Peregrine falcon capture permits revoked in Bayankhongor province www.gogo.mn

Under Bayankhongor Province Governor’s Decree No. A/478, dated August 21, 2026, permits to capture peregrine falcons in Bumbugur, Khureemaral, and Bayanbulag soums have been revoked.

As part of the implementation of the decree, foreign nationals from countries including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Syria, and Iran who had entered into contracts to capture peregrine falcons were expelled from the territory of Bayankhongor province. 

Why Mongolia Should Host the Next Trump-Kim Summit www.asiapacific.ca

North Korea now has 57 “very powerful” nuclear weapons, according to an August 20, 2026, statement by U.S. President Donald Trump. Whatever the precise number and lethality of these weapons, it is now beyond doubt that the arsenal is sizeable and not going away anytime soon.

The realistic and practical task in Northeast Asia is therefore not disarmament but risk reduction. The longer North Korea’s arsenal remains unaddressed, the louder the voices in Seoul and Tokyo calling for developing a nuclear weapons capability of their own will grow. The real danger in the region is a proliferation cascade, with three or four nuclear-armed states packed into one corner of Asia, with no arms control architecture, no functioning hotlines, and broken channels of communication. Amid this darkening picture, one country – Mongolia – offers a rare opening for dialogue.

Nuclear proliferation in this part of the world is not a distant problem for Canada. Ottawa’s Indo-Pacific Strategy identifies North Korea as the principal security challenge in the North Pacific, recalls that 516 Canadians died in the Korean War (1950–53), and notes that Canada "has never left" the Korean Peninsula — a reference to Canada’s continuous presence in the United Nations Command in South Korea and its deployment, since 2018, of ships and aircraft to support the enforcement of sanctions against North Korea as part of Operation NEON.

The Indo-Pacific already has four nuclear-armed states: China, India, North Korea, and Pakistan. If Japan and South Korea join them, the region's security calculus would change profoundly. Both are among Canada's most important trade partners in Asia, anchored by the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) and the Canada-Korea Free Trade Agreement, respectively. A more nuclearized Northeast Asia would strike at the non-proliferation order Canada has spent decades defending and unsettle the stability on which its trade with the Pacific depends. Preventing that outcome requires Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. to talk to Pyongyang, and that would need to happen at a venue that Pyongyang does not distrust.

Singapore, Hanoi — and now Ulaanbaatar?
Seoul appears to have reached the same conclusion about Mongolia’s viability as a dialogue host. Under South Korean President Lee Jae Myung’s progressive government, which favours dialogue with Pyongyang over deterrence, Seoul now embraces a policy of engagement. What it lacks, however, is a channel that can connect North Korea with other key stakeholders in Northeast Asia, including the U.S. It is looking to Ulaanbaatar to provide that channel.

In July, Lee made a state visit to Mongolia, the first by a sitting Korean president in nearly 15 years. The headlines focused on co-operation around critical minerals and a joint declaration proclaiming a "golden age" in bilateral relations, but there was also a quieter and more consequential agreement between the two presidents to strengthen co-operation on establishing peace on the Korean Peninsula. Lee, in an interview with Mongolia’s state news agency on the eve of the July 9 summit, called Mongolia a "trusted partner" in his effort to normalize relations with North Korea. 

In addition to Lee, there have been other South Korean dignitaries who have recently bolstered ties with Mongolia. In June, Chung Dong-young became South Korea’s first Minister of Unification to attend the Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, Mongolia’s annual security forum, where he asked his hosts to help bring Pyongyang back to the table, making the possibility of Ulaanbaatar hosting the next U.S.-North Korea summit appear more likely than ever. 

A rare window of opportunity for peace talks
For three decades, engagement with North Korea has tracked the political calendar in Seoul. Progressive administrations have pursued dialogue, while their conservative successors have set it aside in favour of deterrence, as Lee’s predecessor, Yoon Suk Yeol, did. In February 2026, the Lee administration unveiled its Policy for Peaceful Coexistence on the Korean Peninsula, the fullest statement yet of its approach to North Korea.

The policy rests on three commitments: respect for the North Korean system, no unification by absorption, and a halt to hostile acts. On the nuclear question, South Korea dropped the old demand that disarmament precede dialogue. Seoul has also halted loudspeaker broadcasts across the Demilitarized Zone, blocked leaflet launches, and, in the president’s March 1, 2026, address, articulated the above-mentioned pledge that it will no longer pursue unification by absorption of the North. This is the most accommodating posture any South Korean government has adopted in a generation.

