mine the underground deposit, we’re using block caving, a technically demanding but highly efficient method of mining large, deep deposits of ore.

How the block caving process works.

We began digging shafts for the underground mine in 2005. The scope of work included sinking 5 shafts, building more than 200 kilometres of tunnels and installing a 6.7-kilometre inclined conveyor to the surface – one of the world’s largest underground conveyor systems.

Some parts of the mine reach depths of 1.3 kilometers – the same height as around 4 Eiffel Towers.
In 2009, the investment partners and the Government of Mongolia signed an Investment Agreement, initiating Mongolia’s largest industrial development to date.

Underground development paused in 2013 as the project partners worked through the project financing and related issues needed for the next phase of the project.

In 2015, the project partners agreed the project financing for the project and other commercial issues, clarifying the path forward, and work restarted in mid-2016.

During the construction, difficult ground conditions required changes to mine designs and sequencing, and COVID-19 restrictions in 2020/21 disrupted construction and contributed to shifting timelines. But design modifications and a further project reset in January 2022 helped clear the way for underground mining to begin.

Soon after, the first drawbells were fired at Hugo North, and in March 2023, sustainable underground production began 1.3 kilometres below the surface.

Since then, the underground mine has ramped up quickly.

Placing supports during Oyu Tolgoi's underground project construction.

We developed the orebody in multiple “lifts”, each several hundred metres high, like layers in a tiered cake. Within each lift, the ore is further divided into large sections called “panels” – separate mining zones that can be developed in sequence.

We initially opened around 15 drawbells – large, funnel-shaped voids blasted into the rock – each quarter, completing the first panel, Panel 0, ahead of schedule in 2024 and helping deliver record copper production.

Underground ore now makes up a growing share of concentrator feed and, because underground grades are more than 4 times higher than the open pit, the underground delivered twice the contained copper of the open pit in the first half of 2025 – making Oyu Tolgoi now a predominantly underground mine.

At the same time, developing Panels 1 and 2 continued to support the ramp-up to full underground production. In the first quarter of 2026, underground copper and gold production exceeded our plan by more than 10%, while development at Panel 2 continued ahead of schedule.

The operation also reached key infrastructure milestones, including commissioning the world’s longest conveyor-to-surface system and completing the second primary crusher – which is as tall as a 7-storey apartment block.

The underground ramp-up is strengthening Oyu Tolgoi’s broader contribution to Mongolia. To date, the operation is the largest foreign investment made in Mongolia, with over $17 billion invested in the mine and related assets since 2010.

Today, the mine supports around 17,000 workers, 97.8% of whom are Mongolian, and works with more than 500 national suppliers, with over $14 billion spent with in-country suppliers since 2010. Over that period, Oyu Tolgoi has paid US$6.1 billion in taxes, fees and other payments in Mongolia, including US$628 million in 2025.

As we continue to develop the mine, we’ve planned for staged drawpoint openings to steadily increase the underground operation’s output in the decades to come.

At full capacity, Hugo North Lift 1 is expected to supply ~95,000 tonnes per day, with the open pit contributing a further 20,000 tonnes.2

But maintaining that performance will require constant monitoring and adaptive management as we continue mining underground.

Safety has remained a constant focus throughout development and operations, reflecting the complexity and risks of large-scale underground mining. Block caving depends on disciplined systems, real-time monitoring and experienced teams to safely access deeply buried ore as underground conditions change.

At Oyu Tolgoi, that approach is supported by structured assurance processes, critical control checks, extensive workforce training, and a culture of continuous improvement.

Mongolia apologises after China raises security concerns about protesters at oil camp www.scmp.com

A senior Mongolian official has apologised after the Chinese embassy raised concern that Mongolians “harassed the camp” of a Chinese-invested oil exploration company.
According to Mongolian media reports, protesters went to the Kherlen Tohoi XXVIII oil exploration area and tried to stop exploration work by Mongolia Foison Energy last Friday.

They live-streamed the event, with social media footage showing two women dumping items belonging to Chinese workers onto the ground.

Two Mongolian citizens involved in the incident have been detained, according to local authorities.

Chinese chargé d’affaires Cao Li raised “serious concern” over the incident with Buriad Dashpurev, state secretary of Mongolia’s Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources, during a meeting on Tuesday, according to the embassy.

“We urge the Mongolian side to continue taking concrete measures to protect the lawful rights and interests of Chinese enterprises and the personal and property safety of Chinese employees, and prevent similar incidents from happening again,” the embassy said.

According to the embassy, Dashpurev apologised over the incident and said Mongolia would not tolerate interference with the lawful operations of Chinese companies.

