Government Cuts Staffing at State-Owned Enterprises by 30% www.montsame.mn

At its meeting today, the Government approved a resolution on measures concerning state-owned enterprises, launching the implementation of the Law on Governance of State and Local Government-Owned Companies.

Under the resolution, staffing at state-owned enterprises will be reduced by 30 percent, 25 organizations will be removed from the state budget, and 108–324 positions will be reorganized and optimized, resulting in MNT 30 billion in savings on salaries and other recurrent expenditures.

In preparation for the implementation of the Law on Governance of State and Local Government-Owned Companies from January 1, 2027, the Government approved, as annexes to the resolution, lists of state-owned enterprises to be reorganized as state-owned companies, state-owned public service organizations, and entities to be dissolved.

Under the resolution, 25 state-owned enterprises will be subject to consolidation or dissolution. As of 2025, these organizations had a combined workforce of 2,162 employees and an annual payroll of MNT 73.2 billion.

According to preliminary estimates, overlapping management, administrative and service functions will be consolidated, while organizational structures and staffing levels will be optimized. Centralizing office facilities, transport services, administrative support, procurement, information technology and other administrative and service functions is expected to reduce recurrent expenditures and improve the efficiency of budget funding.

According to the 2025 report, a total of 65 state-owned enterprises were operating with 7,030 employees. Of these, 26 fully finance their expenditures through operating revenues, while the remaining 39 receive a combined MNT 153.1 billion in subsidies from the state budget.

Vietnamese National Assembly Chairman Arrives in Mongolia for Official Visit www.montsame.mn

 A delegation led by Chairman of the National Assembly of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam Tran Thanh Man arrived in Mongolia today for an official visit at the invitation of Chairman of the State Great Khural of Mongolia Byambatsogt Sandag.

The delegation was welcomed at Chinggis Khaan International Airport by Bayarmaa Judag, Member of the State Great Khural and Chair of the Mongolia-Vietnam Parliamentary Friendship Group, Khulan Ganbaatar, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Mongolia to the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, and other officials.

Chairman Tran Thanh Man’s official visit to Mongolia will take place from September 9 to 11, 2026.

During the visit, Speaker Byambatsogt and Chairman Tran Thanh Man will hold official talks and sign cooperation documents at the parliamentary level.

According to the Open Parliament Office of the State Great Khural, the visit, the first by a Chairman of Vietnam’s National Assembly to Mongolia in 23 years, is of significant importance for strengthening and developing the Comprehensive Partnership between Mongolia and Vietnam, particularly by deepening inter-parliamentary cooperation and cooperation between the two countries’ parliamentary friendship groups and parliamentary offices.

1% of Mongolia's Population Are Foreign Nationals www.montsame.mn

Of the population residing within the territory of Mongolia, 99% are citizens of Mongolia and 1% are foreign nationals.

The National Statistics Office of Mongolia (NSO) reported that 18 people are stateless, without citizenship of any country.

According to the 2025 census, the number of foreign nationals residing in Mongolia for six months or longer stood at 35,446, up 58.1% from 2020. Between 2020 and 2025, the composition of foreign nationals living in Mongolia shifted as the share of Chinese citizens rose from 41.7% to 60.1%, correspondingly reducing the share of nationals from other countries. For example, citizens of Russia, South Korea, and the United States each accounted for around 10% in the 2020 census, but their shares fell this time to between 3.2% and 8.5%.

While most foreign nationals living in Mongolia are concentrated in the capital, that share has declined compared with the previous census (from 77.9% to 64%), even as the number of foreign nationals has risen in some provinces. Specifically, the growing numbers of foreign nationals living in Dornogobi (from 1% to 10.9%), Tuv (from 0.6% to 5%), and Umnugobi (from 5.6% to 7.3%) provinces are linked to rising local economic activity, particularly in connection with mining, infrastructure, and industrial zones. By contrast, foreign nationals are settling in smaller numbers in Uvs, Uvurkhangai, Gobi-Altai, Arkhangai, Bayankhongor, and Bulgan aimags, which have smaller populations and lower economic activity.