Pyongyang has not yet responded. Kim Jong Un continues to treat the two Koreas as hostile states, dismisses the Lee administration’s overtures, and leans on his alignment with Moscow and Beijing while waiting to see what Washington might offer.

That strategic ‘waiting it out’ may be ending. On August 18, it was reported that Trump had ordered a scaling back of the U.S.’s annual joint military exercise with South Korea, citing his good relationship with Kim Jong Un. Trump said he expects to meet the North Korean leader again this year, possibly during his trip to Asia in November. 

Kim Yo Jong, Kim Jong Un’s influential younger sister, said the relationship between Kim and Trump “remains excellent.” Lee, for his part, pledged to do his utmost to support Trump’s peacemaking. But the window will not stay open forever. South Korean presidents serve a single five-year term, and President Lee’s ends in 2030. Pyongyang thus has an incentive not to let the opening lapse. What is missing on both sides is not motive but access. And access is precisely what Mongolia can supply.

Ulaanbaatar as a venue for the next Trump-Kim summit
Mongolia’s credentials to host a Trump-Kim summit are real. It was the second country in the world to recognize North Korea (in 1948), and the two countries’ diplomatic presence in each other’s capitals has never been interrupted, even during the Korean War and the COVID-19 pandemic.

As a former socialist state, Mongolia is more familiar than others with Pyongyang’s political and bureaucratic culture. As one of only a few functioning democracies in Eurasia, Mongolia also shares South Korea’s values of liberal democracy and a free market economy. 

Ulaanbaatar hosted Japan–North Korea talks in 2012, and it was in the Mongolian capital that the parents of Megumi Yokota, a Japanese citizen who had been abducted by North Korea in 1977, met their granddaughter in 2014. More recently, in 2024, Ulaanbaatar reportedly hosted secret meetings between a Japanese politician and North Korean intelligence agents. The Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, which has convened annually since 2014, is virtually the only standing venue where North Korean, South Korean, Japanese, and U.S. officials have sat across the table from one another. Finally, Mongolia holds a UN-recognized nuclear-weapon-free status, the only country in Northeast Asia to do so, giving it standing on the nuclear question that none of its neighbours currently possess.

Seoul has begun to make the case for Mongolia’s role out loud. At the June 2026 Ulaanbaatar Dialogue, Minister Chung proposed a four-party dialogue among the two Koreas, the U.S., and China that would expand over time to include Mongolia, Japan, and Russia. He called on North Korea to rejoin the Greater Tumen Initiative, the regional economic grouping that Pyongyang left in 2009, following its second nuclear test. South Korea now sees Mongolia as an integral part of the architecture of engagement between the two Koreas.

Canada has good reason to support this initiative. In 2018, it co-hosted, with the first Trump administration, the Vancouver Foreign Ministers’ Meeting on the Korean Peninsula, which was the last time Ottawa convened diplomacy on this issue at such a scale. Yet since 2010, Canada’s “controlled engagement” policy has kept official contact with Pyongyang to a minimum. Ottawa, in other words, shut its own door to North Korea and cannot simply reopen it.

But Ottawa need not remain outside the process. Canada could play a historic role in ensuring that the next summit takes place where it has the best chance of success. In his 2024 memoir, From The Periphery to The Center, former South Korean president Moon Jae In revealed that when the first Trump-Kim summit in 2018 needed a third-country venue, North Korea “hoped for Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia as their choice,” as it could be reached by train from Pyongyang. However, Washington refused, offering Mar-a-Lago, Hawaii, or Geneva. 

The two sides settled on Singapore, even though the city lay beyond the flying range of Kim’s aircraft. This limitation forced Kim to borrow a Chinese plane and, in Moon’s telling, pushed a then-estranged Pyongyang further back into Beijing’s orbit. That mistake need not be repeated. The logistical, symbolic, and geopolitical considerations that pointed to Ulaanbaatar in 2018 have only strengthened since. With Seoul now pushing in the same direction, a fourth Trump-Kim meeting — in Ulaanbaatar — faces only one significant obstacle, which is to convince Washington to reconsider a venue that has fewer fancy hotels. 

