2nd railway to Mongolia commences construction www.chinadaily.com.cn

EBRD organises US$145 million package for Mongolia’s Khan Bank www.ebrd.com

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is organising a financing package of up to US$ 145 million (€140 million) for Mongolia’s biggest lender, Khan Bank, in what is its largest bilateral transaction with a Mongolian financial institution to date.
The funding will support the introduction of technologies to enable climate adaptation and improve resource efficiency, creating new growth opportunities for small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) owned or led by women.
The package consists of a senior loan of up to US$ 75 million (€72.4 million) under the EBRD’s Green Economy Financing Facility (GEFF), of which up to US$ 60 million (€57.9 million) will be provided by the EBRD and up to US$ 15 million (€14.5 million) by the Green Climate Fund (GCF). The GEFF loan, which will improve access to green technologies for Mongolian households and SMEs, will benefit from grant funds provided by the GCF and Japan.
The remaining part of the package, a senior loan of up to US$ 70 million (€67.6million), will be provided under the EBRD’s Central Asian Women in Business programme. The funds will support women’s entrepreneurship by providing access to finance and technical advice.
Khan Bank is a long-term EBRD client that offers financial services to more than 82 per cent of Mongolia’s population through its digital channels and network of 545 branches.
The EBRD has invested almost €2.6 billion in Mongolia’s economy through 154 projects. Approximately 90 per cent of these funds have been used to support private-sector companies.

Mongolia's foreign trade drops 6.7 pct in first 4 months www.xinhuanet.com

 Mongolia's foreign trade turnover reached 7.8 billion U.S. dollars in the first four months of 2025, a 6.7 percent decrease compared to the same period last year, according to the National Statistics Office (NSO) on Wednesday.
During the period, exports fell 14.1 percent to 4.2 billion dollars, while imports rose 3.9 percent to 3.6 billion dollars.
The decline in exports was mainly influenced by the supply of coal, crude oil, iron ore and combed cashmere from Mongolia to foreign countries.
The landlocked country traded with 135 economies worldwide in the cited period.

Anti-Corruption Agency Launches Investigation into Prime Minister Following Public Complaints www.gogo.mn

Controversy surrounding the Prime Minister of Mongolia, L. Oyun-Erdene, has recently sparked public concern. Specifically, citizens filed a complaint yesterday, alleging that the lavish lifestyle of the Prime Minister’s daughter-in-law may have been financed through corruption, and demanded that the Anti-Corruption Agency (ACA) investigate the matter.
According to official sources, the ACA has initiated an investigation based on the citizens' request to probe the Prime Minister.
By law, such complaints must be investigated within 30 days of being received.
To recap, the Prime Minister’s son, O. Temuulen, has reportedly gifted his girlfriend expensive items such as luxury handbags and a car—sparking public outrage. As the son is unemployed and has no known source of income, citizens are demanding an explanation for how he was able to afford such lavish gifts. Meanwhile, a protest dubbed the "Handbag Protest," calling for the resignation of the Prime Minister, is currently taking place in Sukhbaatar Square.

Public demands transparency as Prime Minister’s son and daughter-in-law showing luxury lifestyle www.gogo.mn

