According to the amendments made to Article 22.9 of Mongolia's Corporate Income Tax Law (CIT Law), businesses are now eligible for tax deductions on certain expenses related to corporate social responsibility (CSR). The deduction amount is limited to up to 1% of taxable income for the tax year. The following categories of activities and expenses qualify for tax deductions:

Activities Eligible for Tax Deductions:

Environmental Protection

Investments aimed at protecting natural resources such as forests, animals, and water; increasing reserves; reducing pollution of air, water, and soil; and mitigating desertification.

Support for the Elderly and People with Disabilities

Expenses related to services for the elderly, care for individuals with disabilities, creation of accessible environments, and construction or maintenance of children’s playgrounds, camps, and public parks.

Preservation of Cultural Heritage

Activities that involve the preservation, restoration, and support of museums, libraries, music, film, handicrafts, performing arts, and the construction and maintenance of cultural complexes.

Public Infrastructure Development

Construction, maintenance, and beautification of public roads, parks, and green spaces, as well as support for the development of public transportation.

Disaster Relief

Expenses incurred to address and mitigate damages caused by natural disasters or similar unavoidable events.

Support for Sports

Construction and maintenance of sports facilities, organization of Olympic sports competitions, and financial support for national Olympic committee-registered sports associations, teams, and athletes.

Scholarships for Education

Tuition scholarships provided to students in priority fields designated by the Government, students studying at accredited domestic and foreign universities, and vocational training institutions.

Support for Research and Development

Grants provided to universities and the Academy of Sciences for research and study purposes.

Support for Public Education and Health Institutions

Financial support for operations of state and local government-owned educational and healthcare institutions.

Government Special Funds

Investments in activities related to government-designated special funds.

Monitoring and Standards

Requirements and standards for projects and activities eligible for deductions under Article 22.9 are to be defined and monitored by the relevant government ministry.

This amendment aims to encourage corporate social responsibility among businesses, supporting public welfare by providing tax incentives for investments in these areas.

Deputy Prime Minister of Mongolia Amarsaikhan Sainbuyan received the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission Director for Mongolia Ryan Washburn and other officials.

Deputy Prime Minister Amarsaikhan underlined that the projects and programs implemented in Mongolia by USAID contribute to the country's social development and economic growth. He also expressed gratitude to the Agency for providing assistance in overcoming the challenges caused by the dzud natural disaster last winter and expressed interest in cooperating in agriculture, regional development policy, and issues on the National Emergency Management Agency of Mongolia.

USAID has successfully implemented projects and programs to support Mongolia’s small-to-medium-sized enterprises, energy reform, and food security. Notably, projects on the detection and prevention of animal diseases, with further plans to improve the capacity of veterinary laboratories for early detection.

Additionally, a capacity-building project for service members of the National Emergency Management Agency of Mongolia is being implemented. The two sides exchanged views on cooperation in improving disaster prevention and early warning systems. Deputy Prime Minister Amarsaikhan emphasized that contributions from not only relevant organizations or agencies but also the government, enterprises, and citizens are vital in disaster risk reduction.

USAID Mission Director for Mongolia Ryan Washburn expressed readiness to support the Mongolian Government’s “New Cooperative” National Movement and also provide assistance in overcoming potential challenges of the upcoming winter.

Troy Minerals Inc. has announced the re-establishment of its drill camp at the Tsagaan Zalaa Silica Project in Mongolia, marking a significant milestone in preparation for the final phase of the Company’s drilling program for 2024. This move highlights Troy’s commitment to unlocking the potential of this high-purity silica asset, which is essential for various applications, particularly in the green energy sector.

With the drill camp now operational, Troy is poised to initiate the last round of drilling, which will focus on the project's high-grade quartz veins that can reach widths of up to 10 meters. The completion of this final drilling phase is anticipated before the end of November 2024. Successfully executing this stage will enable the Company to establish resource estimates, a crucial step in advancing the project toward a comprehensive mine plan. This progress is essential as it positions Troy to submit a mining license application by the end of 2024, paving the way for future production and long-term growth opportunities.