Canada’s contribution does not need to end with helping to secure the venue. Prime Minister Mark Carney has spent this past year assembling a coalition of middle powers to defend a rules-based order that has come under strain. A nuclear risk reduction track in Northeast Asia is precisely the kind of work such a coalition can do. Canada could demonstrate the kind of leadership it promised at Davos at the start of the year and show Washington that a Canadian-led middle-power coalition in the Indo-Pacific complements American power rather than competes with it.

The cost of Canada and Mongolia testing this proposition is close to zero. It offends no allies, breaches no sanctions, and concedes nothing on deterrence. The cost of not testing it, however, is another year subtracted from a window that may close as early as 2028, when Trump’s presidency ends and the proliferation clock keeps ticking. 

Mongolia, the land that once launched the largest contiguous land empire in history, could now host the peaceful resolution of one of the gravest security risks of our time. That outcome will not arrange itself. It will take deliberate decisions in Seoul and Washington, and Canada is well placed to champion them in both capitals. Reducing nuclear risk through Ulaanbaatar would be middle-power diplomacy at its best.

By Tuvshinzaya Gantulga: APF Canada Indo-Pacific Research Fellow

• Edited by Jeehye Kim, Senior Program Manager, Northeast Asia, and Ted Fraser, Senior Editor, APF Canada.

Tuvshinzaya Gantulga a principal adviser at Rio Tinto Mongolia and an APF Canada Indo-Pacific Research Fellow. Previously, he served as the foreign policy aide to the President of Mongolia and the executive director of the American Chamber of Commerce in Mongolia. 

As part of his reserve officer duties in the Mongolian Armed Forces, Tuvshinzaya was deployed to Afghanistan as a member of the Mongolian contingent that served with NATO troops. 

Tuvshinzaya holds an MPA from the School of International and Public Affairs of Columbia University in the City of New York, where he served as an online editor of the Journal of International Affairs. His articles have appeared in Foreign Affairs and The Diplomat. 

He is also a Millennium Leadership Fellow at the Atlantic Council.

Audit finds 92.4 billion MNT in irregularities www.ubpost.mn

An audit of the 2025 consolidated financial statements and budget execution of organisations under the Ministry of Health identified irregularities totaling 92.4 billion MNT. Most were related to healthcare service claims. Auditors found that revenues deducted through quality and payment controls from claims submitted through the electronic health insurance system had not been fully transferred.

Following the audit, several financial indicators improved. In 2025, health organisations’ receivables fell by 55 billion MNT and liabilities by 25.8 MNT billion from the previous year, while the number of organisations receiving unqualified audit opinions increased.

However, further action is needed to fully implement audit decisions and address overdue or unimplemented requirements and recommendations. The ministry and the National Audit Office held a meeting on August 19 to discuss common audit findings and corrective measures, in which 416 officials participated in person and online.

Prime Minister Submits Budget Cut Amendments Amid 7.7% Economic Growth www.capitalmarkets.mn

Mongolia's economy grew by 7.7% in the first half of 2026, with real GDP reaching MNT 16.4 trillion. This is the highest first-half growth of the last three years and exceeds the 2026 annual forecasts of international institutions such as the ADB and the World Bank. Yet on 20 August, with those figures barely a week old, the government submitted a 2026 budget amendment to the State Great Khural, cutting a total of MNT 1.4 trillion in spending. Presenting it, Prime Minister N. Uchral said:

“The state is tightening its belt as it should, and we are amending the budget by MNT 1.4 trillion.”

The state tightening its belt while the economy posts high growth is not a contradiction once the composition of that growth is examined. The 7.7% was produced by a narrow set of factors that did not reach households, investment, or the budget. 

Mining was the main contributor to growth
Real value added in the mining and quarrying sector rose by 31.5%, accounting on its own for 3.9% of total economic growth. Agriculture contributed 1.4%, services 1.8%, and industry and construction 0.5% of positive impact respectively. The main drivers of the growth were production at Oyu Tolgoi and coal exports. According to Rio Tinto's report, Oyu Tolgoi's copper production in concentrate reached 198 thousand tonnes in the first half, up 31% from the same period of the previous year, while coal exports reached 65.6 million tonnes in the first seven months, an increase of 59%. The 7.7% growth therefore resulted from strong mining production and export growth rather than from a broad-based recovery of the economy.