According to the 2025 Interim Population and Housing Census, the citizen population of Mongolia stood at 3,589,826. Ethnic Khalkhs make up 83.4% of the country's resident population, down 0.4 percentage points from the previous census, while the share of ethnic Kazakhs remained unchanged at 3.8%.

Mongolian National Audit Office launches audit of COP17 funding and expenditure www.gogo.mn

The Mongolian National Audit Office has launched a financial and compliance audit of the funding and expenditure related to the 17th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (COP17), which was held in Mongolia.

The audit was launched on September 8, 2026, by D.Bayarsaikhan, Director of the Special Purpose Audit Office and Lead Auditor. He briefed representatives of the audited organizations on the objectives, scope, plans, and programs of the audit.

The audit will examine the sources of funding used to organize COP17, as well as the planning and budgeting processes, compliance of budget expenditures with relevant laws and regulations, and the results of funding and expenditure.

The audit will cover the National Committee for Organizing COP17, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, the Ministry of Culture, Sports, Tourism and Youth, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Department of State Property Policy and Regulation, the Office of the Mayor of the Capital City, and other relevant organizations.

It will examine decisions, policy documents, operational reports, primary financial records, procurement contracts, and other relevant documents issued by these organizations between 2023 and 2026. The audit will also assess compliance with applicable laws and regulations.

At the opening of the audit, it was emphasized that representatives of the audited and participating organizations should provide complete and accurate documents and information required for the audit and fully cooperate with the audit team.

UK-Mongolia B2B Networking Reception in UB with the British Ambassador and John Grogan MBCC www.britishbusinesscentre.com

Mongolia's NBFIs Are Having Their Breakout Funding Run www.capitalmarkets.mn

Five years ago, Mongolian NBFIs were barely on the radar of international investors. Recently, several of them have landed on term sheets from IFC, FMO, and a Singapore-based fintech fund, and one has issued a bond in South Korea.

International investors have quietly moved close to $100 million into Mongolia's NBFI sector since the start of 2025, spread across development finance institutions, impact funds, and Asian debt platforms most Mongolian companies had never had access to before. It's a small number by global standards. In a sector that barely registered on foreign radars five years ago, it's a signal. 

Why now
The timing isn't an accident. Mongolia's NBFI sector has been the fastest-growing corner of the country's financial system for years: loan books expanding at a 38% CAGR since 2021, nearly double the 21% pace of the banking sector, even as NBFIs still account for less than 10% of total banking-sector assets. That's a sector with room to run and a growth rate that's hard to find elsewhere in frontier credit markets.

It's also a sector that just got a lot more disciplined. Between early 2025 and January 2026, Mongolia's Financial Regulatory Commission and the Bank of Mongolia rolled out the most consequential set of NBFI rules in the sector's history: a ban on raising capital from domestic banks and money lenders, a 60% debt-to-income cap on consumer loans, and a 20% minimum capital adequacy requirement. For operators without an alternative funding source, that domestic funding ban is existential. For the ones who'd already built international capital relationships, digital-first lending models, and governance that meets outside disclosure standards, it's a moat.

Three companies illustrate how that capital found its way in.