Rana Vig, President and CEO of Troy Minerals, emphasized the importance of this development, stating, "Re-establishing the drill camp at Tsagaan Zalaa marks another significant step in advancing this project. With the camp fully operational, we are well-positioned to complete the final phase of drilling and continue progressing toward production." He further noted that the strategic location of this high-purity silica project, coupled with the increasing demand from the green energy sector, reinforces the project's long-term potential. Vig highlighted the company's commitment to executing its development plans swiftly and efficiently to maximize shareholder value.

As full-scale field operations recommence, Troy is dedicated to advancing the Tsagaan Zalaa Silica Project, aiming to establish itself as a leader in the high-purity silica market. The ongoing exploration and drilling activities are not only critical for determining the resource's viability but also serve to demonstrate the project’s capacity to cater to the growing market demand associated with the transition to green energy technologies.

Troy Minerals remains focused on leveraging its strategic advantages in the silica sector, which is becoming increasingly important as industries shift toward sustainable practices. The successful establishment of the drill camp and the commencement of drilling activities are vital steps in this direction. The Company’s initiatives underline its proactive approach to ensuring that the Tsagaan Zalaa project aligns with the evolving market needs, positioning Troy for future success in the high-purity silica market. With continued dedication and strategic planning, Troy is set to play a significant role in the green energy transition while enhancing shareholder value.

At the end of the third quarter 2024, the MINING.COM TOP 50 ranking of the world’s most valuable miners scored a combined market capitalization of $1.51 trillion, up just under $76 billion from end-June, largely on the back of gold and royalty stocks.

The total stock market valuation of the world’s biggest mining companies is up a fairly modest 8% year to end-September and despite the good run is still $240 billion below the peak hit in the second quarter of 2022. And judging by the performance of the top tier in the final quarter (BHP down 8% QTD, Rio Tinto –5%, Vale –3%, Glencore –5%, Newmont –9%, Zijin –5%, Freeport –7%) the gap won’t be closing anytime soon.

In contrast, Nvidia — the maker of chips highly prized for artificial intelligence (AI) computing — is up nearly 200% so far this year (and 2,600% over five). When comparing the graphics card maker’s stock valuation to the mining industry’s collective worth, it’s difficult not to wonder if something is not awry with how global investors appraise the industrial economy.

Should Nvidia (or Microsoft or Apple for that matter) be worth more than twice the top 50 miners? Outside the top 50 the average market cap quickly shrinks to the low teens so Nvidia is in fact worth more than the entire listed mining industry.

Even when extending the top 50 into metals and energy – steel, aluminium and electricity companies often operate their own mines – Nvidia can still throw shade. BHP does not even crack the top 100 most valuable companies in the world and is worth less than Booking.com, and Temu and Zara’s owners, none of which can exactly be called the building blocks of the global economy.

Nvidia briefly surpassed Apple on Friday to become the world’s most valuable company. Its market capitalization is approximately $3.5 trillion, just below Apple’s, which remains the highest-valued firm globally.

The population of Mongolian wild asses (Equus hemionus), also known locally as Gobi Khulan, has reached approximately 90,000, accounting for around 80 percent of the estimated global population, according to the Mongolian Ministry of Environment and Climate Change on Monday.

These wild asses inhabit an area of approximately 262,000 square km in the Gobi region of Mongolia, which represents only about 20 percent of their historical range, the ministry stated.

Despite the overall increase in their population, Mongolian wild asses continue to face threats, including illegal hunting for their meat and hooves, as well as pressure from nomadic herders who chase them away to protect their livestock pastures.

In response to these challenges, the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change has designated Oct. 25 each year as "Khulan Conservation Day," which was celebrated for the first time this year.

The Embassy of Mongolia in Beijing, in collaboration with the Chinese People’s Association Society for Friendship with Foreign Countries, organized a ceremonial reception in Beijing in commemoration of the 75th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Mongolia and China on October 18, 2024.

At the commemorative event, Prime Minister of Mongolia Oyun-Erdene Luvsannamsrai and Li Hongzhong, Vice Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress and Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China attended and delivered opening remarks. Approximately 600 guests participated in the event, including representatives from the Chinese public and business sectors, heads of foreign diplomatic missions in China, and Mongolians residing and working in China.

