This year marks the 10th anniversary of President Xi Jinping’s proposal of building a community with a shared future for mankind. China recently released the white paper A Global Community of Shared Future: China’s Proposals and Actions, which elaborates on the connotation and best practices of the concept and allows people from all walks of life and the international community to better understand the far-reaching significance of the concept and the goals of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics.

Ten years ago, when faced with the profound question of the world, history and the times, “What is happening to the world and what should we do?”, President Xi Jinping proposed the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind with the broad strategic vision, outstanding political wisdom and strong sense of responsibility as a leader of a major country and party. He pointed out the right direction for global development at the turning point of history and built a strong consensus for international cooperation at a time of complex changes.

Over the past decade, the concept of a community with a shared future for mankind has been developing, while following the right path amid rising changes and moving forward in the face of crises and challenges, and it has achieved significant results and emerged as a thought that leads the times.

From state visits to multilateral summits, President Xi Jinping has elaborated on this important concept on multiple occasions and helped the international community understand more about the idea. Thus a science-based theoretical system is established that takes an open, inclusive, clean, and beautiful world that enjoys lasting peace, universal security, and common prosperity as the ultimate goal, the common values of humanity as the target, a new type of international relations as the fundamental path, Belt and Road cooperation as the platform for action, and the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative and the Global Civilization Initiative as the important pillars.

The concept of a community with a shared future for mankind has become a key strategy for the global response to major challenges of health, climate change, cybersecurity etc. It has been written into the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly for six consecutive years and included in resolutions or declarations of multilateral mechanisms many times. The idea has gained understanding and support from the international community, especially from developing countries. As a platform for action for the concept, Belt and Road cooperation is also celebrating its 10th anniversary this year. China has signed cooperation documents with 152 countries and 32 international organizations and set up more than 3,000 cooperation projects.

Data from the World Bank shows that the Belt and Road Initiative will generate USD 1.6 trillion in global revenue every year and help nearly 40 million people get out of poverty by 2030. The turbulent international and regional landscape , resurging Cold War mentality, and increasingly intense bloc confrontation in recent years have wreaked havoc on the world economy. Despite the challenges, China’s economy recovery is making steady progress. In the first half of this year, China’s GDP grew by 5.5%. The World Bank, the OECD, and the IMF all predict that China’s economic growth will exceed 5% in 2023.

China’s independence policy, abundant macro policy tools, and broad market prospects allow the IMF and other institutions to predict that China will contribute more than 30% to global economic growth in 2023 and remain the main engine of future growth. China and Mongolia share geographical proximity, cultural connectivity, and people-to-people sincerity.

The principle of amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness and the policy of forging friendship and partnership with neighboring countries have found their best practices here in Mongolia. The close cooperation and fruitful results of high-level visits, economic and trade exchanges and cultural and people-to-people connectivity open a new chapter of building a community with a shared future for the two countries. A community with a shared future for the two countries benefits from the strategic guidance of the two countries’ leaders. Mongolian President Khurelsuh and Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene reached important consensus with President Xi Jinping during their visits to China, setting the course forward for the two countries.

High level leaders of the two sides built the tree engines that will drive the future of the two countries by seeking greater synergy between the Belt and Road Initiative and the Steppe Road Plan, between the Global Development Initiative and Mongolia’s New Recovery Policy, and between China’s two-step development strategy and Mongolia’s “Vision-2050” long-term development policy. A community with a shared future for the two countries benefits from the close cooperation in economy and trade. The strong mutual complementarity and huge potential for cooperation make China and Mongolia close neighbors and partners that cannot be separated. In 2022, despite the pandemic, the bilateral trade between the two countries reached USD 12.2 billion.

Trade in the first three quarters this year increased by 30% year on year, growing closer to the USD 20 billion goal. Mongolian coal export this year is expected to exceed 5,500 tons to a historic new high. Mongolian estimation shows that, for every 1% of economic growth of China, the export of Mongolia in 6 months to a year will increase by 4% and the GDP by 0.6%. A community with a shared future for the two countries benefits from the people-to-people connectivity. The traditional friendship of the two peoples rolls into the new era with even greater vitality. During the pandemic, the donations of sheep and tea became a story well-told among the public. China and Mongolia strengthened cooperation in response to desertification by setting up the sand stabilization pilot area in Mongolia and the China-Mongolia Desertification Prevention and Control Center, which have become a new example of environmental protection for the two countries.

