1 CHINA’S MONGOLIAN COAL IMPORTS UP 20% IN OCT, RUSSIAN IMPORTS SLIP 18% WWW.BRECORDER.COM  PUBLISHED:2025/11/21      2 S.KOREA-MONGOLIA JOINT COMMITTEE MEETING REAFFIRMS MINERAL COOPERATION WWW.KOREAPOST.COM PUBLISHED:2025/11/21      3 TEAM MONGOLIA FROM PHYSICAL ASIA: WHERE ARE THEY NOW? WWW.MOVIEDELIC.COM PUBLISHED:2025/11/21      4 N.UCHRAL: I’LL BE LENIENT WITH THE RIGHT, STRICT WITH THE WRONG WWW.GOGO.MN PUBLISHED:2025/11/20      5 MONGOLIAN BANKING SECTOR'S NET FOREIGN ASSETS DECLINE 16.1 PCT IN OCTOBER WWW.XINHUANET.COM PUBLISHED:2025/11/20      6 ON THE TALKS OF SECRETARY-GENERAL WITH THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF MONGOLIA WWW.ENG.SECTSCO.ORG PUBLISHED:2025/11/20      7 MONGOLIA UNIFIES TO COMBAT NEW THREATS TO SNOW LEOPARDS WWW.SNOWLEOPARD.ORG PUBLISHED:2025/11/20      8 AMERICAN-CANADIAN BILLIONAIRE OPENS $2-BILLION PLATINUM MINE IN SOUTH AFRICA WWW.AFRICA.BUSINESSINSIDER.COM PUBLISHED:2025/11/20      9 EDUCATION INFRASTRUCTURE: 12 SCHOOLS, 24 KINDERGARTENS SET FOR 2025 LAUNCH WWW.MONTSAME.MN PUBLISHED:2025/11/20      10 MONGOLIA JAPAN HOSPITAL INTRODUCES SELECTIVE LASER TRABECULOPLASTY SYSTEM WWW.AKIPRESS.COM PUBLISHED:2025/11/20      Н.УЧРАЛ: ХУУЛЬ ТОТООХ ДЭЭД БАЙГУУЛЛАГААС ХУЛГАЙН СЭЖИГТНҮҮД БИШ ХУУЛЬ ТӨРЖ БАЙХ ЁСТОЙ WWW.ITOIM.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/11/21     ТЭРБУМ МОД САНГИЙН ТӨСЛИЙН СОНГОН ШАЛГАРУУЛАЛТ ЗАРЛАГДЛАА WWW.BILLIONTREE.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/11/20     ОЙЖУУЛАЛТАД ХАМГИЙН ИХ ХӨРӨНГӨ ОРУУЛАЛТ ХИЙЖ БАЙГАА ХУВИЙН ХЭВШЛИЙН САНГААР ТЭРБУМ МОД САНГ НЭРЛЭЛЭЭ WWW.BILLIONTREE.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/11/20     МОНГОЛД ГАДНЫ БАНК НЭЭХ НЬ ХЭРЭГЛЭГЧДЭД ӨГӨӨЖТЭЙ Ч ДОТООДЫН БАНК САНХҮҮГИЙН САЛБАРТ ЭРСДЭЛТЭЙ WWW.EGUUR.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/11/20     ӨНГӨРСӨН САРД 11 УЛСЫН 240 ИРГЭНИЙГ АЛБАДАН ГАРГАЖЭЭ WWW.EGUUR.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/11/20     Х.НЯМБААТАР: ГАНДАН ОРЧМЫГ НОГООН БАЙГУУЛАМЖ БҮХИЙ ЖИШИГ ГУДАМЖ БОЛГОН ТОХИЖУУЛНА WWW.ITOIM.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/11/20     ОЮУ ТОЛГОЙ ТӨСЛИЙН ХУВЬ НИЙЛҮҮЛЭГЧДИЙН ЗЭЭЛИЙН ХҮҮГ БУУРУУЛАХ ХЭЛЭЛЦЭЭ ҮРГЭЛЖИЛЖ БАЙНА WWW.MONTSAME.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/11/20     УИХ-ЫН ДАРГААР Н.УЧРАЛ СОНГОГДЛОО WWW.ITOIM.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/11/20     "ЧИНГИС ХААН" ОДОН ХҮРТЭЖ БУЙ С.НАРАНГЭРЭЛ ГЭЖ ХЭН БЭ WWW.ITOIM.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/11/20     ОХУ-ЫН БАНК САЛБАРАА МОНГОЛД НЭЭХ ҮҮ? WWW.NEWS.MN НИЙТЭЛСЭН:2025/11/20    

Category

Events

Events

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MBCC “Doing Business with Mongolia seminar and Christmas Receptiom” Dec 10. 2024 London UK MBCCI London UK Goodman LLC

NEWS

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Bank of Mongolia Purchases 2,829 kg of Precious Metals in October www.montsame.mn

The Bank of Mongolia reported that 2,829 kilograms of precious metals were purchased in October 2025, marking a cumulative increase of 12.7 tonnes since the start of the year.
The Bank of Mongolia’s Darkhan-Uul aimag branch purchased 722.6 kilograms of precious metals in October, while the Bayankhongor aimag branch acquired 1,532.9 kilograms. Combined, this marks a 10.3 percent decline compared to the same period last year.
The Bank of Mongolia sets the domestic purchase prices for precious metals based on global market rates. In October 2025, the average price of gold stood at MNT 466,000 per gram.
Economists note that fluctuations in global gold prices, domestic mining output, and currency exchange rates have impacted the volume of gold purchased. Notably, 2020 recorded the highest annual gold acquisition in the past six years.
Gold acquisitions remain a key element of Mongolia’s strategy to strengthen its official foreign exchange reserves. The Bank of Mongolia sources gold from domestic mining companies, organizations, and individuals, then exports it to foreign institutions for refining to international standards and monetization – ultimately expanding the country’s foreign currency reserves.