Dashpurev described such acts as damaging to Mongolia’s national interests and economic security, adding that police had opened an investigation and that those involved had been detained, it said.

Mongolia Foison Energy is registered in Mongolia as a foreign-invested company and is owned by Hong Kong-registered Foison Energy Holdings Limited. It signed a production-sharing agreement with the Mongolian government for the Kherlen Tohoi XXVIII block in 2024, with plans to spend about US$50 million on exploration over eight years.

The incident came two months after another resources-related protest disrupted exports to China.

In June, members of a group called Mongolia’s Radical Reform Movement blocked a road used to transport copper concentrate from the Rio Tinto-controlled Oyu Tolgoi mine towards the Chinese border, demanding a greater share of mining revenues for Mongolians.

The landlocked country relies heavily on oil imports, exporting nearly all its crude to China while sourcing more than 95 per cent of its refined oil from Russia.

It has sought to balance the influence of China and Russia through a “third neighbour” policy of cultivating closer ties with other countries, including the United States, Japan and India.

China and Mongolia have been pushing to boost transport links and mineral extraction in recent years but with mixed success.

Construction of the Gashuun Sukhait-Ganqimaodu cross-border railway began in May 2025, making it the first new rail connection between the countries since 1956.
But the proposed Power of Siberia 2 pipeline, which would carry Russian gas to China through Mongolia, has remained stalled despite two decades of discussion.

By Alcott Wei 

Alcott Wei joined the Post to report on China in 2025, after working as an intern for the Beijing bureau in 2024 and has long had a keen interest in Chinese politics. He graduated from the Hong Kong Baptist University with a bachelor's degree in journalism and communication.

Spotlight on UN desertification summit as it mulls how to spend $12bn war chest www.theguardian.com

As swathes of the northern hemisphere bake in what could be the hottest year on record, with wildfires blazing across North America and Europe and heatwaves afflicting millions across Asia, the UN’s bi-annual talks on desertification have assumed much greater importance – and have started attracting more money.

Work will begin this week on allocating more than $12bn (£8.9bn) to vulnerable countries to help them deal with drought and land degradation, when scores of countries gather in Mongolia for Cop17.

Yasmine Fouad, executive secretary of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD), whose 17th “conference of the parties” begins in Ulaanbaatar on 17 August, said the negotiations would “send a positive signal of multilateralism”.

The key aim is to put pledges of billions of dollars made two years ago into action through projects in the developing world.

Countries around the world are bracing for food price rises as a result of damage to harvests from record heat and lack of water, and the World Food Programme predicts that 50 million more people could be pushed into hunger by the “super El Niño” weather system currently developing. Initiatives to restore land and prevent drought have up to now been poorly funded and badly managed.

According to Fouad, that situation was changing rapidly as nations began to recognise the risk. “At the heart of our discussion is the topic of food security,” she said. “The more you work on restoring land, the more you have productive soil to ensure food security. That kind of narrative should be part of our finance [initiatives].”

The UNCCD was signed in 1992, one of a trio of environmental treaties launched at the Earth summit in Rio de Janeiro, alongside the better known UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which is parent treaty to the Paris agreement of 2015; and the Convention on Biological Diversity, which includes targets on protecting species. Over the last three decades, the desertification treaty has been the “poor relation”, garnering the least attention of the three and producing scant progress.

But that is changing. Saudi Arabia – a petrostate that for years has blocked action on greenhouse gas emissions and any mention of fossil fuels at UNFCCC meetings, and has refused calls to provide climate finance – is an enthusiastic backer of UNCCD. The kingdom, which hosted the Cop16 UNCCD summit in 2024, has pledged hundreds of millions of dollars to its aims, as well as joining with allies through larger groups and institutions to offer much bigger collective pledges.

The US is also still a member of the UNCCD, despite Donald Trump’s withdrawal from the Paris agreement and UNFCCC.

Osama Faqeeha, the Saudi deputy minister of environment, said: “Land degradation and drought have significant impacts on food and water security, biodiversity, climate resilience and the wellbeing of almost half the world’s population. Cop16 in Riyadh was a historical turning point in global awareness and the drive for action to address land management and drought.”

Drone view shows a farmer driving a tractor at a paddy field in Cirebon, West Java, Indonesia. Photograph: Willy Kurniawan/Reuters
At the core of the Cop17 talks, which will run until 28 August, will be the “operationalisation” of the Riyadh Global Drought Resilience Partnership, forged in 2024 under the leadership of Saudi Arabia. Under this fund and related initiatives, countries and institutions pledged $12bn over seven years to help 74 countries stricken by drought and the accompanying problem of land degradation.