Invescore NBFI JSC (MSE:INV) was Mongolia's first NBFI to seriously court foreign capital, and 2025 was the year that bet started paying off at scale. The company, celebrating its 10th anniversary in 2026, secured $58 million in disclosed financing during 2025 from a run of European and Asian institutions: $5 million from Dutch impact investor Triple Jump, $16 million total from EMF Microfinance Fund, $20 million from the Netherlands Development Finance Company (FMO), $5 million from Triodos Investment Management, and $25 million into its Pocket NBFI subsidiary from Singapore-based Helicap. Five separate international backers, five separate votes of confidence, inside a single year. That momentum carries into London this year: InvesCore's parent company, ICFG Limited, is the presenting partner of the Mongolia Investment Forum: London 2026. 
LendMN NBFI JSC (MSE:LEND) has spent since 2017 building an AI-driven underwriting model that turns loan approvals into a mobile-app transaction, and its funding base now reflects a similarly diversified, tech-investor logic. The company drew $41.81 million in international funding across 2025 and into 2026: a $20 million facility from Lendable Asset Management in two tranches, $10 million from Kilde across six disbursements, $9 million from Alternative Investments VCC, and additional financing from DWM Asset Management, on top of an earlier $21.4 million Series B led by IFC and AEON Financial Service. It's also one of the more interesting impact stories in the sector: 72% of its MSME borrowers are female-owned, and 92% of clients reported rising income or sales in 2025. AND Global Pte. Ltd., LendMN's parent, is also a presenting partner of the Mongolia Investment Forum: London 2026.
Sendly NBFI JSC (MSE:SEND) took a slightly different route. Rather than raising equity or drawing debt facilities, Sendly went to the capital markets directly, launching a secured 24-month public bond on the MSE, and then becoming the first Mongolian company to issue an "Arirang" bond in South Korea, a 10-year, KRW 2 billion (~$1.45 million) instrument. A Bond 3.0 issuance is already in preparation for this September. Sendly will also take part in the Mongolia Investment Forum: London 2026 as a participant.
The bigger pattern
None of this happened in isolation. It's the product of a sector reaching the scale and governance maturity where international capital starts paying attention, and a regulatory environment now actively selecting for exactly that combination. The NBFIs still growing share three things: international funding pipelines, digital-first models, and disclosure standards that meet outside scrutiny. That's a narrower field than it was two years ago, but a more investable one.

For a market this early in its international story, three companies raising close to $100 million combined, opening a Korean bond market, and building out MSME lending at a 30%+ annualized re-lending rate isn't a rounding error. It's what a breakout funding run in a frontier credit market actually looks like. 

Mongolians wait hours for fuel as reliance on Russia bites www.afp.com

After a five-hour wait for petrol, Mongolian pensioner Nasanjargal is still 10 places from the pump, with dozens of cars behind him in a queue snaking into the arid steppe.

“Fuel is unavailable, there are huge queues everywhere,” he told AFP from his motionless Toyota sedan after a 1½ hour drive from the capital Ulaanbaatar.

Sandwiched between Russia and China, landlocked Mongolia has historically imported more than 95 per cent of its petrol from its vast northern neighbour.

But Ukrainian strikes on Russian oil facilities have disrupted supplies in recent months, triggering a relentless fuel shortage that has depleted Mongolia’s limited stockpiles and raised questions about its energy security.

The shortages have roiled logistics, lifted costs and ruined the plans of many Mongolians accustomed to taking advantage of the short summer season with a road trip in the picturesque countryside.

Nasanjargal, a former police officer who goes by one name, said he was “out of options”.

“I headed out this way hoping things might be better out in the rural areas,” he said, his young granddaughter shifting impatiently in the back seat. “It’s the same story everywhere.”
The prolonged crisis has increased pressure on the Mongolian authorities to ensure unfettered supply of fuel.

Government responses have included daily individual caps on fuel purchases, a ban on stockpiling and an alternating licence-plate scheme intended to reduce the number of cars filling up.

But the rationing has frustrated many ordinary citizens, with Nasanjargal telling AFP that the lines are “very troublesome and extremely difficult overall”.

Beyond crowded Ulaanbaatar – notorious for its daily traffic – fuel shortages present other challenges for rural, tourism-dependent regions.

Munkhchuluun Samdannyam, the governor of central Dundgovi province, told AFP that his local government’s “first priority” was the needs of tourists and herders.

“Under Gobi (Desert) conditions, herders do not draw water from wells by hand. They mostly use motors and pumps.

“And to operate those motors, gasoline is necessary,” Munkhchuluun said on the sidelines of an international summit on desertification hosted by Mongolia in August.

“For everyone else, we are trying to manage and coordinate the situation as best we can,” he said.

Diversifying
Mongolia’s vast size and relatively small population of 3.6 million means that the government has limited resources for building the necessary infrastructure, Telmen Altanshagai, an independent policy analyst specialising in Mongolia’s energy security, told AFP.

“As geopolitics shifted, the country started talks with Kazakhstan on the trade of petroleum products,” Telmen said.

“More recently, the current crisis forced the government to import fuel from South Korea and China,” she added.

But as diversification of imports becomes a political imperative, Telmen said, “it doesn’t address the fundamental question of energy dependency” on foreign providers.