Exports rose and the external balance improved
One of the most positive indicators of the economy in the first half was the external sector. The current account posted a surplus of USD 207 million, reversing the USD 1.75 billion deficit of the same period of the previous year. As of the first seven months, exports reached USD 12.2 billion, up 57.5%, while imports increased by 10.4%, bringing the trade surplus to USD 5.0 billion. However, part of the export growth was driven by commodity prices. For example, export revenue from copper ore and concentrate rose by 89.7%, while the physical volume increased by only 23%.

Domestic demand and investment growth slowed
Although foreign trade indicators improved, domestic demand and investment activity remain weak. Gross capital formation fell by 14.5%, and within it gross fixed capital formation fell by 11.0%, reducing GDP growth by 6.5%. At the same time, real household consumption grew by only 0.5%, a marked slowdown from the 6.5% growth of the same period of the previous year. Behind this lie price and labour market pressures. Inflation reached 13.0% in July, and the number of employed people fell by 22.1 thousand in the second quarter. These are precisely the pressures the budget amendment is designed to address, and they explain why a year of record exports has not translated into relief for households. 

The amendment reallocates rather than cuts
Fiscal pressure is equally real. As of the first seven months, the equalised budget balance recorded a deficit of MNT 2.2 trillion, an increase of 70% from the same period of the previous year, even as export earnings rose 57.5%. The amendment provides for savings of MNT 433.4 billion from current expenditure, MNT 758 billion from the capital city's securities, and MNT 249.5 billion from capital expenditure. However, this is not so much a reduction of the deficit as a reallocation of spending. Almost all of the MNT 1.44 trillion in savings is planned to be spent on new outlays. The largest share is the education sector's outstanding wage costs at MNT 675.5 billion, with the remainder allocated to base pensions for the elderly, wage increases in the health, culture and sports sectors, food supply, and energy subsidies. According to the Prime Minister, the amount actually saved is MNT 49.5 billion. 

The International Monetary Fund's 2026 Article IV assessment, published on 6 August, warned of precisely this risk. The IMF considered the submission of the budget amendment to Parliament a priority, but advised refraining from further expanding current spending, particularly wages and pensions, and rebuilding fiscal buffers. It also noted growth of 7.8% through April while emphasising that underlying growth momentum remained subdued, which is consistent with the composition of the first-half figures. In this sense, the budget amendment is not merely a spending-cut measure but a policy instrument for cushioning the risks associated with high inflation and with energy and fuel supply, while protecting household incomes. 

From the pace of growth to the sustainability of growth
Strong growth has not removed the two main risks: high inflation and the budget deficit. While mining exports are supporting economic growth, the 13.0% rise in consumer prices is putting pressure on domestic demand and household purchasing power. The fact that, alongside spending cuts, the budget amendment includes decisions to increase wages, pensions, and food and energy expenditure shows that despite high economic growth, pressure remains on people's real incomes and cost of living. Therefore, going forward, in addition to maintaining the pace of growth, it is important for Mongolia's economy to ensure price stability, improve fiscal discipline, and channel mining revenues into investment that raises long-term productivity. Although the 7.7% growth of the first half of 2026 is a strong indicator, the main challenge remains turning this growth into more sustainable and broad-based economic growth.

COP17 High-Level Segment Opens www.montsame.mn

The High-Level Segment of the 17th Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (COP17) began on August 24.

Ahead of the opening ceremony, President Khurelsukh Ukhnaa, Minister of Foreign Affairs and COP17 President Battsetseg Batmunkh, UN Deputy Secretary-General Amina Mohammed, Executive Secretary of the UN Convention to Combat Desertification Yasmin Fouad, and other distinguished guests and ministerial-level delegates planted trees.

President Khurelsukh officially opened the High-Level Segment with an address. He said climate change, desertification, land degradation and biodiversity loss have become global challenges rather than the problems of any single country, posing an increasingly serious threat to humanity and the future of the planet. Efforts to combat advancing desertification, dust storms, water scarcity, food crises and ecosystem degradation must therefore be coordinated, integrated, long-term, sustainable and mutually reinforcing, he stressed.

The President expressed confidence that the participants would not merely discuss the challenges facing the world, but would jointly identify solutions and deliver concrete decisions and results for a peaceful and green future.

President Khurelsukh said Mongolia believes that combining the traditional knowledge of Mongolians in respecting and protecting nature with modern science, technology and innovation can make an important contribution to finding solutions for sustainable land management, ecosystem balance and people-centered development.

He stressed that desertification, land degradation and drought should not be viewed solely as environmental issues, but addressed comprehensively in connection with food supply and security, water resources, livelihoods, sustainable development, and global peace and security.