After the pandemic, the “Years to Visit Mongolia” program attracted flocks of Chinese tourists. The international departure hall of the Erenhot railway port has been busy with all the passengers. It is the BRI that provides 21,000 households in three sums of western Mongolia with stable electricity from China. The man in charge of the grid won the special contribution medal of Mongolia for four consecutive years. The Xinjiang Beixin Road & Bridge Group built a high-quality road stretching from Arvaikheer to Bayankhongor in western Mongolia. The manager of the company’s Mongolian office was awarded the Order of the Polar Star by the President.

China is about to hold the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation. We are ready to uphold the principle of extensive consultation, joint contribution and shared benefits to push forward the Belt and Road cooperation with Mongolia and build a road of peace, friendship, and prosperity that brings benefits to the world. Over the decade, the successful practices of a community with a shared future for mankind have proved that the historical trend of human development is unstoppable. In a global village where all share the same future and interests, no one can stay immune in crises or resolve all the problems. It is solidarity and cooperation, not the zero-sum game mentality, that bring a better world and welfare to every ordinary person living in this global village.

Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the People’s Republic of China to Mongolia Shen Minjuan

Mongolian President Ukhnaa Khurelsukh on Tuesday begins a visit to France where he will discuss uranium mining and sign deals on energy and telecommunications, the Mongolian government said in a statement.

The visit, which will last until Saturday, follows a trip to Mongolia by French President Emmanuel Macron in May, during which the two countries pledged to expand ties.

They will also hold talks on Mongolia's rich deposits of uranium, which French nuclear firm Orano is seeking to exploit in a deal yet to be approved by Ulaanbaatar.

A French official told AFP in June the project was estimated at "more than a billion euros" and would "make it possible to extract a significant quantity of uranium" to "reinforce the strategic autonomy" of France.

The Mongolian head of state's visit will also focus on culture, with Khurelsukh to open an exhibition focused on his country's founding leader Genghis Khan at the Nantes History Museum, according to his government.

"The significant progress we will make this week, building on President Macron's visit to Mongolia in May, will leave us in a better place to tackle shared challenges and support Mongolia's long-term development for decades to come," the Mongolian president was quoted as saying in a press release.

Mongolia is pursuing what it calls a "Third Neighbour" strategy, in which it seeks to build closer ties with countries beyond the vast authoritarian powers next door.

Mongolia, a landlocked nation, is grappling with the shrinking space for maneuvering between its two powerful neighbors and is seeking to balance its relations with the West. The Foreign Affairs journal has reviewed its unexpected relation to a "third neighbour", the United States which adopts a strategy of economic engagement with Mongolia with the aim of helping it develop options and leverage in dealing with Russia and China. Caliber.Az reprints this article.

"The visit in early July of Russian Prosecutor General Igor Krasnov to Beijing would have gone largely unnoticed but for an unexpected announcement. Krasnov revealed that he and his Chinese colleagues had discussed the need to counteract the increasing Western influence on their 'inner neighbor,' Mongolia. To this end, Krasnov said, he had already forwarded a proposal to his Mongolian counterpart to help strengthen ties with both China and Russia.

Krasnov’s remarks triggered alarm bells in Mongolia. For the past three decades, Mongolia has tried desperately to keep itself at arm’s length from its two neighbors, in part by exploiting their differences and in part by pursuing closer relations with the West. But now, as China and Russia grow ever closer, Mongolia’s space for maneuvering is rapidly shrinking.

This vast, resource-rich country of just over three million people in the heart of Eurasia still clings to a vision of the more open world that existed for about 30 years after the end of the Cold War. In those decades, Mongolia had a degree of freedom in choosing friends, trading with everyone, and benefiting from the prosperity produced by the rules-based international order. But it now faces many uncertainties in an era of great-power competition and hardening geopolitical divisions. In recent conversations with officials in the capital, Ulaanbaatar, we detected a creeping sense of resignation and fears that any rash move may invite intolerable pressure from Beijing or Moscow and further limits on the country’s ability to act independently.

Mongolia, however, does not have to meekly surrender to life as an appendage of China and Russia. Instead, it could become a model for how the United States approaches Central Asia in the unfolding geostrategic competition with China. The United States should do more to facilitate trade and investment links with Mongolia and signal a long-term commitment to the country through educational and training programs without attempting to portray its involvement as a deliberate strategic ploy to weaken autocracy and promote democracy. For its part, Mongolia must redouble its efforts to reassure foreign investors and to nurture a transparent and predictable economic environment, thus setting an example for other Central Asian countries that face similar dilemmas. In this way, Mongolia and other countries that feel caught between great powers might find that they are not so trapped after all.