During the commemorative event, a joint performance was held by artists from the two countries, featuring the “Chulugen” Morin Khuur quartet of the Morin Khuur Ensemble of Mongolia and musicians from the China Broadcasting Chinese Orchestra.

Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia Battsetseg Batmunkh received the delegation headed by Executive Secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) Robert Floyd, during the delegation’s working visit to Mongolia between October 24-27, 2024.

The two sides exchanged views on relations and cooperation between Mongolia and the CTBTO, underscoring the organization’s critical role in strengthening global peace and security. Additionally, they emphasized the importance of fully enforcing the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and discussed cooperation in ensuring nuclear-weapon-free status and nuclear safety, as reported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia.

ASTANA – Trade turnover between Kazakhstan and Mongolia reached $83.9 million in January-August 2024, Kazinform reported on Oct. 28, citing the Kazakh Ministry of Trade and Integration, ahead of President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s state visit to Mongolia.

According to Aidar Amrebayev, the Center for Political Studies director at the Institute of Philosophy, Political Science and Religious Studies, the states share a similar approach to foreign policy in dealing with such major powers as China and Russia.

Amrebayev noted that Kazakhstan and Mongolia are also undergoing political modernization. Mongolia’s economic ambitions paralleled Kazakhstan’s focus on transitioning from a resource-based to a manufacturing-based economy, particularly in agricultural processing and livestock.

The countries plan to open a joint museum to support bilateral initiatives in education, science, information, archaeology, and the history of nomads, reflecting their cultural ties.

“There is a historical and cultural connection between our countries. Now we are developing a construct related to Jochi [Khan, the eldest son of the Mongol Emperor Genghis Khan] in Kazakhstan. Mongolia’s national and cultural identity is also based on the legacy of Genghis Khan,” Amrebayev noted.

Kazakhstan and Mongolia are further strengthening their connections with plans for a new road route passing through Oskemen and Ridder in Kazakhstan and Tuyekta, Russia, with access to Mongolia’s border. The Kazakh section of the proposed route from Oskemen to the Russian border (189 kilometers in length) has already been built: specialists will carry out major and medium repairs on 62 kilometers of the road. This route will significantly improve transport links and reduce travel times, facilitating economic and cultural exchanges.

Amrebayev also emphasized the potential of the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route as a promising avenue for Mongolia to diversify its transport corridors, potentially reaching the European Union via Kazakhstan. He expects Tokayev’s visit to Mongolia will bring diverse and fruitful initiatives.

VICE President Sara Duterte welcomed Mongolian Deputy Prime Minister Sainbuyan Amarsaikhan at the Office of the Vice President in Mandaluyong City.

This visit coincided with the arrival of Amarsaikhan in the Philippines to participate in the 2024 Asia-Pacific Ministerial Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction.

This also coincided with the celebration of the 50th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the Philippines and Mongolia, a milestone that highlights the long-standing friendship and bilateral cooperation of the two countries.

In their meeting, they discussed disaster risk reduction, identifying the threats posed by climate change and natural disasters that could affect the Philippines and Mongolia.

They stressed the critical role of preparedness and collaboration in responding to significant threats to the security and well-being of the two countries.

The recent Mongolian regional, capital, soum and district council elections have further solidified the dominance of the Mongolian People’s Party (MPP) and the Democratic Party (DP). With 17,278 candidates across 10 parties, two coalitions, and a number of independents competing for 8,031 seats, the outcome has reaffirmed the stronghold these two parties maintain over Mongolian politics. MPP emerged as the victor in 14 provinces, while DP claimed seven, leaving little room for third-party influence, especially in the capital, where no third-party candidate won a seat.

A rare exception to this trend was the limited but symbolic representation of the HUN Party, which secured one seat each in Arkhangai, Selenge and Dornod provinces. While these wins indicate some level of third-party presence, they lack the numbers or concentration to influence policy direction in any significant way. At the soum and district levels, third-party parties similarly struggled to make inroads, with only isolated pockets of representation amid a sea of MPP and DP dominance. The Civil Movement Party (CMP) did manage a breakthrough, securing a majority in a single constituency, an uncommon and notable feat for a third party.