Questions are mounting over the finances of Prime Minister L.Oyun-Erdene's son, O.Temuulen, who is currently studying at Harvard University in the United States, and his wife, U.Uguumur. A recent wave of public attention has been sparked by online posts made by U.Uguumur, which showcase signs of a luxurious lifestyle that many believe deserve closer scrutiny.
In a personal blog post, U.Uguumur revealed she received a MNT 20 million engagement ring and two designer handbags valued at MNT 10 million each as birthday gifts. She also shared photos of a limited edition 2021 Mercedes-Benz vehicle reportedly worth USD 294,000, stating that it was a birthday gift from her parents.
These public displays of wealth have raised concerns about the source of such finances, especially given the prominence of the Prime Minister and the ongoing discussions surrounding the ethical obligations of public figures and their families. Many citizens are now calling on the Prime Minister to publicly disclose his and his family's income and wealth to assure the public that no misuse of state funds has occurred.
In response to growing speculation, Uguumur’s father, Ch.Uguudeibaatar, stated that he has been in business for 18 years and runs a company based in Virginia, USA. “Like all fathers, I pamper my daughter and buy her everything she wants,” he said. While many acknowledge a parent’s right to support their children, questions have been raised regarding the legitimacy and profitability of his business.
Online searches indicate that while Ch.Uguudeibaatar claims to operate a company in the United States, there are no accessible tax documents or business activity records tied to his name. Additionally, he has previously posted advertisements on Facebook offering small services, such as transporting luggage for a fee, which has led some observers to question the credibility of his statements regarding business success.
Further scrutiny has been directed at Uguumur’s mother, N.Ariunaa, who worked in the social insurance sector for two decades. She was dismissed in March 2025 from her role as Head of the Chingeltei District Social Insurance Department and is currently contesting the dismissal in court. According to public disclosures by the Anti-Corruption Agency, her annual income was MNT 227 million, with a total family income of MNT 85 million and savings of MNT 9 million. 
Given the inconsistencies and lack of clarity surrounding the family's financial background, public skepticism has grown. Many are now urging Prime Minister L.Oyun-Erdene to address the concerns and demonstrate accountability. So far, the Prime Minister’s response has been limited. In a brief statement, the Government Press Office said, “The Office cannot provide information related to family members or individuals. It operates according to relevant norms.”
As pressure mounts, the public continues to await a more comprehensive explanation regarding the apparent wealth and spending of the Prime Minister’s family members.

Mongolia Deploys 23 Thousand Troops to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations Over Two Decades www.montsame.mn

Over the past two decades, Mongolia has deployed over 23 thousand troops to the United Nations peacekeeping operations.
To align with the UN’s strategic priorities, Mongolia will continue boosting its operational capabilities. Minister of Defense of Mongolia Byambatsogt Sandag paid a working visit to the  Republic of South Sudan in March 2025, and observed the operations of the Mongolian peacekeepers serving in UNMISS and upgraded 24 pieces of essential equipment.
During the UN Peacekeeping Ministerial 2025 held on May 13-14, 2025, in Berlin, the Federal Republic of Germany, Minister of Defense of Mongolia Byambatsogt Sandag met with UN Secretary-General António Guterres and noted that Mongolia has met the pledge made at the 2023 Summit by increasing the ratio of female peacekeepers serving in Mongolia’s peacekeeping missions to 15 percent. Defense Minister Byambatsogt affirmed that amid today’s complex global geopolitical climate, Mongolia will honor its obligations to the international community and work together with the UN to overcome current challenges.
The participation of the Mongolian Armed Forces in UN peacekeeping operations began with the first two military observer officers sent to the Republic of Congo in 2002. Since then, in the past 23 years, Mongolia has participated in peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Western Sahara, the Republic of Sudan, Ethiopia-Eitrea, Georgia, Sierra Leone, Chad, the Republic of South Sudan, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, the Darfur region of Sudan, Yemen, the disputed border region of Abyei, as well as in Iraq, and Kosovo.

EAEU, Mongolia complete negotiations on temporary trade agreement — EEC www.tass.com

The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and Mongolia have launched procedures for signing a temporary trade agreement, the press service of the Eurasian Economic Commission (EEC) reported.
The EEC Council approved the draft temporary trade agreement between the Eurasian Economic Union and Mongolia and sent it to member states for internal procedures.
"Following additional consultations with the Mongolian side, we launched the procedures with our partner necessary for signing a temporary trade agreement. The document covers 367 commodity sub-items on each side," EEC Trade Minister Andrey Slepnev said as quoted by the press service.
He also noted that once the agreement is signed and enters into force, the EAEU will receive preferential access to the Mongolian market for such key items as: grain, meat products, dairy products, honey, vegetable oils, sugar, metallurgical products, motor vehicles, chemical products, tires.
"We will also be happy to welcome Mongolian goods to our market, including key products of their export interest: meat and dairy products (horse meat, cattle meat, lamb, canned meat, offal, yogurt, cheese, etc.), light industry products (in particular, wool, threads, as well as finished knitted and textile clothing)," the minister stressed.
Andrey Slepnev expressed confidence that the conclusion of a temporary trade agreement will create favorable conditions for the further growth of mutual trade and, in general, will contribute to strengthening the traditional friendly relations of the EAEU countries with Mongolia.