Between two giants

Mongolia survived the Cold War by aligning itself closely with the Soviet Union. The West was far away, and a much more dangerous enemy was close by: China. Mongolian leaders feared that China harbored irredentist ambitions. With Sino-Soviet relations in a tailspin since the late 1950s, the best option was to hold tight to the Soviets, who promised to protect Mongolia from Chinese encroachment and to support its economic development.

The end of the Cold War ushered in a sea change. In 1990, Mongolia underwent a democratic revolution. The communists were toppled, and the country has since developed a reasonably stable two-party system. It has also pursued an activist foreign policy, characterized not just by a willingness to engage with China and Russia but also a desire to build close relations with the 'third neighbor'—a loose term used by Mongolian policymakers to describe the collective West and significant players among the countries of the global South. Mongolia seeks to defy geopolitical realities through a forceful and purposeful assertion of its claim to international relevance. It was the third neighbor policy, for instance, that underpinned the country’s decision to support US efforts by sending 1,200 troops to Iraq between 2003 and 2008, close to 6,000 troops to Afghanistan between 2003 and 2021, and over 10,000 peacekeepers to South Sudan in recent years.

When it comes to Mongolia’s economy, however, China and Russia tower over all others. More than 90 percent of Mongolian exports [mainly mineral resources] find their way to China. Russia, for its part, supplies Mongolia with 95 percent of its fuel. Mongolia is also a key conduit of trade between China and Russia. Russia owns half the strategic railroad that crosses Mongolia from north to south. [The other half belongs to the Mongolian government.] In the past year, the railroad saw a surge of Russian traffic as the Kremlin sought to make up for its loss of access to Europe by importing an ever-larger quantity of Chinese goods. In the first half of 2023, 2.4 million tons of goods moved between China and Russia through Mongolia, a 58 percent increase from the same period a year ago.

Poking the bear

And yet these strong commercial ties have not prevented diplomatic frictions. The Kremlin has leaned on Mongolia since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, which came as a major shock to Mongolian policymakers. Mongolia is not a party to the Collective Security Treaty Organization, a Russian-led regional security alliance made up of six former Soviet republics. But the Kremlin has still tried to press Ulaanbaatar to back Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war. Although they have not lent Russia their support, Mongolian diplomats abstained during the votes for UN General Assembly resolutions that condemned the war in 2022.

Even this ostensible neutrality is not enough for Moscow. Russian officials have accused Mongolia of intending to host US biological warfare labs, much as they have insisted on the purported presence of such labs in Ukraine. Mongolia is pushing back, however. Foreign Minister Battsetseg Batmunkh strenuously denied that such laboratories exist or that there are any plans to set them up. And since the beginning of Russia’s war in Ukraine, Mongolian authorities have welcomed thousands of Russian self-exiles and draft dodgers, many of whom hail from nearby Buryatia, which has linguistic, cultural, and ethnic ties to Mongolia. Just in the fourth quarter of 2022—essentially, in the three months that followed Putin’s call for a partial mobilization of Russian citizens—153,162 Russians visited Mongolia, a greater number than entered Mongolia in any prior calendar year. In the first six months of 2023, over 140,000 Russians entered Mongolia. In August 2023, Putin signed a law to close the escape hatch by setting up a new system for conscripts: they will no longer be allowed to leave Russia if drafted.

Mongolian authorities have also allowed voluble expressions of opposition to Putin’s war within their country. About 80 small-scale anti-Russian demonstrations have taken place in front of the Russian embassy in Ulaanbaatar. Several Mongolian politicians have spoken sharply against the war. Damdinnyam Gongor, a Canadian-educated parliamentarian, raised an antiwar sign during a parliamentary session in March 2022. This act prompted Russian diplomats in Mongolia to demand a meeting with him, which he has refused. In the weeks that followed the Russian invasion, former President Elbegdorj Tsakhia and former Prime Minister Bayar Sanjaa [who hail from rival sides of the Mongolian political spectrum] condemned the Russian invasion and called on Putin to end the war. In September 2022, in a video message that went viral, Elbegdorj called on Russia’s ethnic Mongolians to resist the draft and flee to Mongolia instead.