In a potential breakthrough for Mongolia’s energy security, work is under way on the country’s first domestic oil refinery, with operations targeted to begin in 2028.

Prime Minister Nyam-Osor Uchral, in office since March, has staked his reputation on his government’s ability to manage the crisis, saying in August that he was “fully responsible for overseeing the oil industry”.

But in bustling Ulaanbaatar, electric-vehicle charging infrastructure remains limited, let alone across the vast, sparsely populated steppe.

The country’s logistics still rely heavily on diesel-powered trucks, leaving freight operators vulnerable to disruptions that have been increasingly acute this summer.

They have also raised costs for operators of logistics networks.

“When I came into the city yesterday, fuel was virtually impossible to find,” said Enkhbayar Myanganbayar, a 25-year-old truck driver.

“Regarding diesel fuel prices, in just the past 15 days, prices jumped,” he said.

“Previously, it cost around 4,000 tugrik (S$1.40) to 4,200 tugrik per litre, but now it’s over 4,600 and pushing close to 4,700 tugrik.”

The volatile supply situation has weighed on ordinary drivers, with prices and availability fluctuating at each petrol station across the country.

In one grassroots effort to ease headaches, an online platform has been created to allow users to upload real-time updates on availability, prices and waiting times.

But many pumps have simply closed up.

When AFP returned to the petrol station where Nasanjargal had been waiting two days later, it was only open to emergency vehicles. AFP

Bolor Lkhaajav: “Mongolia does not need to choose between Russia and China” www.novastan.org

Mongolia’s position between Russia and China is often portrayed as a geopolitical constraint. Researcher and writer Bolor Lkhaajav argues that Ulaanbaatar instead seeks to combine strong ties with both neighbours with an increasingly ambitious “third neighbour” policy spanning critical minerals, energy, technology, diplomacy and security.

Bolor Lkhaajav is a specialist in East and Northeast Asia who has published more than 200 articles and commentaries in multiple languages. She writes regularly on diplomatic history, foreign and security policy, geopolitics, economics, politics and society. She is currently working on Mongolia’s foreign-policy grand strategy and has been accepted to a PhD programme beginning in autumn 2027.

In this interview with Novastan, she discusses how Mongolia is navigating the geopolitical consequences of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the growing importance of South Korea and other “third neighbours”, the country’s critical-mineral potential, environmental pressures and Mongolia’s distinctive position in a rapidly changing Northeast Asia.

Novastan: You are currently working on Mongolia’s foreign-policy grand strategy. How would you describe the country’s strategic approach today, and how has it evolved in the changing geopolitical environment since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine?
Bolor Lkhaajav: In 2011, the Mongolian Parliament adopted the country’s Foreign Policy Concept, a legal document mapping out Ulaanbaatar’s foreign-policy strategy to meet modern-day demands while maintaining a balance between its two neighbours – Russia and China.

One of the important elements of the concept was the formal introduction of the “Third Neighbour” Doctrine. The idea of a “third neighbour” had long existed in Mongolian history and diplomatic circles, but it had never been explicitly defined and applied in such a transparent way. Since 2011, the policy has become one of the pillars of Mongolia’s foreign-policy grand strategy.

It is specifically intended to strengthen Mongolia’s diplomatic, political, economic and cultural links with countries outside Russia and China, while at the same time reinforcing bilateral and trilateral engagement with Moscow and Beijing.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Mongolia has experienced the consequences of Russia prioritising its domestic energy supply. Given Mongolia’s heavy dependence on Russian fuel, intermittent shortages have become a regular occurrence over the past six months. This also highlights why it is crucial for Mongolia to invest in renewable energy and work with third-neighbour partners to strengthen the country’s energy sector. I would not say that Mongolia can achieve energy independence at present, because that is simply not realistic.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has also changed the geopolitical and security dynamics of Northeast Asia. For Mongolia’s foreign-policy grand strategy, it is crucial that its only two neighbours remain free of conflict.

Mongolia’s grand strategy seeks to position Ulaanbaatar as a stable, democratic actor on the world stage. It is not dependent on the foreign policies of its neighbours, or of any other country, nor on their global engagements. Mongolia may respond differently to external challenges, but these will not fundamentally alter the country’s foreign-policy grand strategy.