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Singapore now has non-stop flights to Mongolia www.mainlymiles.com

There’s an interesting new addition to Changi Airport’s passenger route map from this week, with the launch of non-stop flights between Singapore and Ulaanbaatar, the capital city of Mongolia, gateway to the Gobi desert and popular hiking and horse trekking expeditions in this fascinating off-the-beaten-track country.
The new link has been launched by MIAT Mongolian Airlines, with twice weekly flights on the seven-and-a-half-hour stretch, initially using narrow-body Boeing 737-8 MAX aircraft but soon upgrading to wide-body service with the Boeing 767-300ER.
MIAT last served Singapore in 2014 with a twice-weekly one-stop Boeing 737-800 service to Ulaanbaatar via Beijing, though the route was short-lived and ended by mid-2015. The airline has therefore been missing from Changi’s departure boards for over a decade.
The schedule
During its first month, the route will be one of Singapore’s longest operated by a narrow-body aircraft, with MIAT deploying its 168-seat Boeing 737-8 MAX, after the inaugural service earlier this week, which was operated by a wide-body Boeing 767-300ER.
Singapore ↔ Ulaanbaatar
4th November 2025 – 29th November 2025
  Days
M T W T F S S
 OM1724
737-8 MAX^ 
SIN
19:25 UBN
02:55*
Duration: 07:30
 OM1723
737-8 MAX^ 
UBN
09:30 SIN
16:55
Duration: 07:25
^ 767-300ER on 4th November 2025, for the launch service
* Next day
From December 2025 onwards, the carrier’s sole 252-seat Boeing 767-300ER takes over the route.
Singapore ↔ Ulaanbaatar
From 2nd December 2025
  Days
M T W T F S S
 OM1724
767-300ER 
SIN
19:25 UBN
02:55*
Duration: 07:30
 OM1723
767-300ER 
UBN
09:30 SIN
16:55
Duration: 07:25
* Next day
Operating on Tuesdays and Saturdays, MIAT’s service departs Singapore in the evening, touching down in Ulaanbaatar just before 3am the following day (ouch!). The return leg is more civilised, a daytime flight leaving the Mongolian capital at 9.30am and arriving into Changi shortly before 5pm.
MIAT is using Terminal 4 at Changi Airport, which includes the Blossom Lounge for those departing in Business Class or holding a lounge access membership like Priority Pass or DragonPass.
Visiting Mongolia
Mongolia is certainly an off-the-beaten-track destination for more adventurous tourists, but the benefit of these non-stop MIAT flights is the ability to reach the country in just 7.5 hours, while the shortest indirect routings from Changi take at least 10 hours each way, with transit typically in Beijing, Hong Kong or Seoul.
Mongolia remains one of Asia’s least-travelled countries, with huge swathes of untouched landscapes, nomadic culture, and adventure tourism.
Singapore citizens don’t need a visa to travel to Mongolia, for trips of up to 30 days, with many other nationalities also benefiting from visa-free access, including:
Malaysia: 30 days
Hong Kong: 14 days
UK: 30 days
USA: 90 days
Australia: 30 days
New Zealand: 30 days
For a full up-to-date list, check this section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia website.
MIAT’s Boeing 767
Passenger Boeing 767s are a rarity in Singapore, most are freighters these days, and many of our readers would probably assume MIAT’s aircraft is therefore an ageing model.

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Petro Matad announces updates on Gazelle and Heron wells in Mongolia www.offshore-technology.com

Petro Matad has started production from the Gazelle-1 well in Mongolia at an initial rate of 200 barrels of oil per day (bopd), following testing and installation of surface facilities last month. 
This initial production rate was set after analysing pressure data from the well test to reduce the risk of early water breakthrough. 
Petro Matad said that it will closely monitor well performance to assess whether the production rate can be increased. 
The company is processing Gazelle-1 crude for export, with the first shipments delivered to the Block XIX TA-1 processing and export facility under its current oil sales agreement with PetroChina. 
Heron-2, another well operated by Petro Matad, is undergoing a retest. 
Temporary pumping facilities have recovered around one-third of the remaining injected fluid, which contains stimulation fluid and an increasing proportion of oil. 
However, the operation experienced a decline in flow, which may indicate a downhole issue or obstruction. 
The well was shut in to realign the beam pump but has since resumed pumping. 
If fluid recovery rates remain low, Petro Matad will shut the well in for the winter and consider further remediation options. 
Petro Matad’s Heron-1 well has produced a total of 59,920 barrels (bbl) of crude oil, with a daily average of 164bbl, since it started production in October last year. 
The water cut has remained around 3%, and current daily production is around 145bbl, consistent with typical performance in the region. 
Petro Matad has prepared the infrastructure to connect Heron-1 to the national electricity grid, with commissioning subject to regulatory approval. 
The company is working with the Mineral Resources and Petroleum Authority of Mongolia to expedite the process. 
It has received funds for oil delivered up to August 2025 under its agreement with PetroChina. 
The company is currently negotiating with PetroChina to finalise the revised sales agreement and confirm a payment schedule for previously withheld amounts. 
Petro Matad CEO Mike Buck said: “Our operations team has worked hard to get the Gazelle-1 well ready for production in short order. We will closely monitor well performance to maximise production balanced with prudent reservoir management. 
“We are very pleased to be able to increase production and revenue generation so quickly after the successful Gazelle-1 well test and to add this to the consistent performance of Heron-1. Meanwhile, Heron-2 continues to present challenges. 
“We still hope to get an oil rate out of the well this year or, at the very least, enough information to allow us to prepare for another operationally appropriate attempt to do so after this winter’s operational shutdown. 
“PetroChina has been slow to respond on the rewording of the oil sales agreement but progress is being made.”