Iskander Azizov, Moscow’s brusque ambassador in Ulaanbaatar in recent years, has made matters considerably worse. In June 2020, he lambasted Mongolia’s national broadcaster for refusing to air the annual Russian World War II victory parade, a decision that was, in Azizov’s view, evidence that Mongolia was succumbing to Western influence. More recently, in November 2022, Azizov prompted stern words from Enkh-Amgalan Luvsantseren, Mongolia’s education minister, when the former sought to intervene in the appointment of a principal at a local school. Enkh-Amgalan furiously denounced Azizov’s 'rude attempt to meddle in Mongolia’s domestic affairs.' The minister reminded the ambassador: 'I am not a minister of [the Russian province of] Buryatia. I am the minister of sovereign Mongolia.' In January 2023, Russia replaced Azizov, who was sent to Myanmar. The new Russian ambassador in Ulaanbaatar, Aleksei Evsikov, is more discreet and tactful. He is a China expert, a fact that speaks loudly to both Russia’s priorities and Russia’s concerns in Mongolia.

But even with these occasional flare-ups, the Mongolian government understandably does not want to provoke Russia for fear that upsetting Moscow could prompt devastating retaliation: Russia could shut off fuel supplies to Mongolia, which would bring the entire country to a grinding halt. As a senior government official told us, 'What can we do? We cannot defend ourselves. Mongolia has no cards to play!'

In the shadow of China

In Mongolia’s relations with China, a remarkable change has occurred. After decades of fretting about Chinese encroachment, Mongolian officials seem a little less concerned. In recent years, fears of Chinese ambitions translated into a policy that aimed at preventing China from acquiring critical stakes in Mongolia’s natural resources, adhering to the standard Russian width between rails in the construction of railroads, and obstructing Chinese migration. In 2017, during his presidential election campaign, former Mongolian President Battulga Khaltmaa spiced up his campaign rhetoric with invocations of a Chinese menace—once elected, however, he pursued a notably more pragmatic course.

That menace does manifest occasionally in serious disputes. In the wake of the Dalai Lama’s visit to Mongolia in late 2016, Beijing swiftly imposed sweeping economic sanctions on its neighbor. Mongolia promptly capitulated and promised to never allow the Dalai Lama to visit again.

But although it gets easily triggered by certain narrowly defined issues [including Taiwan, Tibet, and its human rights record], Beijing refrains from putting too much pressure on Ulaanbaatar—for now. This benign neglect has benefited the Mongolians, especially as they face a more radical neighbor to the north that is intent on reasserting its waning influence. 'The Chinese are very practical people,' Damdinnyam told us. 'The Russians, by contrast, are arrogant—needlessly arrogant. Arrogant for the sake of being arrogant.'

A less charitable explanation for China’s relative neglect of Mongolia is that Beijing knows that Ulaanbaatar’s space for independent action is already terribly circumscribed. China need not expend a great deal of geopolitical capital on coercing a neighbor so bound to it by hard geographic and economic realities. Policymakers in Mongolia [as across Central Asia] have learned to live in the shadow of China.

Testing ground

As a landlocked country almost entirely dependent on China and Russia, Mongolia may be in a particularly vulnerable spot. But that vulnerability is what makes it a crucial testing ground for Western policies. The same set of policies could be applied across Central Asia to counter both Chinese expansionism and Russian malice.

US officials should not confuse political gestures with the genuine economic statecraft that is so desperately needed. Mongolia has always been desperate for attention, especially from senior US politicians. [The only US president to have ever visited Mongolia was George W. Bush in 2005—and that trip was largely an effort to rally support for the US wars in the Middle East.] It is important, however, not to overemphasize the importance of attention, especially if all Mongolia has to gain from the visits of top-ranking US officials are rote statements regarding the two countries’ shared commitment to democratic values.

For instance, US Undersecretary of State Victoria Nuland’s visit to Ulaanbaatar in April produced little of substance beyond praise for Mongolia’s democratic credentials. During a recent White House meeting with Mongolian Prime Minister Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai, US Vice President Kamala Harris not only talked about Mongolia’s 'reliable democracy' but even found time to situate Mongolia within the broader context of US 'defense and deterrence commitments and our security presence in the region.'

There is no real need for such language. It is a bad time for the United States to attempt to impose its ideological view of the world—one divided between democracies and autocracies, placing the US rivalry with China at the heart of geopolitics—on others. Like many countries in Central Asia, Mongolia does not want to be put in a position of having to choose between China and Russia, on the one hand, and the West, on the other. In Mongolia’s case, making such a choice would be extremely painful if not altogether impossible. Mongolia is too dependent on its two authoritarian neighbors to risk antagonizing them.