Mongolia’s “third neighbour” policy has been central to its diplomacy for decades. Which relationships do you think have the greatest potential to deepen in the coming years – whether with South Korea, Japan, India, the European Union, the United States or others – and why?
Mongolia’s “Third Neighbour” Doctrine provides a much broader framework that envisages mechanisms for cooperation across different sectors and stages of development. It is not restricted to the mining sector.

At its core, the Third Neighbour Doctrine is both a concept and a foreign-policy practice encompassing multiple mechanisms that support Mongolia’s geopolitical balance between the two major powers surrounding it, Russia and China, while also placing an emphasis on reinvigorating the country’s bilateral and multilateral engagements outside their respective spheres of influence.

Within the region, relations between Mongolia and South Korea have certainly expanded tremendously. This is partly because of South Korea’s successful commercial presence in Mongolia and its more recent interest in diversifying its critical-mineral supply chains. Japan’s interest and investment follow, although not to the same extent as South Korea’s.

European partners will continue to play a crucial role in Mongolia’s democracy and development. Building on strong bilateral relations with European partners, Ulaanbaatar aims to increase cooperation on climate change, renewable energy and sectors that align both with Mongolia’s development priorities and with European standards and regulations.

With the United States, however, environmental and renewable-energy cooperation is unlikely to be a central focus under Donald Trump’s administration. In many respects, the current administration’s priorities do not align with Mongolia’s core values at present.

The US has shown interest in Mongolia’s critical minerals. However, given Washington’s posture towards both Moscow and Beijing, Ulaanbaatar is not particularly confident about the prospects of concluding a major deal.

One of the largest US contributions to Mongolia to date has been the successful implementation and launch of the Water Compact funded by the US Millennium Challenge Corporation.

You have written extensively on Mongolia’s relationship with South Korea, as well as on India and the European Union. How far can these partnerships help Mongolia translate diplomatic diversification into real economic diversification, given the constraints of geography, infrastructure and export routes?
Mongolia’s partnerships with South Korea, India, the European Union and others vary considerably according to the kinds of investment each partner is interested in pursuing. These are not all equivalent partners, and each can offer something different.

For example, India’s $1.7 billion soft loan for Mongolia’s first major greenfield oil refinery is a major boost for the country’s domestic supply and also has potential for exports.

The EU, on the other hand, is more interested in investing in human capital and civil society, promoting democratic values, and supporting the green transition, forestry and governance. Mongolia has a great deal to gain from its relations with the EU.

For example, the Mongolian government can learn from the EU’s Artificial Intelligence Act as the country moves towards establishing data centres and becoming a more digital nation. These ambitions will in turn create a need for greater cybersecurity capabilities, which countries such as South Korea, India and the United States can provide.

The logistical challenge involved in exporting Mongolian goods is obvious, and there are no magical solutions. All exports ultimately need to transit through Russia or China.

It is therefore strategically important for Mongolia to maintain the strongest and most stable possible bilateral and trilateral relations with both neighbours. Mongolia-China railway connections, as well as Mongolia-Russia transit corridors, are equally important for expanding Mongolian exports to Europe and elsewhere in the world.

Critical minerals and uranium are attracting growing international attention to Mongolia. What opportunities does this create, and what would Mongolia need to do to turn this interest into durable economic and strategic benefits?
Mongolia’s exploration and export of critical minerals and uranium form part of the country’s diversification strategy, even though they remain within the mining sector.

Mongolia holds an estimated $1-3 trillion in untapped mineral reserves, including significant deposits of copper, fluorspar, coal and rare earth elements.

South Korea is already working on building a stable supply chain to support its technological development. During South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s state visit to Mongolia in July, Ulaanbaatar and Seoul signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), which included the elimination of 2-5 percent tariffs on critical minerals.

In 2025, a South Korean critical-minerals research hub was established in Ulaanbaatar. This was recently followed by the launch of joint scientific research between the Mongolian National Rare Earth Corporation and the Korea Basic Science Institute.

Given South Korea’s advanced manufacturing industries, including steel, automobiles and semiconductors, the country has considerable demand for high-purity molybdenum powder. Moreover, South Korea’s growing interest in becoming more active in the defence industry and manufacturing makes Mongolia’s natural resources a strategic asset.