The Conclusion of Mongolia’s Proceedings before the International Criminal Court: Implications on Non-Cooperation www.ejiltalk.org

On 18 March, the Pre-Trial Chamber II (PTC II) of the International Criminal Court (ICC) rendered a decision on the ‘Request for Reconsideration of the “Decision on Mongolia’s Requests for Leave to Appeal, Temporary Stay of the Proceedings, and Related Matters”’ filed by Mongolia on 2 December 2024. In essence, the Chamber denied the state party its final opportunity to get an appellate review of the Finding under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute dated 24 October 2024 (hereinafter ‘Non-Cooperation Finding’) in which the PTC II determined Mongolia’s failure to comply with the request by the Court for cooperation in the arrest and surrender of the Russian President Putin and referred the matter to the Assembly of States Parties (ASP). In parallel with the decision of the Plenary of Judges dated 10 March that dismissed Mongolia’s other Request for Partial Reconsideration on the Disqualification of Judges, the Decision of 18 March marks the conclusion of a series of proceedings before the Court in relation to the Non-Cooperation Finding.
This post argues that the course of proceedings described above has certain implications on the issue of Mongolia’s non-cooperation, specifically, and on other states parties in general. While one may raise substantive questions as to the decisions of the Court, including but not limited to the reasoning for removing the immunities of the head of state that is not party to the Rome Statute (e.g. see here), it is rather the relevance of these proceedings as a whole that seems to be worth an appreciation in a timely manner.
Time for the ASP and the Bureau to Address the Non-Cooperation Finding
First and foremost, the conclusion of the legal proceedings will allow the ASP and its Bureau to revisit the Non-Cooperation Finding. When the matter was first brought to its attention, the Bureau invited a representative of Mongolia to the meeting of 6 November 2024. It took note of the latter’s statement, but did not act further, deciding ‘to defer the matter until all proceedings before the Court had concluded’ (Report of the Bureau on non-cooperation, paras. 36-39). In fact, Mongolia’s two major applications related to the Non-Cooperation Finding were both rejected during November. The Plenary of Judges dismissed the ‘Application for the Disqualification of Judges’ on 15 November, and the PTC II dismissed the ‘Request for Leave to Appeal’ on the 29th of the month.
Yet, the proceedings before the Court did not come to an end because Mongolia filed, as already mentioned, the two requests for reconsideration of these dismissals on the very day when the ASP opened its 23rd session, 2 December 2024. This move, taken together with the ‘Urgent Request for Suspensive Effect’ filed three times in November that sought interim protection of the rights concerned, may reasonably be understood to intend a prolongation of the legal proceedings to block any action the ASP might take on the matter. Thus, the Assembly in its ‘omnibus resolution’ merely took note of the Non-Cooperation Finding and the Bureau’s report and did not adopt any concrete action to address Mongolia’s non-cooperation specifically (paras. 33-34).
Now, all the proceedings have been concluded, and there is no reason for stopping short of taking up the matter. The Bureau can and should address it with a view to making specific recommendations to the Assembly. Indeed, the omnibus resolution also ‘[d]ecide[d] to include on the agenda of future sessions of the Assembly the consideration of non-cooperation issues arising during the inter-sessional period’ (ibid., para. 36, emphasis added). This represents a determination of the Assembly to place under its scrutiny non-cooperation issues, apart from cooperation, as a major subject of discussion in future sessions (cf. the 24th session). Therefore, the Assembly will be able to revisit Mongolia’s non-cooperation insofar as such ‘issue’ (not ‘instance’) may technically be treated as having arisen upon the completion of the proceedings before the Court. It is time for the Bureau and the Assembly to demonstrate that non-cooperation cannot persist. Their actions are vital for the international criminal justice system to be effective.
Having said that, a question remains as to how they should deal with the matter. Since Mongolia can no longer change its decision in the past, the only possible response will be future-oriented. It should be noted in this regard that Mongolia has had many doubts on the impartiality and fairness of the Court throughout the proceedings. One of the allegations made is emblematic in claiming that the PTC II rendered the Decision of 29 November 2024 on ‘Request for Leave to Appeal’ in an hasty manner and that ‘the motivation for its decision may not have been purely legal but political – driven by a desire to resolve the matter before the ASP session, potentially at the cost of fairness and justice’ (paras. 31-38). Even if this were true, such a motivation would not be provable. The Plenary of Judges was thus right in rejecting the claim as ‘entirely speculative’ (para. 17), but Mongolia’s lack of confidence in the Court is clearly observable.