The third neighbour

The United States needs a different strategy, one not of grand proclamations but of small steps aimed at giving smaller countries such as Mongolia options. The United States cannot expect Mongolia to decouple from China and Russia, but Washington’s active engagement with the country [including through economic involvement but also educational and training programs] would increase Mongolia’s leverage in dealing with its two difficult neighbors. The aim here should be to help Mongolia survive as a robust democracy that can maintain a precarious neutrality in an increasingly polarized world.

Trade and investment will be an important part of any such strategy. Mongolia has a lot to offer the United States. Of particular interest to US officials and companies may be Mongolia’s rich deposits of rare earths and lithium, resources that have become ever more important as the United States attempts to better insulate its supply chains from China.

Progress has been slow on this front. In June, Mongolia, South Korea, and the United States held their first trilateral 'critical minerals dialogue.' What results from this dialogue remains to be seen. Rare earths were also discussed during Oyun-Erdene’s visit to Washington; according to one US official, the Americans are looking for 'creative ways' to help Mongolia. A source familiar with these matters said that this entails technical assistance in geological prospecting. But further impediments to US investment in Mongolia remain, including the difficulty of processing minerals in Mongolia and, critically, the lack of clarity about how to export these strategic materials from a landlocked country without entering into either China or Russia.

Mongolia has another hurdle to overcome: its own reputation. Mongolia must do more to build a predictable legal framework that would make long-term commitments more attractive for foreign investors. But the country is known for occasionally throwing out investors, as it did in 2009 with the revocation of a uranium mining license held by Khan Resources, a Canadian company. That decision, which many suspect was intended to placate the Russians, who wanted exclusive access to Mongolian uranium, led to years of international litigation between the Canadian firm and the Mongolian state, a battle that Mongolia ultimately lost. Earlier this year, a Mongolian court canceled the permits of another uranium prospecting company that was supported by investment from the Czech Republic. The Czechs are currently threatening legal repercussions.

Such cases serve as reminders of both how easy it is to paint foreign investors as crafty foreigners out to steal Mongolia’s riches and how challenging it then becomes to invite them back because the country cannot do without them. Mongolia can and should redouble its efforts to attract foreign multinationals and thus strengthen the economic underpinnings of the third neighbor policy. Mongolia’s energy infrastructure, in particular, is in dire need of help. An Indian firm is building an oil refinery at Sainshand in the Gobi Desert. Although this refinery will not completely eliminate Mongolia’s dependence on imported Russian fuel, it will make a sizable step in that direction. The arrival of more foreign investment in Mongolia’s energy sector will help weaken Russia’s influence in the country. There is also vast potential for investments in wind and solar power: not only would such investments address the country’s vulnerability to energy blackmail by the Russians, but they could also help Mongolia increase its capability to export electricity to China.

That may seem like a bad thing to US officials, but they must dispense with zero-sum thinking when it comes to understanding Mongolia’s geopolitical position. The United States could make a virtue of necessity and recognize that limited cooperation with China here makes sense. Mongolia desperately needs assistance in mitigating climate change, which remains one of the few areas in which the United States and China may be capable of reaching agreement.

The same logic could apply more broadly to Central Asia, which calls for serious Western attention, not in the form of political or ideological grandstanding or military involvement [here, the mess in Afghanistan has shown Americans what not to do] but in the form of hard-nosed economic engagement that would give regional players more breathing space as they face continued Russian bullying and China’s relentless drive for regional hegemony".

Caliber.Az

Mongolia purchased 13.2 tons of gold in the first three quarters from legal entities and individuals, the central bank said Tuesday.

As of September, Mongolia's average gold purchase price had been 213,818.68 Mongolian tugriks (about 62 U.S. dollars) per gram, the Bank of Mongolia said in a statement.

Purchasing gold is one of the key ways for the central bank to ensure the country's economic stability by consistently increasing foreign currency reserves, said the bank.

The Asian country's forex reserves stood at 4.124 billion dollars at the end of September, marking a third straight monthly rise, according to the central bank.

Due to the deepening of a current account deficit caused by external and internal economic conditions, the country's forex reserves shrank to 2.695 billion dollars at the end of August 2022, hitting the lowest level since 2017.

The country's forex reserves hit an all-time high of 4.892 billion dollars at the end of April 2021.

The economist members of the HUN Party have become acquainted with the 2024 state budget draft.