This amount is small compared with the scale of what is needed – about $2.6tn cumulatively by the end of this decade, according to UNCCD estimates, to repair degraded land, halt desertification, protect against drought and restore soils.

But the pledges are a major step forward and show what could be a useful new addition to global environmental funding. “More than 70 countries submitted their drought management plans, and we need to convert those plans into projects that would be implemented,” Fouad said.

Such projects could include overhauling irrigation systems to make them more efficient; replanting land with more drought-resistant crops; and improving rainwater storage facilities for farmers.

All of the $12bn so far pledged is from the public sector, but moves are under way to raise additional funds from the private sector. Fouad said food companies, textile makers and others that are heavily reliant on water and crops should play a role.

Lily Maxwell-Lwin, head of advocacy at the Dutch nonprofit organisation Commonland, which focuses on degraded land, said rich countries should recognise that funding for drought and land restoration in poor countries would benefit them too. “Our core ask for Cop17 is financing for restoration on par with what’s available for emissions-focused climate action, backed by governments recognising that degraded land abroad is a direct threat to their food security, migration pressure and supply chain resilience,” she said.

81.9% of Mongolia Affected by Desertification, 0.9% “Severe” www.montsame.mn

The updated Desertification Atlas, which provides a scientific evaluation of the state of desertification and land degradation in Mongolia, was presented on August 18, 2026, during the COP17 conference.

According to the updated atlas, 81.9% of Mongolia’s territory has been affected by desertification and land degradation to some extent. The atlas was developed utilizing data from the national network for water, weather, and environmental monitoring from 1991 to 2025, alongside global observation data, reanalyzed climate data, and satellite remote sensing information.

The research indicates that Mongolia's average annual air temperature increased by 2.5°C between 1941 and 2025. A warming of 1.2–1.6°C was observed across 72.6% of the country's total territory. Precipitation shows a decreasing trend in 49.7% of the land, primarily in the western regions, while it tends to increase in 50.3%, mostly in the east.

Based on drought and aridity assessments, 51.1% of the territory is characterized as dry or predominantly arid, whereas 48.9% is humid or adequately humid. Of the areas experiencing dry conditions, 25.3% fall into the extremely arid category. Furthermore, the drought index reveals a trend of intensifying drought across 53.5% of Mongolia's territory.

Regarding soil conditions, severely water-eroded soils make up 54.8% of the total land area. Meanwhile, areas experiencing wind erosion at a rate of 0.16–1.25 tonnes per hectare annually account for 34.3% of the entire territory.

Additionally, a trend of decreasing soil moisture was detected across 93.3% of Mongolia's territory, with a sharp decline in 44% of these areas raising significant concern.

In terms of water resource assessment, river runoff has decreased in nearly 60% of all rivers across the country. Regarding water quality, 67.5% of rivers showed minimal change, 28.6% experienced a decline in quality, and 3.9% showed improvement.

Vegetation productivity showed an increasing trend across most of Selenge aimag, certain soums of Tuv, Dornod, and Sukhbaatar aimags, as well as select parts of the southwestern region, covering 8.4% of the total territory.

According to the integrated assessment of desertification and land degradation, 81.9% of Mongolia’s territory has been affected: 0.9% is extremely severe, 6.2% is severe, 42.9% is moderate, 31.9% is slight, and 18.1% shows no signs of degradation.

The updated atlas features 12 land cover classification maps alongside drought and vegetation condition maps, which serve as the baseline data for Mongolia's 2026/2027 National Report on Desertification and Land Degradation to be submitted to the UNCCD.

Furthermore, this data enables national-level evaluation of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) indicators, facilitating Mongolia's transition from general international data to national, calculation-based Tier 2 reporting standards.

Government Approves Security Measures, Special Tax Benefits for Oil Refinery Project www.montsame.mn

The Cabinet has formally approved a decision to place the Oil Refinery under construction in Altanshiree soum, Dornogobi aimag, under the protection of the Internal Troops, and instructed Amar­sai­khan Sainbuyan, Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs, to implement the decision.

The Internal Troops will protect not only the refinery site but also water supply facilities and the oil pipeline complex.

The Cabinet also decided to develop the Oil Refinery as an industrial and technology park and instructed Damdinnyam Gongor, Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources, and other relevant officials to ensure implementation.

During Prime Minister Uchral Nyam-Osor’s visit to the refinery construction site, the project management outlined several challenges, including the risk of delays and funding disruptions due to property and land taxes, as well as the daily accumulation of tax liabilities.

Developing the refinery as an industrial and technology park will make it eligible for several tax and customs benefits. These include exemption from land fees for the first 10 years and property taxes for the first five years, as well as the possibility of extending payment periods for customs duties and value-added tax on imported goods, materials, and equipment that cannot be sourced domestically for up to four years. Foreign employees will also be exempt from workplace fees.