The President also emphasized the importance of considering land use, climate change, biodiversity and food systems not as separate issues, but as closely interconnected, and of implementing policies based on science, traditional knowledge and local experience.

Mongolia, which is home to and has safeguarded one of the world's largest remaining temperate grassland ecosystems, experiences the impacts of climate change, desertification and land degradation in daily life due to its landlocked location and predominantly arid and semi-arid environment, he said.

The fact that much of Mongolia's territory is affected by land degradation and desertification has direct consequences not only for the environment, but also for the economy, food supply and security, livelihoods and the sustainability of Mongolia's nomadic heritage, the President noted.

He highlighted Mongolia's national movements, including “Billions of Trees,” “Food Revolution,” “White Gold,” “Blue Gold,” and “Healthy Mongolian,” which seek to restore land, expand forest resources, protect soil, water and pastures, strengthen food supply and security, promote sustainable rural development and create jobs.

President Khurelsukh called for a fair international system that directs global efforts to address the challenges facing developing countries and countries in dry and drought-prone regions, ensuring that financing, technology and capacity reach the countries, regions and communities that need them most.

He called on governments, international financial institutions, development partners and the private sector to direct more grants, concessional financing and green investment toward land restoration, drought resilience and sustainable livelihoods.

The President further stressed that the participation of herders, farmers, local communities, women, young people, children, civil society, researchers and the private sector must be ensured at every stage of policymaking, implementation and monitoring, describing inclusive participation as the foundation for fair, effective, open and sustainable solutions.

He noted that Mongolia is working to increase public participation and youth engagement through initiatives such as the national Youth Participation in Combating Desertification Forum and aims to engage the private sector in cooperation on sustainable land management, investment and innovation in line with the UNCCD's Business for Land initiative.

Mongolia will chair the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification for the next two years. The country's proposed “Steppe Action Agenda” is based on three pillars: the Rangelands Flagship Initiative, the Integrated Water and Land Management Initiative, and the Nature-Based Solutions for Sustainable Infrastructure Initiative.

COP17 Is a New Platform for Mongolia's 'Ecological Diplomacy' www.montsame.mn

For the first time, Mongolia is serving as a global platform for ecological diplomacy.

COP17 is taking place in Ulaanbaatar under the theme ""Restoring Land, Restoring Hope." The country has welcomed governments, businesses, civil societies, scientists, herders, and other participants from 197 nations.

Hosting the Conference of the Parties to the UN Convention to Combat Desertification (COP17) is, for Mongolia, not merely a major environmental event but a matter of strategic significance. As it is tied to foreign policy, the economy, national branding, and the country's "third neighbor" diplomacy. In that sense, COP17 can be seen as a new platform for "ecological diplomacy."

Here, Mongolia is not only the host but is also able to present its own positions, experience, and initiatives on the global stage in areas including:

Combating desertification

Protecting rangelands

Sustainably using water resources

Adapting to climate change

Reducing land degradation

In short, Mongolia is turning its own challenges into global ones.

Owing to its geographic location and harsh climate, Mongolia is among most vulnerable to climate change. As a result, summer precipitation has fallen rapidly, droughts have grown more frequent, and desertification is spreading.

The country has broad opportunities to share its experience with the world and develop joint solutions to this challenge. As COP17 enters its second leg, final decisions have not yet been reached. For my part, I hope the conference will produce many important outcomes and forms of cooperation that Mongolia genuinely needs.

There are several outcomes I would most like to see come out of COP17. First and foremost would be a major, comprehensive national program to combat desertification—one bringing together tree planting, water retention, land restoration, and the protection of rangelands from degradation. That would be the most significant change of all. Second, greater investment and financing directed toward fighting desertification and protecting the environment. Third, new opportunities for technological and scientific cooperation with Mongolia. And most importantly, the incorporation of COP17's decisions into Mongolia's own national budget and policy—so that what is agreed here is actually carried out at home.

Most significantly of all, COP17 matters for Mongolia's foreign policy. Viewed through that lens, the conference carries wide-ranging significance, offering a rare chance to bring together several strands of Mongolian diplomacy at once—its multilateral engagement, as I mentioned before its "third neighbor" policy, its ecological diplomacy, its international standing, and its economic diplomacy.