Ts.Lut-Ochir, member of HUN Party and economist: Next year’s inflation is estimated at 6+-2 percent in the State budget. 8% inflation is not possible when expenditure is so high. The Bank of Mongolia has determined that inflation increases by 1% when budget expenditures are increased by MNT 1 trillion. According to this, the State budget will increase by MNT 5 trillion, and inflation will increase by 5%.

A strict monetary policy is the only choice when the large expansion is made to the State budget. This means that the Bank of Mongolia will implement a strict policy in order to keep the exchange rate stable. Currently, the policy rate is 13%. Bank loan interest rates for business are still high.

When the budget expenditure is high, corruption and theft will continue. The business of purchasing green buses at high prices and buying fake goods at high prices will continue. It is not the budget with the purpose of supporting the private sector.

There are no plans to open up parts of state-owned companies to the public. However the government says it will support the private sector, it has not provided space for the private sector through the budget.

Civic space in Mongolia is rated as ‘narrowed’ by the CIVICUS Monitor. Ongoing concerns raised by civil society include reports of harassment, intimidation and reprisals against human rights defenders, especially those working to defend economic, social and cultural rights. Further, provisions of the Criminal Code related to cooperation with foreign intelligence agencies (article 19.4) and sabotage (article 19.6) have been used to prosecute human rights defenders for legitimate activities. There are also concerns about press freedom.

In July 2023, the sixth EU-Mongolia Human Rights Dialogue took place online. The EU and Mongolia discussed a broad range of human rights related issues including further strengthening cooperation on human rights and the rule of law. Mongolia and the EU discussed the implementation of the recommendations accepted by Mongolia during its United Nations Universal Periodic Review. The EU stressed the importance of a safe and enabling space for civil society and human rights defenders and referred to Mongolia’s law on the protection of human rights defenders and encouraged Mongolia to enforce this law to protect human rights defenders and promote their work.

In recent months, UN experts have raised concerns around the investigation of environmental activist and human rights defender Sukhgerel Dugersuren while the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention visited Mongolia and raised concerns around vague and broad provisions in the Law of Mongolia on the Legal Status of Human Rights Defenders that are inconsistent with international law and standards and could be used to criminalise activists. Human rights defender Munkhbayar Chuluundorj is serving a ten-year sentence.

In September 2023, the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Defenders posted online a joint communication by the Rapporteur and other UN experts to the Government of Mongolia in June 2023 expressing renewed concern about human rights defender Sukhgerel Dugersuren. The government did not reply to the UN experts within the 60 day time frame.

As previously documented, in 2022 Mongolian woman human rights defender and Executive Director of Oyu Tolgoi Watch (OT Watch) Sukhgerel Dugersuren was informed by the General Intelligence Agency of Mongolia (GIA) that she was being investigated for crimes under Article 19.4 of the Mongolian Criminal Code, which prohibits the “illegal cooperation with foreign intelligence agency, agent.”

Sukhgerel Dugersuren works closely with communities impacted by large scale development projects. She has a long history of exposing human rights abuses and environmental degradation linked to large scale mining, energy and infrastructure projects.

An earlier communication in September 2022, noted that Dugersuren had published an opinion piece online arguing against the development of the Erdeneburen Hydropower Reservoir on the basis of the threats it would pose to the rights of local communities and wetlands. The investigation was launched following the appearance of an article on a German news website alleging that Ms. Dugersuren and one other person were being used by the Russian Federation to sabotage Mongolia’s efforts to break free of energy dependence on Russia. This article was translated into Mongolian and republished on a number of Mongolian websites.

In the June 2023 communication, the UN experts expressed “concern at the confirmation by the government, in its response to our previous communication, of the criminal investigation opened against Sukhgerel Dugersuren, which we fear to be directly connected to her exercise of her right to freedom of expression to highlight environmental and social risks connected to the development of the Erdeneburen Hydropower”.

The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention visited Mongolia and published their report in July 2023 around their visit to Mongolia in October 2022.

The Working Group noted that the Law of Mongolia on the Legal Status of Human Rights Defenders to protect human rights defenders sets out strong protections for the work of human rights defenders and that Mongolia is the first country in Asia to have adopted such a specific legal framework. The law also establishes a protection mechanism, and a Commissioner from the National Human Rights Commission has been designated to coordinate its work.

Despite this the Working Group was concerned about specific provisions of the law, including article 5.1.5, which requires human rights defenders to “respect honour, reputation, rights and legal interests of others” and, similarly, article 8.1.3, which prohibits human rights defenders from damaging the human rights, freedom, dignity, reputation and business reputation of others.