With the foregoing considerations, it would not be wise to act towards condemnation or politicization that might drive Mongolia away from the ICC regime. This state party should face the consequences of its behaviour, but a ‘punitive’ action against it would not be the right solution. The Bureau and the Assembly should rather be fora for a constructive dialogue to prevent future instances of non-cooperation and strengthen the cooperative relationship with Mongolia.
Concerns with Non-Appealability of the Article 87(7) Finding
Second, and more generally, the course of the proceedings before the Court points to a problem of concern to other states parties as well. The disqualification aside, the Court articulated that the finding under Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute was unappealable by nature. It is not intended here to develop an extended discussion on the substance of the Court’s decisions, but the focus is to highlight another aspect of the unsuccessful ending of Mongolia’s legal challenges in a broader context of the circumstances surrounding the Court to date.
In its Decision of 29 November 2024 on ‘Request for Leave to Appeal’, the PTC II considered as to Article 87(7) ‘it important to examine the nature of such finding’ and opined the following:
[…] The primary aim of these referrals is not to enforce a sanction against the non-complying State but rather to notify the relevant bodies of the breach to the Statute, which in turn prevents the Court from exercising its functions. It follows that a chamber’s determination under article 87(7) does not involve a judicial decision in the procedural sense, but rather constitutes a determination of a failure to comply with the statutory obligation to, in this case, cooperate in the arrest and surrender of a suspect. This determination does not constitute a formal ruling on the merits or on a procedural matter of the case, but rather a compliance assessment concerning the duty to cooperate with the Court. In other words, this notification does not concern a procedural issue that would directly impact the rights of the parties or the outcome of the trial. In this regard, since the notification to the States Parties neither affects the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings against the person sought by the Court, nor the outcome of the trial, the Chamber’s finding under article 87(7) of the Statute does not amount to an appealable decision within the meaning of article 82(1)(d) of the Statute.
This reasoning is worth a critical review in many respects: it is logically questionable; it does not contain any reference; it is inconsistent with the precedent of the Al Bashir case and the Prosecution Response did not even raise this point.
The most problematic, however, is the categorical exclusion of the Article 87(7) finding from the scope of Article 82(1)(d). This may give rise to uncertainty and concerns about the procedural fairness before the Court among states parties in general, as it indicates that the state party concerned may dispute an alleged non-cooperation only once, with no chance of appeal. Mongolia refuted the Chamber’s reasoning and questioned the denial of appellate review in its request for reconsideration of the decision, but the Chamber dismissed it and presented no interest in engaging with its essentialist ruling (Decision of 18 March, para. 17).
It is true that the Chamber’s decisions constitute no more than a settlement of the proceedings concerning Mongolia’s non-cooperation and do not have any legal effect on other states parties. The conclusion of these proceedings would nonetheless have repercussions on the perception of those states parties, in particular those that disagree with the Court’s jurisprudence on the law of immunities of the head of state or possess potential or real risks of becoming another addressee of the Article 87(7) finding. These states may find the Court procedure less credible. Perhaps one would recall that in February, the PTC I invited Italy to provide submissions concerning its failure to surrender Mr. Njeem to the Court, and that the Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu received a warm welcome in Hungary in April, which also led to an invitation to the same effect.
The non-appealability of the Article 87(7) finding, as indicated by the PTC II, could be a deterrent factor in decision-making for such states, while it may undermine the procedural integrity of the Court, whose effective functioning depends much on cooperation by states parties. Either way, it is how the ASP and its Bureau will deal with the issue of Mongolia’s non-cooperation that determines the way forward.
The author acts fully in personal capacity and this post does not in any way represent a view of his affiliated organisation.
BY Kazuki Goto
Kazuki Goto is Researcher at the Embassy of Japan in the Netherlands. His research interest concerns the prohibition of the use of force, international criminal law and international accountability processes.…