This entrenched two-party dominance raises questions about the viability of third parties in Mongolian politics. Structural factors, such as a lack of financial resources, limited access to media, and the entrenched networks of the major parties, create considerable barriers. For third parties to gain ground, they must navigate these obstacles while carving out a unique identity that resonates with the electorate. However, the persistence of third-party actors, however small their representation may currently be, suggests there is potential for alternative voices in the political landscape. In fact, the steady presence of the HUN Party and the rare success of CMP could signal latent demand for change. Yet, realizing this potential will require strategic organization and coalition-building among third parties, especially if they wish to present a viable alternative to MPP and DP duopoly. Without these steps, third parties may continue to function as marginal actors rather than influential stakeholders.

In short, while the current political landscape in Mongolia is largely polarized between MPP and DP, there is space for third-party involvement if these parties can effectively mobilize and distinguish themselves. The challenge lies in their capacity to create sustainable support bases, articulate distinct policies, and adapt to an environment that has historically favored established players.

CMP secures 23 mandates

In the recent local elections in Bayan-Agt soum of Bulgan Province, the political landscape took an unexpected turn, showcasing an intriguing shift in voter sentiment. The CMP, a relatively small third-party entity, won a majority with 12 out of 21 seats in the council, marking a rare victory for third-party influence at the local level in Mongolia. DP won three seats, MPP one, and five independent representatives were elected, creating a unique council composition that breaks from the longstanding dominance of MPP and DP.

This success is part of a broader wave for CMP, which secured 23 seats across multiple soums, making it the most successful third-party party in these local elections and marking the first time a third-party party has achieved a majority independently. The party now holds a presence in Bugat in Bulgan Province, Must in Khovd Province, Altanbulag in Selenge Province, Delger in Govi-Altai, Tsagaan-Ovoo in Bayankhongor and Yeruu in Selenge, symbolizing the public’s growing openness to alternatives outside the traditional two-party system.

CMP’s origins add depth to this story. The party was founded by political activists J.Batzandan and O.Magnai in 2007, who previously led the “Healthy Society-Citizen Movement.” Their grassroots activism drew attention to corruption and social justice issues, initially attracting widespread support. However, following the July 1, 2008, protests - during which the government accused them of inciting violence - the founders faced accusations of incitement, leading to detentions and eventual exile for some members. Despite these challenges, the party’s ability to secure significant seats reflects enduring public loyalty to its founding principles and a growing frustration with the status quo.

The results also hint at a subtle but significant undercurrent in Mongolian politics. Voter support for CMP and other independent representatives indicates a growing appetite for diversity and accountability, as citizens seek alternatives to the MPP-DP dominance. For many, the CMP’s anti-establishment roots and stance on corruption offer a compelling counter-narrative. Additionally, its recent showing, with 126 candidates in parliamentary elections, underscores its momentum and suggests that it could play a transformative role in Mongolia’s political future.

Third parties take 0.5% of total representation

Despite some isolated successes - such as CMP, Truth and Right Party, National Alliance, and Civil Courage Green Party collectively winning only 31 out of 6,922 soum council seats (0.4 percent) - third-party influence remains marginal. Urban districts saw a stronger presence of third-party candidates, as these groups strategically allocate resources where outreach efforts are more viable. Altogether, third-party parties captured 43 of the 8,031 seats available nationwide, representing just 0.5 percent of total seats.

A.Buddorj, a journalist affiliated with CMP, won a seat in Tsogttsetsii soum of Umnugovi Province, marking his shift from parliamentary candidacy to local governance. Additionally, the National Alliance secured three seats in Khulunbuir soum of Dornod Province, while the Civil Courage Green Party won four seats in Bayanchandmani soum of Tuv Province. Beyond these isolated victories, 86 independent candidates were also elected to soum councils.

Interestingly, the concentration of third-party candidates has been highest in urban areas, where they tend to focus their resources and efforts. In the recent elections, 15 third-party parties and two coalitions participated in the capital elections, with some success. For instance, the HUN Party won four seats in Baganuur District, and the National Alliance captured two seats in Bayangol District Council. The Khan-Uul District Council showed the most diversity in representation, with the United People’s Participation Party, led by former lawmaker Ts.Oyungerel, securing one seat, alongside single representatives from the HUN Party and the New United Coalition.