The Working Group stated that “noting that the legitimate work of human rights defenders often involves criticising and challenging existing policies and practices, such vague and broad wording, especially the terms “reputation” and “business reputation”, may be misused in order to silence and criminalise their work.”

It added that “further, Article 7 restricts the resources that human rights defenders may receive by prohibiting funding from entities, organisations or persons carrying out activities that are considered to be terrorist or extremist or that harm national unity. Framed in very broad terms, this provision may be used to restrict funding sources for the vital work of human rights defenders, fundamentally undermining their ability to carry out their functions. Vaguely worded provisions may be used to deprive individuals of their liberty without a legal basis that conforms with the essential prerequisite of the principle of legality.”

The Working Group recommended that the government amends “broadly worded legal provisions in the law in order to obviate the possibility of individuals being detained for being critical of or for challenging existing policies and practices and to ensure the principle of legality stipulated in article 11 (2) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.”

ACTIVIST REMAINS IN PRISON

Activist Munkhbayar Chuluundorj has spent around 18 months in prison. He is serving a 10-year prison sentence on politically motivated charges related to his public criticism of the Mongolian government’s close ties with China.

As previously documented, the prominent activist was arrested in Mongolia in February 2022, part of what campaigners have said is a wider effort to "clean up" Beijing's critics in the country. A founding member of the World Mongols Poetry Association, Munkhbayar Chuluundorj is a well-known blogger, poet and human rights activist known for defending the linguistic, cultural and historical identities of ethnic Mongolians in China’s Inner Mongolia.

After the Parliament approved the Mining Products Exchange Law, Mongolia began trading not only coal, but also iron ore concentrates on the Mongolian Stock Exchange.

Iron ore concentrate was traded on the stock exchange for the first time on September 15. A total of 113,400 tons of iron concentrate are traded on the exchange. 72,000 tons of iron concentrate with a 65% content of the Mongolrostsvetmet state enterprise and 6,800 tons of iron concentrate with a 58% content of the Darkhan Metallurgical Plant were sold in the first trade. The price offered by the seller increased by 10-50% after trading.

The first commercial delivery began on October 4. The first 100 cars of iron concentrate sold by Mongolrostsvetmet were transported by rail from the terminal of the Bor-Ondor mining plant to the port of Erenhot, China, on October 5. The shipment of 50 cars of products from the Darkhan Metallurgical Plant began on October 7.

Russia is strategically seeking to diversify its trade partnerships, aiming to replace lost European trade with new allies in the east. Russia has long-standing ties with Mongolia, which has grown in importance since the G7 sanctions regime was imposed last year and is home to trillions of dollars-worth of natural resources.

Deep-rooted cultural ties have spanned decades, with numerous Mongolian leaders, artists and scientists having received their education in the USSR or its Eastern European allies.

In recent years, Russia's business ties with Mongolia have grown stronger. Mongolia's role as a key player in enhancing Russia's connectivity with China is pivotal, benefiting both nations. Russia stands to bolster economic relations with China and the Asia-Pacific region, while the activity drives Mongolia's economic growth.

Mongolia's geographical location provides crucial transit and transport corridors, strategically significant for Russia. The Trans-Mongolian Railway, linking China to Russia's Trans-Siberian railway system, serves as a key route for the movement of goods between Russia and East Asia.

Over the past 25 years, Russian exports to Mongolia have steadily expanded at an annualised rate of 8.8%, from $218mn in 1996 to $1.81bn in 2021. In 2022, Russian-Mongolian trade surged by nearly 50% compared to 2021, reaching a historical high of $2.7bn, with expectations of surpassing $3bn by year-end. Russian exports make up nearly 95% of this trade turnover.

Russia's key exports to Mongolia include mineral products, particularly fuels, oils, energy commodities, as well as food products, agricultural raw materials, machinery, equipment, vehicles, chemical industry products, metals, and metal products. In contrast, Russia's primary imports from Mongolia consist of mineral products such as salt, sulphur, earth, stone, plastering materials, lime, and cement, along with articles of clothing and clothing accessories, machinery and railway locomotives.

Presently, Mongolia's exports to Russia account for less than 1% of its total exports. Nevertheless, Russia's supplies constitute a significant portion of Mongolia's imports, particularly for certain commodities: over 90% of petroleum products, 27% of foodstuffs, and 30% of electric power.