In addition, the technical and technological level of the industrial and technology park unit will be reviewed promptly by the Sectoral Council for Heavy Industry Technology Level Assessment. The authorities will then proceed in stages with evaluating the development plan and feasibility study, designating the land for special state use, and issuing the permit to operate as an industrial and technology park.

149th School to Install Solar Power System www.montsame.mn

The Capital City's 149th Secondary School, the Governor’s Office of Chingeltei District, and "Make Value" LLC have signed a cooperation agreement to install and lease a solar power system.

The project aims to improve air quality in Mongolia and Ulaanbaatar, boost the use of renewable energy, and reduce electricity costs for social infrastructure organizations. Additionally, it aligns with the implementation of the Joint Crediting Mechanism (JCM) between the governments of Japan and Mongolia to mitigate climate change.

By utilizing solar energy for its daily operations, the 149th School will significantly reduce its reliance on the central power grid. The combined installation of solar panels and a battery storage system will ensure uninterrupted school operations during peak grid loads, power fluctuations, and outages.

The transition to renewable energy will decrease the burden on coal-fired power plants and reduce carbon dioxide emissions in the school's vicinity. Furthermore, the solar power system will serve as an interactive learning environment, giving students firsthand experience with renewable energy while enhancing their ecological education and understanding of green development.

Mongolia pushes to complete rail bypass around Ulaanbaatar www.intellinews.com

Mongolia is making rapid progress on a new 127-kilometre (79-mile) railway that will allow cargo and hazardous products to bypass Ulaanbaatar, a long-awaited project that could significantly impact the way freight flows around the fast-growing capital city. 

The Bagakhangai–Khushig Valley–Emeelt railway will branch from the existing Trans-Mongolian railway at Bagakhangai Station, southeast of Ulaanbaatar, run through Khushig Valley and reconnect with the main line at Emeelt Station west of the capital.

The Mongolian tughrik (MNT) 1.2-trillion ($333.6m) project is being built by state-owned Mongolian Railway (MTZ) and includes four railway stations and three passing sidings along the route.

The Bagakhangai–Khushig Valley–Emeelt railway is long-awaited.

Construction began in April 2025 on the 87.8-km Bagakhangai–Khushig Valley section. According to the government, the main construction on that section is now complete. Work on the Khushig Valley–Emeelt section began this year.

The government has ordered officials to have the railway ready for test runs in September. Full operation of the route could occur as early as December.

The railway is being built primarily to move dangerous freight away from populated areas of Ulaanbaatar. Once completed, it will carry gasoline and other petroleum products, as well as explosives and chemically hazardous cargo and coal destined for power plants.

"This dangerous cargo will be transported via the Bagakhangai–Khushigiin Valley–Emeelt direction, not through Ulaanbaatar city," Prime Minister Uchral Nyam-Osor told reporters during a visit to the project site on August 13.

The need to remove hazardous freight from the capital gained added urgency after a deadly accident in January 2024, when a heavy transport truck carrying liquefied gas collided with a vehicle in Ulaanbaatar and exploded, killing six people and igniting a large fire (See archived news video report at foot of this article)

In addition to the safety aspect, moving cargo trains around the city is also expected to reduce wait times at railway crossings. The government adds that train use could also take hundreds of trucks off Ulaanbaatar’s roads.

The new line is being constructed on a considerably more direct alignment than the older railway that goes past Nalaikh and through Ulaanbaatar.

"The old line was built like a snake. Now, the route is direct," said Uchral.

One of the project's largest structures is a new railway bridge over the Tuul River. The government says the bridge will be 476 metres long, making it the longest railway bridge in Mongolia.

Mongolian Railway officials said engineers are working to protect the flow of the Tuul River during construction.

The government says a total of 95 Mongolian companies and more than 4,000 Mongolian engineers and workers are participating in the railway project.

Uchral emphasised the domestic nature of the construction, saying Mongolians had reached a point where they could undertake major railway projects themselves.

The railway is also intended to play a much broader role in the development of the Khushig Valley, home to Chinggis Khaan International Airport, completed in 2021.

With around 1.7mn people now living in Ulaanbaatar, the population has doubled over the past two decades, and the government is looking to take pressure off the capital’s infrastructure by encouraging its residents to move to satellite towns.

The government envisions the Khushig Valley as playing a key role in that effort and is promoting it as a major transportation and logistics hub rather than simply an airport district. A new logistics centre is planned there, with the railway providing a connection that could allow some freight and logistics operations to move out of Ulaanbaatar.

By Michael Kohn