France has also become the first European country to seal a major uranium deal, signing a $1.6 billion investment agreement in 2025. These interests can be mutually beneficial: France requires uranium for its nuclear-energy sector, while Mongolia can use the partnership to diversify its exports.

For Mongolia to continue attracting investment from global partners, however, the country’s political system needs to be stable.

More than anything else, I think the constant changes of government, government plans and budgets, changes to the taxation system, and corruption are among the main obstacles to Mongolia’s development.

Mongolia recently hosted UNCCD COP17 in Ulaanbaatar, a subject you have also written about. Beyond the diplomatic visibility of hosting a major UN conference, what could COP17 realistically mean for Mongolia in areas such as desertification, land restoration, water security and environmental finance?
This year’s COP17 included discussions on finance, water, land and people, and food systems. Each of these issues has direct implications for Mongolia.

Water security, water pollution and land restoration in particular are closely linked to major mining operations in the country. Over the years, we have come to understand that environmental-protection clauses must be included as part of responsible mining. These requirements are understandably costly, but they are something the Mongolian side needs to demand regardless.

During COP17, mining giants such as Rio Tinto announced strategies to contribute to Mongolia’s fight against desertification and water pollution and to restore forests, including planting 5,000 hectares of forest, investing in renewable energy for company use and introducing new technologies to replenish groundwater.

Oyu Tolgoi, one of Mongolia’s largest mining operations, began paying water-pollution fees in 2026, with regular quarterly payments of 150-200 million Mongolian tugrik, or roughly $42,000-$55,000. These practices are intended to set an example for other major mining companies operating in the country.

Water security and water pollution will become even more important issues in the coming years as the construction of data centres is already being discussed at government level.

Their environmental impact needs to be studied thoroughly, and Parliament will need to develop appropriate legal and regulatory mechanisms for such projects.

You have also written about the changing geopolitical environment in Northeast Asia. What new opportunities or challenges does this create for Mongolia, particularly as relations among Russia, China, North Korea, South Korea and Japan continue to evolve?
Over the last five years, Northeast Asia has become a hotspot of geopolitical transformation, and recent events have only highlighted these shifts in the post-Second World War international order.

These are dynamic and complex international-relations issues, but I will mention the most significant ones here.

Russia’s war in Ukraine created tremendous opportunities for North Korea. Pyongyang is moving towards becoming a de facto nuclear state, most likely with the backing of both Russia and China.

For Mongolia, regional peace and security are crucial, and this includes peace on the Korean Peninsula. Mongolia currently maintains, and will continue to maintain, open diplomatic channels with North Korea regardless of Pyongyang’s actions. There are also some economic incentives for doing so.

Despite Mongolia’s landlocked position in Northeast Asia, one of its geopolitical advantages is that it is the only country in the region without territorial disputes or unresolved historical grievances with neighbouring states. This is a significant advantage for Mongolian diplomacy and creates opportunities for Ulaanbaatar to develop diverse political, economic and cultural engagements.

In the short to long term, Mongolia’s economic engagement with all regional actors is likely to continue.

Moreover, in order to diversify its energy sources – a need that has become more pressing because of the consequences of Russia’s war in Ukraine and fuel shortages – Mongolia will require support from China as well as third-neighbour investment in the energy sector.

India is currently supporting Mongolia’s first greenfield oil refinery, which is expected to become operational in 2028.

Finally, what aspect of Mongolia’s international position do you think remains most misunderstood outside the country, and looking five to ten years ahead, what would successful diversification actually look like for Mongolia?
I think one of the main misconceptions among observers of Mongolia is the idea that the country somehow has to choose between Russia and China.

Mongolia’s histories with Russia and China differ, and its diplomatic and economic relations with the two countries also differ tremendously. To think that Ulaanbaatar needs to choose between Russia and China in modern-day diplomacy is therefore not only a misconception, but also something that simply does not apply to Mongolian foreign policy.

The second misconception is that, because of Mongolia’s landlocked position between Russia and China, the third-neighbour policy is unsuccessful.