Building new ties in a post-Soviet world

The early 1990s marked a pivotal shift in Mongolia's relationship with the Soviet bloc, as Mongolia transitioned to its first democratically elected government. This transformation led to the cooling of previously close ties and the discontinuation of Russian technical aid after 1992. Additionally, Russia requested repayment of aid received from the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1990, amounting to nearly $180mn. However, since the turn of the millennium, Russia has been diligently working to strengthen its bond with Mongolia, aiming to elevate its status as a regional power – an effort that has only been spurred on by Russia’s break with the West.

In 2000, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Mongolia and renewed a significant bilateral treaty, resulting in reduced prices for oil and energy exports to Mongolia and an upswing in cross-border trade. In 2016, Russia forgave 98% of Mongolia's state debt.

Russia aims to bolster its eastern relations through the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), with Mongolia becoming the first state to sign a memorandum of co-operation with the Eurasian Economic Commission in 2015. Subsequently, a working group was established to explore expanding economic ties between EEU member states and Mongolia.

Russia also advocates for Mongolia's full membership in the China-led Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), as Mongolia has been an observer state for over two decades. Mongolia has expressed interest in joining ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and has attended its meetings in the past. Russia is a dialogue partner within ASEAN.

All three countries – Russia, Mongolia and China – have signed several tripartite agreements since 2016, simplifying border clearance processes and promoting seamless transportation via road and railway along the corridor. A noteworthy agreement involves the comprehensive development of the China-Mongolia-Russia (CMR) economic corridor.

In September 2019, Russia and Mongolia signed a comprehensive strategic partnership agreement, bolstering their collaboration in politics, economy, trade, business, infrastructure and culture. Additionally, the two nations established the Russian-Mongolian Investment Cooperation Fund.

Efforts are underway to modernise the central railway corridor, including doubling railways, electrification and repairs. Practical implementation is expected to commence in 2024. The Eastern Railway Corridor is also taking shape, connecting the Trans-Siberian Railway, Northeast China's railways and Mongolia's eastern aimags. Mongolia plans to construct the missing Choibalsan-Huut-Bichigt section.

Road connections are expanding, with a significant portion of the AN-4 highway in western Mongolia now open, linking Western Siberia in Russia with China's Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region.

Crucially, the Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline project is set to begin construction in 2024. Spanning 2,600 km, the pipeline connects Russia and China via Mongolia, with a gas capacity of 50bn cubic metres per year. It is anticipated to be operational by 2030, generating substantial transit fees and gas.

Russian agricultural holding SibAgro rolled out plans to build a pig farm in Mongolia to sell finishers to local customers.

With a planned output of 18,000 tonnes per year, the farm is designed to grow piglets imported from SibAgro’s East Siberian pig farm in Russia’s Buryatia republic. The company has already signed an investment agreement with the Mongolian government and is working on finishing the farm’s design documentation. “Our territorial proximity to the borders of this country makes shipping animals fast and safe,” Yulia Shishkina said. She is a branch director of SibAgro.

Springboard

The farm is expected to become a springboard for SibAgro to expand its presence in the Asian markets. The company said it eyed the Chinese market and those of other countries in Southeast Asia. SibAgro has not disclosed the project’s timeline or the investment costs.

In 2022, SibAgro disclosed that the East Siberian pig farm expanded its presence in the Mongolian market during the previous years. The farm started exporting pork to Mongolia in 2017 and delivered 10,000 tonnes of pork in total, Shishkina estimated. Every year, the supplies have been growing, and the company intended to pick up the pace, she added.

A logical move

Launching pig farms abroad is a logical solution for Russian companies as it allows them to avert Western sanctions. Konstantin Korneev, executive director of Rincon Management, a Moscow-based think tank, explained about that strategy in local publication Agroinvestor. “The establishment of extraterritorial projects in friendly countries is an organic solution for many Russian companies,” Korneev said, describing this as a win-win solution since Russian farms could help other countries improve their food security. It should also contribute to a further rise in Russian pork exports. “It would be good if Russian banks and financial institutions supported such projects when implemented abroad.”

Mongolia is a good start

Mongolia is characterised by low population density and the absence of centralised developed retail, Korneev continued. Another advantage is an absence of religious restrictions for building pig farms, unlike, for example, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, where such activity is prohibited by Islamic traditions. On the other hand, Korneev pointed out logistic issues, as live animal delivery and storage to Mongolia will be associated with relatively high costs.

A low concentration of pig farms in Mongolia would be beneficial from the point of view of biological safety, Korneev added.