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Mongolia Shines at WTM 2025 in London, Unveiling Its Rich Culture and Sustainable Travel to a Global Audience www.travelandtourworld.com

At WTM 2025 in London, Mongolia is captivating global audiences by showcasing its unique cultural heritage and commitment to sustainable tourism. With its vast landscapes, nomadic traditions, and UNESCO World Heritage Sites, Mongolia offers an unparalleled travel experience that combines adventure with cultural immersion. Through its “Go Mongolia” campaign, the country aims to position itself as a top destination for responsible travelers seeking authentic experiences. By highlighting its efforts to preserve the environment while promoting local traditions, Mongolia is not only attracting attention but also solidifying its place as a key player in the future of sustainable global tourism.
Among the many countries showcasing their tourism offerings at WTM 2025, Mongolia is returning for the second consecutive year. This year, Mongolia is represented by the Ministry of Culture, Sports, Tourism, and Youth, along with the Embassy of Mongolia in the United Kingdom, the Mongolian Tourism Association, and ten local tour operators. The nation’s aim is clear: to increase its visibility in the global tourism market, attract a diverse audience of travelers, and position itself as a unique and sustainable destination for those seeking something extraordinary.
At the heart of Mongolia’s participation is its tourism campaign, “Go Mongolia.” This national initiative seeks to highlight the country’s rich cultural heritage and stunning natural landscapes. Mongolia is home to vast steppes, ancient historical sites, and a nomadic lifestyle that draws visitors from around the world looking for adventure and authentic experiences. The “Go Mongolia” brand emphasizes the country’s ability to offer both breathtaking landscapes and rich cultural experiences, presenting it as an ideal destination for those who want to explore the deep traditions and wild beauty of Central Asia.
The theme of WTM 2025, “Redefining Travel in a Changing World,” reflects the evolving nature of the global tourism industry. The pandemic reshaped travel patterns and expectations, making sustainability, innovation, and technology key areas of focus. This year’s exhibition is centered around how the industry can adapt to these changes, with a strong focus on sustainable practices, digital advancements, and collaborative efforts between countries and industry stakeholders.
The growth of WTM in recent years highlights the increasing interest in tourism innovation. In 2024, the event saw a 7% increase in attendance from the previous year, with over 43,700 tourism professionals and 3,875 organizations from 184 countries participating. This rise in participation underscores the significance of the exhibition as a global meeting point for tourism professionals and emphasizes the growing importance of innovation in the industry.
For Mongolia, WTM 2025 provides a valuable opportunity to reach a wider audience, forge new partnerships, and promote its diverse tourism offerings. The country’s tourism sector has immense potential, and the government, alongside the private sector, is working diligently to enhance Mongolia’s appeal to international travelers. With UNESCO World Heritage Sites like the Orkhon Valley Cultural Landscape, the country offers a variety of experiences that span from cultural heritage to outdoor adventures. Visitors can explore its vast deserts, mountainous regions, and pristine valleys while immersing themselves in Mongolia’s unique traditions, including the famous Naadam Festival, which celebrates the country’s ancient history.

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Mongolian doctors and health staff announce strike from November 13 www.thestar.com.my

Doctors and other health workers held a press conference Wednesday evening (Nov 5) and formally announced they will go on strike starting Thursday, November 13.
The executive council of the Mongolian Healthcare Workers’ Union met in an extraordinary session and decided to initiate a collective labour dispute under Article 25, Clause 1.2 of the Labour Law and to declare a strike, after their demand for a basic salary of MNT 3.5 million (US$978) remained unresolved.
The executive council will attach its meeting resolution and submit an official notice to the Ministry of Health Thursday (November 5). Under the law, the strike will begin five working days after the notification is delivered, which places the start date on November 13. - Go Go Mongolia/ANN

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ADB to Support Mongolia’s Disaster Preparedness Through Innovation and Technology www.adb.org