COP17 is a historic moment not only for Mongolia but for East and Central Asia as a whole. Mongolia is the first country in Central Asia to host a COP, and this is the first of the three 2026 Rio Convention COPs to take place.

1. Elevating Mongolia's multilateral diplomacy to a new level

Although Mongolia sits geographically between two large neighbors, it regards multilateral diplomacy as one of the key pillars of its foreign policy. COP17 becomes a major arena for implementing that policy. By hosting a high-level UN convention meeting involving 197 countries in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia can strengthen its image as:

An active participant within the UN system

A country capable of creating international negotiating platforms

A country that takes the initiative on shared global issues

The UNCCD itself frames land degradation, desertification, and drought as global issues linked to the economy, food, water, livelihoods, and stability. In this regard, Mongolia has the chance to shift from being seen as a "small country" toward a diplomatic posture as a "country that offers solutions." Over the next two years, Mongolia will also preside over the UNCCD COP.

2. Adding new substance to the "third neighbor" policy

This, in my view, is one of the most interesting effects on Mongolian foreign policy. Traditionally, Mongolia's "third neighbor" policy has been closely tied to political, security, and economic cooperation. Through COP17, a new dimension is added. Mongolia—which has many partners, including Japan, the Republic of Korea, the United States, the European Union, India, Australia, and Central Asian countries—can expand cooperation around shared interests: climate, water, land restoration, rangelands, green technology, and financing. This offers a chance to broaden the "third neighbor" policy from a traditional security concept toward sustainable-development diplomacy.

3. Using Mongolia's nomadic culture as "soft power"

This is a major advantage that sets Mongolia apart from other countries. The year 2026, designated the UN International Year of Rangelands and Pastoralists, coincides with COP17. Mongolia holds a special position in bringing rangeland and pastoralist issues to the international level. From this, a new diplomatic initiative can emerge: Nomadic culture → Sustainable pastoralism → Global ecological solutions. In this way, nomadic culture becomes not merely a tourism brand but a tool of Mongolia's soft-power diplomacy.

4. Connecting Mongolia with new international finance and technology partners

The COP17 discussions are not only about environmental protection—financing for land restoration, private-sector participation, technology transfer, and scientific cooperation are also central themes. This directly benefits Mongolia's economic diplomacy. We can build a new chain: COP17 → international organizations → development banks → investors → technology companies → Mongolian projects. In particular, Mongolia's adoption of its first law on climate change in July 2026 has strengthened the policy foundation ahead of COP17.

5. Rebalancing Mongolia's international image from "mining" toward "green development"

To much of the international community that knows us at all, Mongolia evokes the image of the combination of "coal + copper + mining + nomadic culture." COP17 offers the chance to build a different image — a broader identity of "Mongolia = a Champoin against desertification + nomadic culture + land restoration + green development." An image like that carries real weight, particularly in relations with partners who place great importance on the green transition and sustainable financing.

6. An opportunity to diversify Mongolia's "diplomatic brand"

Mongolia can build a distinctive diplomatic brand combining traditional nomadic culture, a heritage of environmental stewardship, and modern ecological solutions. This would present Mongolia not merely as a country "caught between two great powers" geopolitically, but as one that contributes to solving shared global challenges.

COP17 can therefore leave Mongolia with three kinds of diplomatic "capital":

Diplomatic capital—the standing of its multilateral diplomacy.

Soft-power capital—Mongolia's experience in nomadic culture, rangelands, and conservation.

Economic-diplomatic capital—green investment, technology, financing, and international partnerships.

The greatest positive impact of COP17 on Mongolia's foreign policy, then, is not merely the success of organizing a single conference well, but the opportunity to make it a new direction for the country's foreign policy.

"Restoring Land, Restoring Hope"

By Baatarkhuu Khorloo, PhD in International Studies

ADB launches $92.6 million fund to support sustainable agribusiness in Mongolia www.qazinform.com

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has launched a new fund aimed at expanding access to finance for herders, cooperatives, small and medium-sized enterprises and agribusinesses investing in sustainable livestock value chains in Mongolia, Qazinform News Agency cites the bank’s press service.

The Green Inclusive Regional Agribusiness Fund (GIRAF) was established with $92.6 million from the Green Climate Fund, under the ADB-supported Aimag and Soums Development Investment Program. An additional $25 million is expected to be provided by commercial banks.

The fund will support sustainable rangeland management, livestock production and rural businesses through concessional loans, credit guarantees, microfinance and grants for green innovation. The initiative is designed to address longstanding financing challenges facing Mongolia’s rural economy.