The factors limiting third-party influence in rural areas are multifaceted. Many third-party groups lack the manpower and financial resources needed to penetrate these vast regions effectively. Consequently, they prioritize more concentrated urban constituencies, where their messages can reach a larger audience with relatively lower resource expenditure. Nonetheless, with 43 total seats won at the provincial, soum, and district levels, third-party parties still represent only a fraction of the country’s political spectrum, with little ability to influence policy at any meaningful level.

Does the problem lie with the party leaders or the system?

In Mongolia’s political landscape, although 37 parties are officially registered with the Supreme Court, only MPP and DP have consistently held governmental power over the past 34 years. This two-party dominance is not only a product of historical precedent but also a result of organizational weaknesses among smaller parties, as well as strategic limitations in the political system itself.

Many smaller parties are built around individual leaders rather than sustained ideologies or comprehensive organizational structures. Such “one-man parties” have limited agendas that revolve around their leaders’ personal goals rather than broader, national policies. Examples include B.Jargalsaikhan’s National People’s Party and L.Gundalai’s People’s Power Party. Both parties have used elections and party structures primarily to advance their leaders’ political and personal interests, rather than aiming for long-term electoral viability. For instance, B.Jargalsaikhan gained a seat in Parliament in 2004 and leveraged his position to join a coalition government, eventually becoming Minister of Industry and Trade. L.Gundalai similarly secured an appointment as Minister of Health. Over time, these leaders moved between parties and even aligned with DP, reflecting a personal rather than ideological commitment. This “one-leader” phenomenon weakens the foundation of these smaller parties, limiting their appeal and preventing them from cultivating a broad, sustainable voter base.

A second category of smaller parties consists of those that appear primarily around election cycles, operating with a transactional approach to politics. These parties are sometimes perceived as working with the intention of splitting votes or entering deals that benefit the main parties, particularly MPP and DP. For instance, during the pandemic, A.Otgonbaatar, leader of the Truth and Right Party, gained public attention for his protest against the government’s handling of a sensitive health incident. This activism, while briefly successful in prompting government change, is seen by many as politically motivated rather than aligned with a consistent platform. Moreover, such parties sometimes form “alliances” with one of the two main parties during elections, diluting their own influence and failing to establish a distinct political identity. These tactics suggest that for many of these smaller parties, the goal is not long-term political transformation but short-term influence and potential benefits from affiliations with the main parties.

A third category consists of parties that participate regularly in elections but lack sufficient organizational structure, financial resources, and credible leadership to build significant support. The Freedom Party serves as an example of a party that has been present in elections yet has consistently failed to secure substantial votes or representation. The Civil Courage Green Party was once a notable third-party with parliamentary representation, but its influence waned after its leader, S.Oyun, left the party for other governmental roles. Its internal challenges have only deepened, with recent reports of division and criticisms about its leadership forming internal factions.

In an attempt to foster multi-party representation, Mongolia’s electoral system was reformed to a mixed representation model. This was intended to give smaller parties a greater opportunity to secure seats in Parliament. For example, in recent elections, the HUN Party won eight seats, while the National Alliance and CMP each won four seats, marking a modest step toward multi-party representation. However, these third-party victories have not translated into a powerful opposition or a cohesive third force in Parliament. In 2012, the Justice Alliance briefly formed a coalition with 11 seats, partnering with DP to form a government. Yet this coalition was short-lived and underscored the challenges smaller parties face in building long-term influence. Today, instead of forming a consolidated opposition, smaller parties often find themselves co-opted into government roles, such as the two ministers from the HUN Party in L.Oyun-Erdene’s administration. This tendency to align with the ruling parties limits the potential for true third-party opposition.

Voter interest in third-party options has gradually increased, as evident by the rising percentage of votes for smaller parties in recent elections. On average, MPP has garnered around 45 percent of the vote, while DP captures 35 to 40 percent, leaving 15 to 20 percent of the electorate favoring smaller parties or independents. This signals a clear public appetite for alternatives to MPP and DP. However, despite this growing demand, many smaller parties fail to capture sustained public trust due to inconsistent messaging, limited resources, and leadership fragmentation.