The Asian Development Bank (ADB) has approved a $32 million financing package to help the Government of Mongolia strengthen disaster preparedness by modernizing the country’s disaster early warning system.
The financing comprises an $18 million loan from ADB’s concessional ordinary capital resources, $12 million loan from ordinary capital resources, and a $2 million grant from the ADB administered Asian Development Fund (ADF). The project will enhance Mongolia’s capacity to respond to major hazards such as floods, storms, wildfires, earthquakes, and dzud—a severe winter condition that can cause mass livestock deaths.
“Around 40% of rural Mongolians live in poverty, many of whom depend on traditional herding, which is highly vulnerable to extreme weather and disasters,” said ADB Country Director for Mongolia Shannon Cowlin. “Climate-related and geophysical disasters pose serious socioeconomic and health challenges for these communities, especially for women. This project will modernize and integrate Mongolia’s disaster early warning systems, improve how risk information is shared, and strengthen preparedness capacity—benefiting the entire population.”
Mongolia is among the world’s most disaster-prone countries. From 2015 to 2024, the country recorded over 40,000 hazardous events, including 1,220 severe weather incidents, resulting in 726 deaths, 2,014 injuries, and the loss of over 11.5 million livestock. Located in a seismically active zone, Mongolia also experienced 73 earthquakes with a magnitude of 3.5 or higher in 2024 alone. These disasters have caused direct financial losses estimated at MNT1.9 trillion, placing a heavy burden on both the government and affected communities.
Climate risks are worsening as hazards intensify faster than the pace of the country’s current early warning systems. Mongolia lacks an integrated multi-hazard early warning system, leading to fragmented coverage and coordination gaps and overlaps. Alerts are limited to certain hazards and locations, such as earthquake warnings in and around Ulaanbaatar. This leaves many, particularly remote herding communities, without timely warnings.
The Strengthening Integrated Early Warning System in Mongolia Project will use digital technologies to improve hazard monitoring, early warning dissemination, and public awareness nationwide. It will upgrade emergency dispatch centers for two-way disaster communication, introduce cell broadcast alerts across mobile networks, enhance emergency broadcasts, expand siren towers, and deploy mobile communication units to remote areas.
The project will also establish a disaster risk monitoring system that addresses the different needs of men and women, upgrade seismic monitoring equipment around Ulaanbaatar, and conduct training for national and local emergency staff. It will mobilize volunteer groups in 21 provinces and develop harmonized national and local disaster procedures.
The initiative supports Mongolia’s National Adaptation Plan to Climate Change (2024–2030), the Disaster Protection Law (2003, amended in 2020), and the “Vision-2050” Long-Term Development Policy, all of which identify disaster risk management and resilience as key national priorities.
ADF provides grants to the poorest and most vulnerable countries in Asia and the Pacific. During its 2021–2024 period, the fund helped 384,000 people emerge from poverty and generated around 500,000 jobs.
ADB is a leading multilateral development bank supporting inclusive, resilient, and sustainable growth across Asia and the Pacific. Working with its members and partners to solve complex challenges together, ADB harnesses innovative financial tools and strategic partnerships to transform lives, build quality infrastructure, and safeguard our planet. Founded in 1966, ADB is owned by 69 members—50 from the region.

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Minister G.Damdinnyam: “We Have Firmly Demanded That Rio Tinto End the Management Contract Based on the “Expired” Dubai Agreement” www.arctusanalytics.com

Mongolia and Rio Tinto have begun negotiations to amend the Oyu Tolgoi Investment Agreement, focusing on lowering shareholder loan interest rates, revising management fees, and improving corporate governance. The talks are co-chaired by Finance Minister B.Javkhlan and Industry and Minerals Minister G.Damdinnyam, with the goal of achieving a fairer and more transparent arrangement for Mongolia.
In an interview with journalist U.Orgilmaa, Minister G.Damdinnyam discusses Mongolia’s priorities in the ongoing Oyu Tolgoi negotiations, including loan-interest reductions, management-fee reform, and the call for greater transparency and board oversight.
The negotiations have temporarily paused. How would you assess progress so far?
G.Damdinnyam: Naturally, the fact that we are negotiating means there are unresolved issues. Both sides have stated their positions and are continuing discussions in a constructive and respectful manner. There have been moments of tough exchange, which is normal, but overall, the talks have begun on a productive footing.
What outcomes is the Mongolian side aiming for?
Our first objective is to reduce the interest rate on the shareholder loan. Mongolia today faces far lower financial risk than it did 15 years ago. The country’s credit standing has improved: international rating agencies have assigned us BB- with a Stable outlook, our government bonds are traded internationally, and we are seen as a credible borrower. Second, the underground mine construction is essentially complete, which means project risk has declined significantly. Therefore, the interest rate must reflect current market and risk conditions. Third, governance improvements are urgently needed, as recent events have clearly demonstrated shortcomings in transparency and oversight.
Do you have a specific target for the new interest rate?
The negotiations are ongoing, so it would be premature to mention an exact figure at this stage. What matters is that both sides have recognized the need to align loan terms with current market realities and Mongolia’s improved credit standing.
You also mentioned management fees. What issues are being raised there?
Managing a complex underground mine certainly requires expertise, skill, and experience. We recognize that such expertise deserves compensation. However, according to international practice, management fees should be performance-based. Currently, Mongolia pays 34 percent and Rio Tinto 66 percent of total management costs. Our question is why these costs are so high and why we must pay above the global benchmark. Independent reviews have already found evidence of cost duplication. Rio Tinto’s corporate overheads are charged to the project, and an additional fee is applied for project management itself. We believe this is unjustified. Fees should reflect actual efficiency and cost reduction, not simply scale with expenses. The higher the cost base, the more we end up paying. That is not acceptable and cannot continue under fair-dealing principles.
So, management cost discussions include several sub-issues?
Exactly. Rio Tinto currently calculates its fee as a percentage of costs. We are asking for that to be revised in line with international standards. Excessive charges must end. In addition, governance reform is critical. Oyu Tolgoi’s board has no independent members, and Mongolia’s representatives are not given full access to operational information. We have even discussed the possible use of the “golden share” mechanism to suspend implementation if needed. Governance must become open and transparent so that both partners share responsibility equally. Only with such reform can we reduce costs, lower loan interest, and bring forward the time when Mongolia begins to receive dividends.
Have the negotiations produced any tangible results so far?
Yes, some progress has been made. The shareholder agreement currently stipulates that the loan interest rate may be reviewed only once every seven years. No one can explain why “seven years” was chosen or on what basis. Both sides now agree in principle to revise this clause. The last opportunity to adjust the rate was seven years ago, but it passed without any change. At present, the government’s working group has initiated discussions to remove this limitation entirely so that interest rates can be reviewed as needed, not just once every seven years.
Some politicians claim the government is acting too slowly before the current seven-year window closes on January 31, 2026. Does this deadline still apply?
No, that date is no longer a barrier. The agreement to start negotiations effectively nullified it. We have secured Rio Tinto’s consent to continue talks until the matter is fully resolved, without being constrained by the previous “lock-in” date. Let me be clear: the government and its ministers are committed to defending the national interest. Since the day I took office, our team has been working continuously, backed by strong technical experts. Our goal is to finalize an agreement that brings concrete benefits to Mongolia, and we will continue negotiations until that goal is achieved.
Which topic has been the most contentious so far?
The management-fee issue. Rio Tinto initially refused to accept our proposal, so we temporarily suspended the negotiations and made it clear that the talks could not continue unless this matter was included. We cannot leave such a major issue unresolved. The government’s mandate to our working group is clear: no concession that undermines Mongolia’s interest can be made. After our position was reiterated, Rio Tinto agreed to reopen discussions on management fees. Talks have since resumed.
Parallel to the talks, corruption probes have emerged involving Oyu Tolgoi’s procurement department, with large sums reportedly seized. Has this affected the atmosphere of negotiations?
I cannot speak for what information the other side had, but from our perspective, we emphasized the need to improve governance and transparency. Oyu Tolgoi is a joint venture, so mismanagement harms both parties. We told Rio Tinto directly: “Either we fix this together as partners, or such a situation cannot continue.”
Some of these issues have been raised under previous governments as well. What makes this round different?
The management-fee issue again stands out. This fee structure originates from the now-defunct Dubai Agreement, which Parliament has already declared invalid. The question is simple: why is a management contract based on an annulled agreement still in effect? It must end. We are working to stop this arrangement entirely and to ensure that all related matters are properly resolved through negotiation. On this, our position is firm.
Did Rio Tinto refer to any prior commitments made with earlier governments?
I cannot disclose details of the internal negotiation process. What I can say is that we are acting strictly within the mandate to protect Mongolia’s long-term interests. We do not engage in emotional politics; we rely on knowledge, evidence, and professional diligence. Our team is composed of capable young professionals who are dedicated to their country’s future. By the end of this month, Rio Tinto will deliver its written response to our proposals, after which we will consolidate and finalize the draft agreement.
Translated and edited by Arctus Analytics. The views expressed are those of the interviewee and do not necessarily reflect the position of Arctus Analytics.
Ulaanbaatar, October 2025
Interview by U.Orgilmaa