The GIRAF Fund represents a new approach to financing resilient rural development in Mongolia, said ADB Country Director for Mongolia John Juhyun Jeong.

“By providing tailored financial solutions for sustainable livestock production and improved rangeland management, the fund will help create jobs, strengthen rural economies, combat land degradation and desertification, and build resilience to disasters,” he added.

Temperate grasslands cover approximately 82% of Mongolia and underpin the country’s livestock sector, which accounts for around one-quarter of employment and more than 10% of gross domestic product.

However, Mongolia’s rangelands and the communities that depend on them are facing growing pressures from desertification and land degradation.

The GIRAF Fund will initially deploy $37.5 million, including a $3 million grant, to provide tailored financing for rural businesses. The financing package will include concessional loans, credit guarantees designed to reduce collateral requirements and grants supporting green innovation.

Priority will be given to businesses that have commercial partnerships and benefit-sharing arrangements with herders and herder cooperatives.

The initiative will also introduce a digital traceability and monitoring system using geospatial and remote-sensing technologies. The system will track investments and assess their environmental and socioeconomic impact.

By 2034, the GIRAF Fund is expected to support approximately 500 small and medium-sized enterprises and cooperatives and 1,000 microenterprises.

According to ADB, the initiative will help increase the value generated from livestock products while promoting sustainable rangeland management, land restoration and more resilient livelihoods in rural Mongolia.

Earlier, Qazinform reported ADB had priced a $2 billion 10-year global benchmark bond. 

Mongolia’s Rangelands Can Bounce Back–If the Livestock Model Changes www.blogs.adb.org

Reversing land degradation in Mongolia requires fewer animals, higher productivity, and farming that restores the land instead of exhausting it. This shift can raise incomes and boost resilience for herders and their families.

Mongolia’s grasslands are one of Asia’s great natural assets, covering about 1.2 million square kilometers—an area larger than France and Germany combined. Mongolia’s grasslands sustain pastoral livelihoods, retain water, and underpin a livestock economy that is central to national identity. But these rangelands are under growing stress. Desertification and land degradation are already visible in weaker pastures, thinner vegetation, drying water sources, and less resilience to changing weather patterns. 

As the land struggles, many herders have tried to protect their income by increasing livestock numbers.

Herd growth is also cultural: Nomadic herders see animals as savings, insurance, and pride. The result is a vicious cycle in which more animals graze the same land, soils degrade, the size of herds the land can support falls, animals enter winter in poor condition, and herders become even more dependent on herd size instead of better productivity per animal. 

Recent hard winters—known locally as “dzud”—have made this fragility painfully clear.

The answer is not to weaken pastoralism. It is to help pastoralism become more productive, resilient, and regenerative. 

We could protect and boost household income at the same time as reducing herd sizes gradually, if we provide fair incentives and plan proactively for higher productivity per animal, better raw-material quality, improve herders’ links to value chains. 

Environmentally smart herding practices such as rotating pastures, resting of degraded areas, protection of winter and spring reserves, harvesting water, preparation of fodder, and planned movement of animals can give grasslands time to recover.
 

Gradual reduction in herd sizes, guided by fair incentives and local planning, can ease grazing pressure without cutting household income.

Agriculture that promotes restoration of soil and nutrients can reinforce this transition. Restoring vegetation cover, increasing the organic matter in soil, protecting rivers and streams, reseeding bare patches, and managing manure and fodder systems more effectively all help soil hold more water and resist erosion. 

Healthy soil supports healthier pasture. Healthier pasture supports stronger animals. Stronger animals allow herders to earn more from fewer, better-managed livestock.

Community-based breeding programs offer a practical starting point for this shift. Instead of adding animals, herders work together to improve the quality of their flocks and herds. They select better animals for breeding, keep stronger replacements, and phase out poorer performers, matching breeding choices to what meat, hide, wool, and cashmere processors and markets need. 

Simple tools such as field measurements, fiber testing, animal records, planned mating, and basic offspring monitoring help communities see which animals perform better. Over time, this approach moves income strategies away from “more animals” toward “more value per animal.” This can help lay the foundation for quality‑based competitiveness that can support herders, cooperatives, processors, and local authorities. 