Views Exchanged on Supplying Crude Oil to the Oil Refinery Plant Post-Commissioning www.montsame.mn

Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources of Mongolia Tuvaan Tsevegdorj held a meeting with the executives of Dongsheng Petroleum Mongolia LTD, a company funded by the People’s Republic of China and operating in Dornogobi aimag of Mongolia, to exchange views on matters related to petroleum extraction and utilization. The meeting was held during the inaugural meeting of the Gobi Regional Council in Dornogobi aimag on May 12, 2025. 
At the meeting, Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources Tuvaan Tsevegdorj proposed that the company supply petroleum products to the Oil Refinery Plant, which is currently under development approximately 60 kilometers from the extraction site, when it will be commissioned in 2028.
"Dongsheng Petroleum Mongolia" LTD was established in accordance with the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) approved under the Resolution of the State Great Khural of Mongolia of 1997 and has been operating in Mongolia since 2003 with 100 percent investment from the People’s Republic of China. Since its establishment, the company has drilled 132 exploratory and appraisal wells, investing a total of USD 367.4 million. The company has reported proven petroleum reserves of 26.05 million tons or 186.3 million barrels, of which 2.07 million tons or 14.86 million barrels are confirmed as recoverable. Currently, the company has extracted one million tons of crude oil from the contracted field, exporting it to the People’s Republic of China.

Fiber Network and Data Infrastructure to Be Expanded Across Mongolia’s Gobi Region www.montsame.mn

As part of efforts to develop the Gobi region into a hub for specialized industry and green energy, the Government of Mongolia announced plans to build a data center in Umnugobi aimag and introduce fiber optic connectivity to 13 key locations throughout the region. 
Developing the Gobi region into a specialized industrial zone and a sub-region for green energy requires the integrated improvement of energy, telecommunications, and digital development. Mongolia offers several advantages for such development, including abundant energy resources, favorable climate conditions, a strategic geographical location, and a relatively low risk of natural disasters. The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications of Mongolia emphasized the importance of leveraging these strengths to facilitate the international data center market and the emerging digital economy. 
The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications has identified several priority areas for action. These include updating the legal framework, creating a stable and investment-friendly environment for foreign-funded international data centers, and ensuring robust data protection and cybersecurity standards. Additionally, efforts will focus on promoting renewable energy-based infrastructure, offering green financing mechanisms, streamlining land allocation, and providing incentives such as energy and tax benefits. 
Additionally, Mongolia plans to approve a national strategy for data center development covering the period from 2025 to 2030. Moreover, public-private partnerships will play a key role, alongside active participation in developing regional cable infrastructure. 
Global demand for data centers is projected to grow at an average annual rate of 10-12 percent by 2030. As major international players increasingly seek regions with low-cost and stable energy sources, Mongolia is positioning itself as an emerging and competitive destination for data infrastructure investment. 
BY Amrida.G
g.amrida@montsame.gov.mn