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Mongolia’s Defector Dilemma: Navigating the Korea Divide www.thediplomat.com

In the intricate geopolitical web of Northeast Asia, Mongolia has long clung to its identity as a “neutral bridge,” leveraging its “Third Neighbor Policy” to carve out autonomy amid the overlapping influence of China and Russia. What began in the 1990s as an expedient to reduce economic dependence on Beijing and Moscow has evolved into a values-based diplomatic stance, earning Ulaanbaatar credibility as a nonaligned mediator. 
Yet between 2024 and 2025, three converging crises shattered this delicate balance: the collapse of the soft power narrative embodied by the Mongolia-South Korea co-produced film ”On the Way to the South,” the exposure of a South Korean spy scandal, and a diplomatic crisis sparked by the defection of a North Korean interpreter. 
Together, these incidents laid bare a sharp contradiction at the heart of Mongolia’s neutrality: how to reconcile humanitarian idealism with economic pragmatism, and how to safeguard national sovereignty while appeasing both Seoul and Pyongyang. Coming in 2025 – the 35th anniversary of Mongolia-South Korea diplomatic ties – and on the heels of Ulaanbaatar’s renewed engagement with Pyongyang in 2024, the crisis has become a defining test of Mongolia’s diplomatic maturity.
Soft Power Ambitions Collide with Sovereign Compromises
Premiering in Ulaanbaatar in September 2024 and Seoul in April 2025, ”On the Way to the South” was intended to consolidate both countries’ soft power. Co-directed by South Korea’s Sangrae Kim and Mongolia’s Battulga Suvid, the film eschewed political grandstanding for a human-centric narrative: a North Korean mother fleeing border patrols with her child, a Mongolian border guard torn between duty and compassion, and a defector grappling with separation trauma. Starring prominent Mongolian actors Sarantuya Sambuu, Erkhembayar Ganbold, Samdanpurev Oyunsambuu, and Zamilan Bold-Erdene alongside South Korean stars Park Kwang-hyun, Oh Su-jung, and Choi Jun-yong, the film deliberately framed Mongolia as a “moral mediator” – rejecting Seoul’s hardline stance toward Pyongyang while disavowing North Korea’s isolationist policies.
The film’s release was meticulously timed to coincide with the 2025 bilateral anniversary, aiming to enhance Mongolia’s voice in Korean Peninsula mediation while aligning with South Korea’s “New Northern Policy,” which positions Mongolia as a Eurasian resource hub. Domestically, it stoked national pride in a small nation contributing to regional stability; internationally, it successfully rebranded the Third Neighbor Policy from a mere economic diversification strategy to a diplomatic framework rooted in humanitarian values. This narrative resonated because Mongolia remains one of the few countries to maintain stable long-term relations with both Koreas since the Cold War.
Yet this idealistic vision crumbled within months amid an espionage scandal. 
In late 2024, Mongolian authorities arrested two officers from South Korea’s Defense Intelligence Command (KDIC) – a lieutenant colonel and a major – accusing them of recruiting Mongolian intermediaries to infiltrate North Korea’s embassy in Ulaanbaatar. The act violated the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, constituting a direct infringement of Mongolia’s sovereignty.
Ulaanbaatar initially issued a stern condemnation, calling the incident a “serious breach of trust,” but reversed course after KDIC Director Moon Sang-ho personally traveled to Ulaanbaatar to apologize. Mongolia dropped the charges and released the officers. This compromise stemmed from Mongolia’s deep economic reliance on South Korea, yet it exposed diplomatic double standards: Ulaanbaatar was simultaneously deepening friendly engagement with Pyongyang, eroding its neutral image. 
More alarmingly, an investigation by South Korean Special Prosecutor Cho Eun-seok revealed potential links between the spy operation in Mongolia and former President Yoon Suk-yeol’s declaration of martial law less than two weeks later. The probe found the KDIC’s actions were a deliberate attempt to fabricate a security crisis over North Korean threats, providing a pretext for Yoon to suspend civil liberties and dissolve parliament in an authoritarian power grab. 
Notes from former KDIC Director Noh Sang-won – now on trial for treason – detailed plans to “launch provocative attacks along the Northern Limit Line (NLL).” Lee Seung-ho, the former operational chief of South Korea’s Joint Chiefs of Staff, confirmed the former defense minister had ordered drones to infiltrate North Korean territory. Internal KDIC memos also referenced using “abandoned balloons” equipped with propaganda or incendiary devices to provoke a North Korean response. Mongolia’s territory had unwittingly become a stage for this political conspiracy, violating both its sovereign principles and cherished neutrality.
The Defector Crisis
In August 2025, the defection of an interpreter during a high-level North Korean academic delegation’s visit to Mongolia worsened the country’s diplomatic predicament. Led by Tae Hyung-chul, president of the Academy of Social Sciences, the delegation marked Pyongyang’s first senior academic mission to Mongolia in seven years. Tae and his group were tasked with promoting the narrative that “Seoul has abandoned reunification.” Chaos erupted during the visit, however, when an accompanying interpreter sought asylum at South Korea’s embassy in Ulaanbaatar. According to Japan’s Kyodo News, Pyongyang responded with an unprecedented retaliation: recalling its ambassador to Mongolia – the first such move since 1999 – ending Oh Seung Ho’s eight-year tenure.
This retaliation stood in stark contrast to the warming of Mongolia-North Korea relations in 2024. That year, Mongolia became the first country besides China and Russia to increase embassy staff in Pyongyang following the COVID-19 pandemic. In January, Mongolian Ambassador Luvsantseren Erdenedavaa presented his credentials to Choe Ryong Hae, chairman of the Presidium of North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly, with both sides commemorating the 75th anniversary of diplomatic ties and the 35th anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s visit to Mongolia. 