Scaling this change will take more than a single project. Mongolia can become a leader in livestock transformation through a package of mutually reinforcing reforms: community pasture agreements linked to the ability of a section of land to sustain animals; fair livestock taxation or grazing fees that are reinvested locally; pricing that rewards quality in cashmere, wool, meat, and hides; risk-financing tools that soften the blow of disasters; and public investment in veterinary care, breeding support, fodder, water infrastructure, and practical advice and training for herders.

Cooperatives can help pool purchases of supplies, enforce breeding rules, share equipment, and negotiate better prices. Processors can reward traceable, high-quality raw materials. Local governments can back pasture-use planning and protect key reserves. Done responsibly, the result could be transformative. Herders would own fewer but more productive animals. Livestock would enter winter in better condition. Communities would have stronger fodder reserves and face fewer catastrophic dzud losses.

Processors would receive more consistent raw materials. Pastures would have space to regenerate, with land slowly regaining vegetation cover and soils holding more moisture and carbon. Rural households could earn more secure incomes from a smaller ecological footprint.

This is the future Mongolia deserves: prosperous herders, resilient communities, competitive livestock value chains, and restored rangelands. The path begins with one clear idea: productivity, not herd expansion, is the foundation of a nature-positive pastoral economy.

The 17th Session of the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification is under way in the Mongolian capital of Ulaanbaatar, and will run until 28 August.
 

Published: 24 August 2026

Author(s)

Au Shion Yee
Director, ADB's Agriculture, Food, Nature, and Rural Development Sector Office

Dustin S. Schinn
Water Resources Specialist, ADB's Agriculture, Food, Nature and Rural Development Sector

China, Arab countries release plan for desertification control at UNCCD COP17 in Mongolia www.bastillepost.com

China and Arab countries will deepen practical cooperation in combating drought, desertification and land degradation in the coming five years, according to an action plan released on Saturday in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia.

The plan was released at a meeting of the Steering Committee of the China-Arab International Research Center for Drought, Desertification and Land Degradation and the China-Arab Cooperation Workshop, which were held on the sidelines of the 17th session of the Conference of the Parties (COP17) to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD).

Drought, desertification and land degradation are pressing ecological challenges shared by China and Arab nations. The action plan outlines concrete initiatives for the next five years, leveraging platforms such as the China-Arab Center and partnership networks to deepen cooperation in key areas including desertification control, degraded land management, and sandstorm monitoring and early warning.

The 17th session of the COP17 to the UNCCD officially commenced on Monday in Ulaanbaatar under the theme "Restoring Land, Restoring Hope." Delegates from UNCCD's 197 Parties, along with representatives from UN bodies, international organizations, civil society groups, research institutions and enterprises, gathered to discuss issues including restoration of degraded land, sustainable land management, drought resilience, and grassland protection and restoration.

Russia exports gasoline to its neighbors, while sales restrictions are in place in 58 regions www.nemoskva.net

Gasoline shortage in Russia intensifies, however, fuel exports continue. Deliveries of motor fuel abroad are carried out under intergovernmental agreements. They are not subject to the export ban imposed by the Russian government. extended until January 31 2027 year.

Mongolia will receive an additional 25 tons of AI-92.
On August 11, Mongolian Minister of Industry Damdinnyam сообщилRussia will supply the country with fuel in excess of the previously agreed volumes. By the end of the month, Mongolia will receive an additional 25 tons of AI-92 gasoline and 5 tons of jet fuel.

Agreements were reached with Rosneft, Gazprom Neft and the Russian Ministry of Energy.

At the same time, Russia is purchasing fuel from India and Belarus.
At the same time, Russia itself is purchasing fuel abroad. In August, gasoline and jet fuel imports will increase. up to 270 thousand tonsAbout a third comes from India. The remaining volumes, according to sources, are transshipped from tanker to tanker off the coast of South Korea and Malaysia.

In June, Belarus became the record holder for deliveries: in 25 days it put 2,4 times more fuel than in the whole of May.

Why is there a gasoline shortage in Russia?
In July, due to attacks on oil refineries, oil refining in Russia fell to a low not seen since 2002. This is approximately a third below the current seasonal norm.

By the beginning of July, gasoline production cover Reuters and Kommersant estimated that this figure was around 65-70% of summer demand.

Restrictions on sales are in effect in 58 out of 89 regions.
According to the BenZinMap portal, restrictions on gasoline sales will be in place by August 15 acted In 58 of 89 regions, localized power outages or price increases were also reported in another 18 regions.