In 2025, Mongolia’s defining event surprisingly came from popular culture, with the Netflix show Physical: Asia captivating the nation. Domestic politics was unstable — marked by two no-confidence votes, leadership turmoil within the ruling Mongolian People’s Party and weak governance — but this instability did not yield major policy shifts. Despite appearing democratic, Mongolia slipped into the ‘electoral autocracy’ category amid growing concerns over free speech and arbitrary arrests of journalists. Falling coal exports early in the year were offset by strong copper production and high global copper prices, offering cautious optimism for the economy despite ongoing political fragility.
Overshadowing relations with Russia, China and North Korea, global commodity prices and two domestic political crises, the big event of 2025 for Mongolia may have been the broadcast of the Physical: Asia game series on Netflix. The Mongolian team reached the final of the show, with the excitement in Ulaanbaatar comparable to Mongolia winning its first gold medal at the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008.
But in contrast to the team dynamics broadcast in Physical: Asia, domestic politics in Mongolia in 2025 was marked by the absence of teamwork and two no-confidence votes against prime ministers.
First, Luvsannamsrain Oyun-Erdene was removed from his role as prime minister through a no-confidence vote in June 2025. His successor, current Prime Minister Gombojavyn Zandanshatar, almost lost a no-confidence vote himself on 17 October 2025. But the Constitutional Court of Mongolia overturned this vote on procedural grounds several days later, leaving Zandanshatar in office. Throughout this turmoil, which was largely the result of infighting within the governing Mongolian People’s Party (MPP), there have been no major changes in policy.
MPP infighting has expressed itself in the turnover of the party chairman. In the past, when the MPP has formed government, the prime minister has also been party chairman. For example, Oyun-Erdene served in both roles. But when Zandanshatar was appointed prime minister, he was not elected as party chairman. Nyam-Osoryn Uchral was ultimately elected as party chairman on 15 November 2025, with the presumed mandate to unite the MPP parliamentary group and the party at large. He was also elected to replace Dashzegviin Amarbayasgalan as speaker of parliament.
The fact that policy continuity has endured despite these leadership changes indicates the absence of substantive policy differences between competing parties and intraparty factions. Instead, personal allegiance networks have dominated these intraparty battles.
Zandanshatar emerged as Oyun-Erdene’s successor despite a relatively weak position. He served as speaker of parliament from 2019 until the 2024 parliamentary election, but was one of few prominent politicians not to win direct election in that vote despite an electoral system that favoured incumbents. Unless Uchral succeeds in re-uniting the party and improving support for Zandanshatar, he will remain a weak prime minister and will likely be replaced in the medium term. His government’s tenure will be focused on addressing the fiscal imbalance facing the public budget.
These events may have dominated the news and appear to be democracy in action. But in the Varieties of Democracy index, Mongolia slid into the ‘electoral autocracy’ category, largely because of perceived restrictions on free speech and the right to assemble. Following similar incidents in previous years, another case of journalists being arrested in March 2025 has fuelled the fear of somewhat arbitrary arrests of government critics. Perhaps as a result, self-censorship is taking root.
While the electoral system remains intact, there are increasing concerns within Mongolia that democracy needs support to better face authoritarian pressures from around the region.
Perhaps happily, given Mongolia’s neighbours, nothing of substance happened in Mongolian foreign policy. The pace of visits from Organization for Security Co-operation in Europe countries slowed down somewhat. The Imperial Japanese visit to Mongolia and Mongolian President Ukhnaagiin Khurelsukh’s state visit to India were also largely ceremonial highlights, in addition to Khurelsukh’s visit to the United Nations General Assembly.
Russian aggression against Ukraine appears to have become the new global normal without an immediate impact on its other neighbours. The Chinese regime has also been relatively quiet regarding Mongolia — seen by some as a sign of the continued success of Mongolia’s multi-vector foreign policy. In summer 2026, Mongolia will host the Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification.
The Mongolian economy was marked by a decline of coal exports during the first half of 2025 that hurt public and private balance sheets. Two large copper mines, the government-owned Erdenet, and Oyu Tolgoi, a joint venture with Rio Tinto, were both producing at a great volume to high global copper prices.
Coal exports increased again in the second half of the year, though the long-term outlook for these exports looks unclear. There are — once again — rumours about the government’s various agreements with Rio Tinto. But Rio Tinto has so far countered these rumours at least symbolically, such as by appointing a Mongolian CEO of the mining operation at Oyu Tolgoi.
There are also rumblings around the appointment of numerous deputy ministers by Zandanshatar at the end of 2025, reinforcing his government’s relative weakness. This weakness is likely to continue in 2026. High global copper prices seem likely to continue in the coming year, providing a basis for continued economic expansion and an opportunity for the government to address its fiscal challenges, assuming that renewed calls for the renegotiation of agreements with Rio Tinto do not turn into a prolonged stand-off with investors.
BY
Julian Dierkes is Dean of the School of Social Sciences at the University of Mannheim, Germany.

Published Date:2026-01-13