In March 2024, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Park Myong Ho led a delegation to Mongolia – the first from Pyongyang’s Foreign Ministry (Ulaanbaatar has repeatedly invited Choe Son-hui, North Korea’s female Foreign Minister, to visit Mongolia. However, in recent years, she has visited Moscow and Beijing more frequently) to Ulaanbaatar since the pandemic. These interactions reflected Pyongyang’s recognition of Mongolia’s decision to keep its embassy open during the pandemic and trust in its neutral stance. 
On July 31, 2025,  Chairman of the State Great Khural, Amarbayasgalan Dashzegve held another official meeting with Chairman of the Supreme People’s Assembly of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Pak In Chol. The Mongolian side emphasized its commitment to further strengthening long-term friendly cooperation based on the profound traditional friendship between the two countries, prioritizing the common interests of their peoples, and supporting regional peace and prosperity. The North Korean side expressed gratitude for the enthusiastic and friendly exchanges on bilateral relations and reaffirmed its commitment to close collaboration to advance stable and long-term cooperation between the two countries. The two sides also exchanged views on enhancing inter-parliamentary cooperation.
The interpreter’s defection shattered this trust, with North Korea issuing a stern warning: it would not tolerate Mongolia becoming a “transit hub for defectors” or a “platform for South Korean conspiracies.”
Faced with the crisis, Mongolia adopted a “strategic silence,” neither confirming nor denying the defection. Despite international accusations of “hypocrisy,” the choice was a pragmatic one for a small nation: prioritizing avoidance of direct confrontation with Pyongyang and long-term regional stability over short-term moral grandstanding. Still, the cost of silence was significant: it disconnected Mongolia’s actions from the humanitarian narrative of ”On the Way to the South,” seriously undermining its credibility as a “neutral mediator.” More importantly, the incident thrust Mongolia’s long-concealed role as a secret transit country for North Korean defectors into the geopolitical spotlight.
Mongolia-North Korea relations have long been guided by pragmatism. The two countries established diplomatic ties in 1948, with Mongolia among the first to recognize Pyongyang. Even after Mongolia’s democratic transition in 1990, bilateral relations endured. In 1999, North Korea closed its embassy in Ulaanbaatar citing “financial difficulties” – a de facto protest against Mongolia’s growing closeness to South Korea. Ulaanbaatar subsequently took initiative to repair relations by facilitating a visit by North Korean Foreign Minister Paek Nam Sun in 2002 to sign a new Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and enabling the re-opening of Pyongyang’s embassy in 2004. 
Between 2004 and 2019, Ulaanbaatar hosted up to 5,000 North Korean workers and provided food aid during times of famine. This low-key engagement maintained crucial communication channels, laying the groundwork for Mongolia’s mediatory ambitions. The 2025 defection crisis squandered decades of accumulated trust, leaving Mongolia’s North Korea policy mired in reactive crisis management.
Economic Dependence: The Shackles of South Korean Influence
Mongolia’s series of compromises in 2024-2025 stemmed from severe economic vulnerability. Over 80 percent of its trade relies on China and Russia, making its economic lifeline vulnerable to fluctuations in their economies and policy shifts. The Third Neighbor Policy is essentially a survival strategy to mitigate this risk. By 2025, South Korea had emerged as the policy’s core pillar: Seoul’s semiconductor and electric vehicle industries create a strong demand for Mongolia’s silver, molybdenum, coal, copper, and rare earths (critical minerals), forging a deeply complementary economic bond built on earlier energy and infrastructure cooperation.
Economic data from 2025 underscored the urgency of this dependence. Amid a slowdown in China’s economy, Mongolia’s exports to China fell by 9.4 percent in the first three quarters, with coal revenues plummeting by 41 percent. While South Korea sought to fill the resulting gap, the actual data indicates that the outcome was less favorable for Mongolia: according to South Korean statistics, bilateral trade volume exceeded US$550 million in the first three quarters of 2025. Notably, although total trade volume rose by 19 percent, this growth was driven by 21.2 percent increase in South Korea’s exports to Mongolia, whereas South Korea’s imports from Mongolia declined by 16.3 percent. Seoul pledged to establish a “Mongolia-South Korea Rare Earth Cooperation Center” in November 2025 to promote joint exploration and smart mining. The ongoing negotiation of an Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) promises not only immediate economic relief but also critical technology for Mongolia’s sustainable development. This economic allure has gradually translated into significant South Korean diplomatic influence.
Amid these diplomatic and economic crosscurrents, high-level parliamentary diplomacy emerged as a critical tool for Mongolia to navigate the Korea divide. 
In April 2025, even as South Korea descended into domestic turmoil – with former President Yoon facing impeachment over his 2024 emergency decree – National Assembly Speaker Woo Won-sik led a delegation to Mongolia. His framing of Mongolia as a “core partner for regional stability”” implied a quid pro quo: economic support contingent on Ulaanbaatar aligning with Seoul on the Korean Peninsula.
After three months, on July 30, 2025, Chairman of the State Great Khural of Mongolia Amarbayasgalan Dashzegve held an official meeting with Speaker of the Republic of Korea National Assembly Woo Won-sik. Notably, this meeting came just one day before Amarbayasgalan would hold a similar meeting with North Korea’s Pak In Chol.
Expressing pleasure at the follow-up meeting after Woo’s April 2025 visit to Mongolia, Amarbayasgalan emphasized South Korea’s importance as a key “Third Neighbor,” a Northeast Asian cooperation partner, and a shared advocate of democratic values. He put forward three core demands: resolving obstacles in the construction of central heating plants in 10 Mongolian provinces funded by South Korean concessional loans and overseeing the selection of new contractors; facilitating mutual people-to-people exchanges (including relaxing conditions for Mongolian citizens’ humanitarian travel to South Korea and addressing the issue of Mongolian citizens being repatriated at South Korean borders).