I have come across views that undermine Ulaanbaatar’s third-neighbour approach, arguing that the policy cannot genuinely counterbalance Russian and Chinese influence. But the misconception lies in assuming that this is what the policy is designed to do.

Mongolia needs robust relations with Russia and China. That is itself a foreign-policy priority. The Third Neighbour Doctrine is an addition to strong relations with Mongolia’s only two neighbours, not an alternative to them.

From both a foreign-policy and implementation perspective, since 2011 – over a period of 15 years – Mongolia’s third-neighbour relationships have flourished and will continue to develop through niche partnerships and new mechanisms for cooperation.

If one looks at the impact of Mongolia’s third-neighbour policy in its entirety, it becomes clear that it is not limited to economic diversification. It also encompasses culture, education, technology, innovation, modernisation and everything else that a modern society demands.

If there is one thing slowing Mongolia’s third-neighbour engagement, it is the country’s political instability, constant changes of government, shifts in investment laws and regulations, and, finally, corruption.

By Mathieu Lemoine, Editor-in-Chief for Novastan English.

Mongolia, Montenegro Sign Joint Declaration, Cooperation Agreements www.montsame.mn

The state visit to Mongolia by President of Montenegro Jakov Milatović, who arrived at the invitation of President of Mongolia Khurelsukh Ukhnaa, is continuing.

Following their official talks, Presidents Khurelsukh and Jakov Milatović attended a signing ceremony for intergovernmental and inter-institutional documents aimed at expanding and developing bilateral relations and cooperation.

The two heads of state signed the Joint Declaration between Mongolia and Montenegro.

The following agreements and memoranda were signed:

The Agreement between the Government of Mongolia and the Government of Montenegro on Mutual Exemption from Visa Requirements for Holders of Diplomatic and Official Passports, signed by Battsetseg Batmunkh, Foreign Minister of Mongolia, and Adis Pepić, General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro;
The Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro on Cooperation in Diplomatic Training, signed by Battsetseg Batmunkh, Foreign Minister of Mongolia and Adis Pepić, General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro;
The Memorandum of Understanding between the Mongolian Academy of Sciences and the Montenegrin Academy of Sciences and Arts on Cooperation, signed by  Demberel Sodnomsambuu, President of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, and Adis Pepić, General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro;
The Memorandum of Understanding between the Mongolian Academy of Sciences and the University of Montenegro, signed by Demberel Sodnomsambuu, President of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, and Adis Pepić, General Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Montenegro;
The Memorandum of Cooperation between the Mongolian National Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Chamber of Economy of Montenegro, signed by Lkhagvajav Baatarjav, President of the Mongolian National Chamber of Commerce and Industry, and Nikola Vujović, Vice President of the Chamber of Economy of Montenegro;
The Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between the national radio and television broadcasters of the two countries, signed by. Gerel. G, Director General of the Mongolian National Broadcaster, and Boris Raonić, Director General of Radio Television of Montenegro.
The two sides had previously signed a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between their National Olympic Committees in Ulaanbaatar in 2023 and a Memorandum of Understanding on Cooperation between their Ministries of Foreign Affairs in New York in 2025.

About 20,000 Foreign Nationals Issued Visas www.montsame.mn

Based on requests submitted last month by enterprises, organizations, and individuals seeking visas and visa authorizations, the Immigration Agency of Mongolia issued visa authorizations to 5,707 foreign nationals and visas of the appropriate category to 19,373 foreign nationals.

The Agency reported that visas were denied to 382 foreign nationals for reasons including an unexpired waiting period following an earlier refusal, incomplete documentation, and an unexpired deportation period.

In addition, residence permits were granted to 4,700 foreign nationals sponsored by 1,633 inviting individuals, organizations, and enterprises, while requests to extend residence permits for 6,911 foreign nationals, submitted by 1,480 inviting individuals, organizations, and enterprises, were reviewed and approved. Compared with the same period last year, these figures show that visa authorizations rose by 5.1%, visa issuance by 34.7%, and residence permit issuance by 50.4%.

As of August 31 this year, 47,413 citizens of 131 countries held residence permits in Mongolia for official or private purposes, including 32,222 for employment, 5,983 for investment, 2,992 for study, 3,018 for family reasons, and 3,198 for other purposes.