In response, Woo pledged to promptly resume and advance the 10-province heating plant project, and stated that South Korea was exploring measures to facilitate Mongolian citizens’ travel, including introducing electronic visas, increasing consular staff at embassies, and simplifying visa procedures for group travel. The two sides also exchanged views on topics from previous official visits and reached a consensus to promote practical economic cooperation between the two countries.
Following South Korea’s June presidential election, new President Lee Jae-myung tightened this linkage further. In a September call with Mongolian President Ukhnaa Khurelsukh, Lee proposed “accelerating EPA negotiations” and “promoting visa-free entry for Mongolian citizens” – one of Ulaanbaatar’s key demands, given that approximately 50,000 Mongolians work or study in South Korea, half of them illegally – in exchange for Mongolia’s support on the Korean Peninsula. 
South Korean Prime Minister Kim Min-seok later explicitly tied rare earth cooperation to regional tensions, urging Mongolia to “support our efforts to address regional instability.” Mongolian Deputy Prime Minister Nyam-Osor Uchral’s response was telling: he pledged to deepen critical minerals cooperation but avoided any mention of “neutrality,” exposing the diplomatic compromises behind economic dependence.
Essentially, Mongolia was betting that Pyongyang would not sever ties because it needed ally support on the eve of the 80th anniversary of the Workers’ Party of Korea. This compromise thus achieved short-term risk management while securing economic rewards from Seoul – yet it carries significant long-term risks. Over-reliance on South Korea could distort the Third Neighbor Policy from diversification to dependence, ultimately eroding Mongolia’s diplomatic autonomy. 
The key to Mongolia’s escape from this dilemma lies in accelerating cooperation with other “third neighbors” such as the United States, Japan, and the European Union, ensuring economic pragmatism truly serves sovereignty rather than reducing Mongolia to a great power vassal.
A Path Forward: Toward Principled Pragmatism
To address internal and external challenges, Mongolia urgently needs to upgrade its strategic thinking – shifting from passive compromise to principled pragmatism, anchoring its foreign policy in sovereignty and core values to build a flexible, sustainable framework. This transformation must proceed in parallel in relations with both South and North Korea, while strengthening domestic institutional capacity.
Mongolia must convert its resource advantages into substantive diplomatic leverage. In EPA negotiations, it should clarify two non-negotiable core demands: first, that South Korea sign a binding agreement prohibiting all intelligence activities on Mongolian territory, repairing the trust deficit caused by the KDIC spy scandal; second, that the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) take the lead in a defector processing mechanism, balancing humanitarian principles with sovereign security. Economically, Mongolia needs to move beyond the low-value-added “raw material exporter” model, promoting value-added cooperation in rare earth processing and smart manufacturing to nurture domestic industries. Reducing dependence on a single market and resource exports will reshape Mongolia from a resource supplier to an industrial partner – aligning with Seoul’s supply chain security interests while granting Ulaanbaatar economic initiative.
Restoring trust with Pyongyang requires a shift from reactive to proactive diplomacy. First, Ulaanbaatar should use backchannel communications to address the interpreter defection candidly, reaffirming the principle of “non-interference in internal affairs,” echoing Ambassador Erdenedavaa’s 2024 commitment to “traditional friendly cooperation,” and clarifying that Mongolia will not become a tool to confront North Korea. Second, it should restart low-sensitivity cooperation projects – cultural exchanges, agricultural aid, and public health collaboration – avoiding contentious Korean Peninsula issues and repairing official trust through people-to-people interactions. Third, it should revive the “Ulaanbaatar Regional Forum on Denuclearization and Reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula,” proposed by Mongolia’s Foreign Ministry, positioning it as a nonconfrontational technical dialogue platform (focused on issues such as family reunions) to reactivate inter-Korean communication channels and revitalize its “bridge” value. Meanwhile, Mongolia can maintain its goodwill gesture of “not joining sanctions against North Korea” – a key bond in bilateral relations.
The fundamental solution to the defector dilemma lies in establishing an institutionalized response mechanism. Supported by the UNHCR, this framework should include three core elements: clear asylum application criteria, strict confidential processing procedures, and third-country resettlement options. Such a system would safeguard the humanitarian rights of vulnerable groups while preventing individual incidents from escalating into diplomatic crises, translating the “humanitarian intermediary” vision of ”On the Way to the South” into actionable policy – and freeing Mongolia from the cycle of “passive response.”
Conclusion
Mongolia’s most valuable strategic asset is not its abundant mineral resources, but the trust recognized – or tolerated – by all stakeholders in the region, particularly Central Asia or the Korean Peninsula. This trust, forged over decades of balancing Seoul’s economic allure with Pyongyang’s demand for respect, represents the wisdom of transforming geographical vulnerability into diplomatic flexibility. Squandering this trust for short-term economic benefits or temporary appeasement of Pyongyang would inflict irreversible damage on Ulaanbaatar’s regional standing.
For a nation that has turned vulnerability into flexibility for centuries, the current crisis is both a challenge and an opportunity for transformation. Mongolia must uphold principled pragmatism, maintaining a precise balance amid inter-Korean competition – avoiding becoming a tool of either side while refusing to abandon its core commitments to humanitarianism and sovereign dignity. Only then can its “neutral bridge” identity take root – safeguarding its own sovereignty, security, and development interests while contributing unique value to Northeast Asian stability, and establishing a model for medium, small-state diplomacy in an era of great power competition.
BY By Sumiya Chuluunbaatar

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Air India to fly relief aircraft to Mongolia to bring back 228 stranded passengers www.indiatoday.com

Air India will operate a special relief flight on Tuesday to bring back 228 passengers stranded in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, after their San Francisco–Delhi flight was diverted on Monday due to a suspected technical issue.
The airline said the Boeing 787 Dreamliner, operating as flight AI183, will depart from Delhi on Tuesday afternoon and return with the affected passengers on Wednesday morning.
Flight AI174, a Boeing 777 operating from San Francisco to Delhi via Kolkata, made a precautionary landing in the Mongolian capital after pilots reported a possible technical issue mid-air. The aircraft, carrying 245 people — including 228 passengers and 17 crew members — landed safely.
“Air India will be operating a relief flight to ferry the passengers of flight AI174 (San Francisco–Delhi of November 2), which was diverted to Ulaanbaatar on Monday. The ferry flight AI183 is scheduled to depart Delhi this afternoon and return with the affected passengers on Wednesday morning,” the airline said in a statement.
The carrier added that it has been coordinating with local authorities and the Indian Embassy in Mongolia to assist passengers and crew, providing hotel accommodation, meals, and regular updates.
“At Air India, the safety and wellbeing of our passengers and crew remain our top priority,” an airline spokesperson said.
The diverted Boeing 777 is currently undergoing technical checks in Ulaanbaatar and will return to India once cleared by engineers.
This marks the third instance in recent years of an Air India San Francisco–Delhi flight diverting mid-air due to technical reasons. In 2023, a similar flight made an emergency landing in Magadan, Russia, and another diversion occurred in 2024 to Krasnoyarsk, Siberia. In both cases, passengers were later flown home on alternate aircraft.

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Construction of oil pipeline nears completion in Mongolia www.akipress.com

43 months ago, a government resolution was issued regarding the construction of Mongolia's first large-scale oil pipeline.
The plan was to build a 530-kilometer pipeline from the Tamsag Basin in Matad and Khalkhgol districts of Dornod province to Dornogovi province, with a budget of $388 million.
The Chinese state-owned company Norinco International Cooperation was selected as the general contractor and began work in June 2022. The company was awarded a contract to build the pipeline over a three-year term, until the commissioning of Mongolia's first oil refinery. The cost of the pipeline alone is $380 million. The country will pay this amount entirely in coal.
The government is working on the project, but the construction of the pipeline has not yet been completed.
"The work is being finalized. The reason for the delay in the pipeline construction work is COVID-19 and the delay in approving additional financing," Minister of Industry and Mineral Resources Damdinyam Gongor stated.
"The construction of the first oil refinery (NPP) is in progress. Just four months ago, the project was over 20% complete, and today it has reached more than 50%. When the plant will be completed, it will produce 1.5 million tons of petroleum products per year, and Mongolia will be able to cover 50–100% of its domestic fuel needs. 1,500 new jobs will be created," he said.

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